How the war in Ukraine will continue in 2024 depends mainly on the support of the “West”, mainly the US and the EU, for Ukraine. Perhaps it would be better – although not entirely geographically correct – to speak of the “global north”, since, in addition to China, many states of the “global south” tend to support the Russian position here.
Russia is entering 2024 with very high self-confidence and hopes to achieve more decisive successes – especially military ones – in the coming months. Russia is increasingly convinced that it has staying power compared to the “global north”. The year 2024 is an important election year, not just in the USA. In this context, Russia hopes that these elections will reinforce the forces that oppose greater support for Ukraine. Therefore, it would be enough to resist until the expected electoral result. Putin sees himself on the path to victory, which makes negotiations unnecessary at this time; Just follow this path until the end, despite all the losses. Putin also confidently awaits his election in 2024. The Russian population massively follows the “Great Patriotic War 2.0” narrative; Divergent opinions are suppressed and do not find a response.
The year 2024 will therefore be the culmination of the war in Ukraine, that is, the support measures taken or not taken in the coming months will decide whether Ukraine and therefore also the “global north” will win or lose against Russia. In addition to the upcoming presidential elections with an uncertain outcome, the US is increasingly concerned about other conflicts and challenges. The maritime alliance needed in the Red Sea to protect one of the world's most important trade routes, Israel's military and financial support, the increasing attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria, the Taiwan problem and the issue of border politics with Mexico are all pushing for solutions. Furthermore, most US citizens have little interest in foreign policy issues.
This means that Europeans are called upon to assume a broader and, above all, more pioneering role in the Ukrainian war. However, there is no evidence of an implementation of the much-cited “turning point”, to use this term that was enthusiastically coined in Germany. If we want to prevent Russia from gaining momentum in 2024, that is, not only keeping Ukrainian territories occupied, but even expanding its conquests that violate international law, then swift and decisive action must be taken. If this does not happen, there is a risk of a “frozen” situation analogous to the Korean War, including an “Iron Curtain 2.0” or, in the case of further significant losses of territory, even a massive defeat for Ukraine.
The Denied War of Attrition and the Adaptability of Russians
At the start of the war, Ukraine achieved spectacular defensive success. After a few weeks, Russia was forced onto the defensive. From the end of March 2022, Russia has therefore attempted to force trench warfare in Ukraine. This was followed by the massive use of artillery and the first cruel trench warfare. As of spring 2022, it has become clear that the war will follow the course of a war of attrition. The West should have responded appropriately, especially as Russia still faced numerous challenges in reproducing and organizing its forces in the course of 2022. In particular, there were very few operational troops available. The mobilization of new forces and the increase in weapons production posed serious problems; Russia had to burn poorly equipped and trained units at the front for months, regardless of losses.
However, Russia not only managed to overcome these bottlenecks, but also improved its military performance on the battlefield. It has always found an answer to the high-quality weapon systems supplied by the West (for example, Javelin anti-tank missiles, HIMARS multiple rocket launchers, AGM-88 anti-radar air-to-ground missiles, Storm Shadow or Scalp cruise missiles, artillery ammunition cluster) or weapons systems produced by Ukraine itself (including weapons-capable drones).
Furthermore, the West (or the “Global North”) has long underestimated Russia’s adaptability on the battlefield as well as its industrial capabilities – a result of overconfidence and lack of knowledge about the enemy. Given the growing Russian successes and the decline of Western support for Ukraine, Russia now senses its opportunity: along the entire 1,200-kilometer front line, the increase in Russian offensive actions has been clearly evident since the end 2023. There are also other troop redeployments. Around 40,000 Russian troops (out of an estimated 420,000 deployed) are already deployed in the Avdeevka area alone.
The Russian approach has two objectives: on the one hand, it tries to force the Ukrainians to use their tactical and operational reserves; On the other hand, Russia wants to make local advances, however small, whenever possible. So you move forward step by step stoically and without considering your own losses. The announcement in late 2023 that an additional 170,000 Russian troops would be added to the military shows Russia's willingness to fight a long war. This means new offensive actions in the medium term. On Russian social media there is constant speculation that there could be new advances into Russian territory from the north towards Charkiv, Sumy or even Chernihiv (north of Kiev). This would significantly widen Ukraine's 1,200 km front line and cause further fragmentation of increasingly depleted Ukrainian forces and resources. Belarusian troops may also be involved.
The failed Ukrainian offensive and its consequences
Russians see 2023 as a success. A look at Russian social media shows this very well. It is important to take into account that Russia suffered one serious setback after another in Ukraine until mid-2022. Most important from the Russian point of view: the Russian armed forces managed to repel the Ukrainian summer offensive in 2023. The profound “Surovikin Line” Russian, built in more than six months, from autumn 2022 to spring 2023, served its purpose. Other successes include taking Bakhmut and Marjinka. To uninformed Western observers, Maryinka may seem like just an insignificant town of just under 10,000 inhabitants, but with this town the Ukrainian defenders lost another important position that had been built into a fortress for eight years. In the course of the fighting, the city was razed to the ground – similar to Mariupol (May 2022) and Bakhmut (May 2023). At the turn of 2023/24, fierce fighting took place around Avdeevka.
The Ukrainians, on the other hand, lack the weapons suitable for extended maneuver warfare. Above all, there is no functional air force. However, in late 2021 it achieved some victories – including in Charkiv and Kherson. This is mainly due to US support with reconnaissance data and the aforementioned Russian problems. In the Black Sea it was also possible to severely hit the Russian fleet. Until the beginning of June 2023, it was possible to observe a tense wait on Russian social networks. This changed suddenly in the summer, after the first Russian defensive successes against the Ukrainian summer offensive. The high Russian losses were obscured by their own defensive successes and by images of burning Western Leopard and Challenger tanks, as well as Bradley, Marder and CV-90 armored personnel carriers. The climate began to change.
The Russian armed forces continue to suffer heavy losses. At the same time, however, the available soldiers are gaining more and more combat experience. An ongoing analysis of Ukrainian videos of attacks on Russian units clearly shows that they are capable of learning and adapting. The spectacular defensive successes of the Ukrainians at certain points cannot hide this fact. All knowledge is painfully bought with blood – but this also applies to Ukrainian soldiers. It is therefore even more worrying that Ukrainian soldiers complain about the lack of combat training in NATO units. This shows that the lessons of the Ukrainian war seem to have not yet reached Western armies; The narrative still seems to prevail that Russian soldiers fight in a completely amateurish way. But underestimating your opponent in a fight is the biggest mistake. There may be an unpleasant surprise here. No less important, Ukrainian authorities also point this out repeatedly.
Quality versus quantity and the lack of European industrial capacity
Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine so far are of high quality, but in a war of attrition and attrition it is not quality that plays a role, but quantity. History has demonstrated this many times: quality may decide the battle, but mass and available resