INTERVIEW || Two experts say they do not believe the Israeli military is prepared for the largescale urban fighting they are likely to face in Gaza.
Editor’s Note: Peter Bergen is a national security analyst at CNN, vice president of New America, professor at Arizona State University, and host of the podcast “In the Room With Peter Bergen.” The opinions expressed in this comment are your own.
It will be long, bloody and complicated. That’s how two leading urban warfare experts described the prospect of an Israeli ground attack on the Hamas base in the streets and tunnels of Gaza.
Colonel (retired) Liam Collins and Major (retired) John Spencer from the USA are coauthors of the book “Understanding Urban Warfare” [à letra, “Compreender a Guerra Urbana”].
Collins is executive director of the Madison Policy Forum, a senior fellow at New America, and an officer in the U.S. Army Special Forces. He served for 27 years and was deployed multiple times to Afghanistan and Iraq. Spencer is director of urban warfare studies at the Institute of Modern Warfare at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He served as an infantryman for 25 years, including two combat tours in Iraq.
The two experts gave a sobering assessment of Israel’s capabilities, saying they did not believe the Israeli military was prepared for the largescale urban fighting it would likely face in Gaza. This type of operation can take many months because an advanced army like the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) loses many of its advantages when fighting in a city.
Experts say Israel retains some advantages, such as specially designed armored bulldozers that can be used in urban combat and the ability to fight at night, but this must be balanced against the lack of experience and training in urban combat. At the same time, Hamas has more than 200 hostages, human shields, suicide bombers, tunnels, traps and many civilians who remain trapped, and has had years to entrench itself.
If the Israeli invasion continues, they estimate that the IDF will destroy “80 to 90” percent of Gaza’s urban areas and that the operation will “change the landscape of this area for decades.”
PETER BERGEN: What is the IDF’s track record in this type of urban warfare?
JOHN SPENCER: Not much.
The IDF’s biggest shortcoming is not its training areas or its tanks. This is a collection of knowledge about how an urban operation of this scale can be carried out as quickly and efficiently as possible. To be clear, not all military forces, including the United States, are trained, equipped, or equipped for these types of urban battles.
LIAM COLLINS: I do not believe its forces are ready for largescale urban operations. If you go to Israel and try to find their large urban training center, like many other military forces, they have something, but it’s not what you need to train for something like Gaza.
Israel has been extremely effective in counterterrorism operations in Jerusalem and elsewhere in the country, but this has not translated into largescale military operations in urban environments.
SPENCER: There are many unknowns to contend with, both in terms of Hamas’s capabilities everything from surfacetoair missiles to what we don’t know Hamas has in preparation for a likely Israeli retaliation .
MOUNTAINS: Let’s talk specifically about the obstacles Israelis face in Gaza: hostages, human shields, suicide bombers, tunnels, crossborder tunnels, improvised explosive devices and booby traps, and many civilians. There is no element of surprise here either.
For political reasons and given international pressure, the Israelis may also want this operation in Gaza to be as short as possible. On the other hand, for military reasons, that could take months, right?
SPENCER: I say the operation in Gaza would take months.
MOUNTAINS: What advantages does an advanced army like the IDF lose in a dense and densely populated urban area?
SPENCER: They lose the ability to use advanced technologies to attack the enemy before they get close, which is what all militaries want to do. For this reason, urban warfare is the most difficult, as any superior advantages that a large army has are reduced and in some respects eliminated.
They lose the ability to perform “combined arms maneuvers.” The entire concept of combined arms maneuver from World War II to today has to do with the existence of mobile forces that can bypass and attack the enemy. You can’t do that. This is not possible in an urban area. No military wants to concentrate its forces on one or more roads.
COLLINS: To give some examples at the tactical level, there are many opportunities for the enemy to hide and move without being observed by intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platforms or drones in the sky. You can’t see the enemy because they move through tunnels. The enemy can move between buildings and break down walls from building to building. And as far as firepower goes, even if we see them, we can’t always shoot because there might be another building in the way and at the same time we have to worry about the civilians in the area.
“There are many opportunities for the enemy to hide and move without being observed by intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platforms or drones in the sky.” Liam Collins
SPENCER: The other thing they lose is the effectiveness of their weapons. In the concrete jungle of urban warfare, most weapons may not even penetrate the building where the enemy is located. Yes, there are many that penetrate, but most standard weapons do not.
MOUNTAINS: Why?
COLLINS: I’ll give an example. In 2002, we dropped two 500pound bombs on a small compound in rural Afghanistan, and somehow a Taliban fighter survived and threw a grenade at us. These structures provide the defender with inherent defensive options. We look at the destruction of a building and think that no one could have survived that, but usually people do.
Hamas wants to gain as much time as possible. The longer the fighting in the cities continues, the greater the political pressure will be on Israel to stop the attack, given the collateral damage and civilian casualties that are an integral part of urban warfare. Their goal is not to destroy the IDF. You can not. It’s about saving time.
MOUNTAINS: Are the Israelites likely to retain some advantages?
SPENCER: D9 bulldozers. Remote controlled biplane bulldozers that can advance and exploit the enemy. Hamas’s advantage is that it is hidden in concrete buildings. Still, if we go ahead with an armored bulldozer that can take the first hit from anything for example, RPGs (rocketpropelled grenades). [uma espécia de bazuca] This gives us the advantage of eliminating the need to protect the concrete buildings that the enemy relies on. This is one of the lowtech solutions the IDF has developed, a capability the US military does not have.
COLLINS: The Israelites also have night fighting skills; A night attack is advantageous for them because it gives them a greater advantage than the enemy.
MOUNTAINS: How can you figure out what the tunnels look like if you don’t have aerial photos?
SPENCER: Aerial photographs do not reveal the depth at which some of these tunnels are located. Special subsurface mapping technologies are required.
Israeli soldiers patrol near the Gaza border on October 24 as fighting continues between the Israeli army and Palestinian factions in Nir Oz, Israel. Mostafa Alkharouf/Anadolu/Getty Images
MOUNTAINS: What about the use of robots, what about the use of tear gas in the tunnels?
SPENCER: Tear gas is an effective means of clearing a building of enemy personnel without destroying it. Due to the political aspect of the matter, Israel is unlikely to make use of it; What if Israel uses gas?
MOUNTAINS: Quotes from Australian strategist David Kilcullen in his book: “Cities are sponges for troops.” Why?
SPENCER: Because of the power required to clear a road. To achieve this, you will not bombard yourself. A much smaller city defender can absorb your entire army, but that doesn’t mean this mission can’t be accomplished. It simply requires a lot of strength and strength, including many soldiers.
COLLINS: And the other challenge of the urban environment is that you can clean an area, but once you leave the building you can’t assume it’s clean anymore because the enemy will attack us again through tunnels or through other people’s walls can. Building. It can stay behind us and reoccupy a building or area as soon as we leave it.
MOUNTAINS: Snipers are a difficult problem. Hamas probably has snipers who are entrenched and know the terrain very well.
SPENCER: There are many lessons to be learned from urban combat over the last 20 years, including acoustic sensors that can tell us where a sniper is.
Also, if you’ve ever seen an IDF soldier, he has a very large bag that goes up to his head. It is a special type of camouflage. The IDF wears these bags covering their helmets on their heads to deceive snipers
MOUNTAINS: What about the robots on the Israeli side?
COLLINS: No doubt they will use them, but they probably don’t have as many as they would like and they are slow.
MOUNTAINS: Hamas collects the trash. Provides some social services. He was elected to government in 2006. There have been no elections since then. But it works on several levels. It has a terrorist component. Does that complicate things?
COLLINS: We have this hybrid organization that is a terrorist organization and a paramilitary organization that provides services to the government.
Therefore, Israel does not know that this is unrealistic, even though it has stated that the goal is the “destruction” of Hamas. It’s just a political statement they have to make. Your goal is to weaken them and prevent a future attack. So what they’re really targeting is the leadership, the terrorist wing, the fighting wing of Hamas.
Therefore, they will end the operation when they feel that they have reached the peak in terms of the diminishing returns from degrading additional capabilities compared to the political cost of continuing this operation to degrade additional capabilities.
MOUNTAINS: What is the day like after the fighting ends in Gaza?
COLLINS: People are returning to their homes. They clear the rubble. We are trying to get the services back up and running. Nongovernmental organizations arrive and try to restore some semblance of normal life to Palestinians.
MOUNTAINS: The Israelis withdrew from Gaza back in 2005 because it was too much of a headache, and the Israelis I spoke to said, “We’re not going to keep Gaza.” But if that’s the case, who will?
SPENCER: The military has an abysmal track record of state or nation building, or city building in general. Who will rule Gaza? Who will provide services, security and reconstruction? This is a question of great importance.
MOUNTAINS: Let’s go to Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq, which was taken over by ISIS in 2014. In your book you talk about one hundred billion dollars in damage to the city during the fight to drive ISIS out of Mosul between late 2014 and 2016 and 2017.
SPENCER: ISIS had two years of defense planning and building a comprehensive defense with huge obstacle belts in Mosul, which is why it took nine months for a hundred thousand Iraqi security forces although nothing like the IDF to be supported by the United States, the best air force in the world, indiscriminately destroyed, buildings for buildings, most of Mosul.
This is a telling sign of what it would be like to accomplish the current mission we believe the IDF will have. It will destroy 80 to 90% of infrastructure and buildings in urban areas of Gaza. This will change the landscape of this area for a generation.
COLLINS: People should know that even under the strictest laws of war, cities will be destroyed to carry out this type of mission.
MOUNTAINS: Israel appears to be a tank army. Explain to me what tanks can do in urban environments and what their advantages and disadvantages are.
COLLINS: Tanks have a big advantage in the open desert. However, many of its benefits are neutralized or diminished when one enters the urban environment. Their ability to hit targets from a distance is very low and they cannot aim the main cannon to hit targets in tall buildings. Therefore, a tank is necessary as part of the combined arms team in urban combat, but it is much more vulnerable in this environment than in others.
Tanks have a big advantage in the open desert. However, many of its benefits are neutralized or diminished when one enters the urban environment. Liam Collins
SPENCER: Of all the challenges presented by this type of urban combat, the tank is extremely vulnerable.
But there is no other tool as important in fighting in a city as the tank, because it can walk down the street and withstand an attack from the defender. It has unique firepower among land forces, capable of penetrating concrete, and has the agility to move around.
The disadvantage, of course, is that you can’t see everything. It’s vulnerable. Is slow. We can see it getting closer. Therefore it must be protected with infantry.
MOUNTAINS: So is it necessary for a significant amount of infantry to protect the tank?
SPENCER: Right. That is the lesson of the Ukraine war; Russia is an army based on artillery tanks. When it invaded Ukraine in early 2022, it had reduced infantry numbers and lost a shameful number of tanks.
COLLINS: You need the infantry to protect the tank, but you need the tank to protect the infantry.
MOUNTAINS: Doesn’t this have an impact on the “masses” involved in launching a military operation in Gaza? Is it easier to defend than to attack?
SPENCER: We often say that this is “combat power.” In open terrain, a defender needs three combat forces some say just troops. Historically, in urban terrain you need fifteen or ten for combat power because you can’t build mass in urban areas.
A road can accommodate an entire battalion just to try to move along that road.
MOUNTAINS: And a battalion would consist of 800 soldiers?
SPENCER: Up to 900.
MOUNTAINS: Let’s do a calculation: What is the size of the troops that would have to be sent to Gaza?
SPENCER: There are many variables, but it’s about power, not numbers. This is not the Battle of Berlin in 1945, where the Soviets stationed a battalion on every street. That’s why there are always city battles, because no one has an army of millions anymore. They have smaller armies, where a small enemy force can gain power in an urban environment, and you have to use a lot of combat power usually artillery to take them out.
MOUNTAINS: Let me ask you, Liam, about the hostages because you are from the US Special Operations community.
COLLINS: I’m pretty sure they have no information on the hostages’ whereabouts. Most likely they hide them underground. And it’s absolutely necessary to have that kind of information to carry out an operation, and even if you have that information, you have the means to get there safely and get it out with a reasonable chance of success without the Losing a hostage? without losing any significant amount of power?
So I think nations are probably preparing their forces so that when they get information, they can decide whether to try to save their citizens. But I think we are more likely to see results through diplomatic channels, as was the case when Hamas released the American mother and her daughter last week.
Well, the Israeli hostages. I think these are the ones Hamas will keep the longest.
SPENCER: The fact that so many hostages from so many countries are mixing with the enemy and the Israelis who want to carry out this operation is, in my opinion, an unprecedented situation.
The fact that so many hostages from so many countries are mixing with the enemy and the Israelis who want to carry out this operation is an unprecedented situation. John Spencer
MOUNTAINS: Why did you write a book about urban warfare?
COLLINS: Battles are increasingly being fought in urban areas, and militaries around the world, including our U.S. military, are illprepared or unprepared for them. I constantly ask people to name an important battle in Ukraine that doesn’t take place in one of the cities.
The military is inherently resistant to urban warfare. It’s a place they don’t want to go. That’s why they don’t prepare for it and that’s why the enemy continues to resort to it.
COLLINS: But you can’t help but be drawn to urban warfare, because people fight wars and people live in cities.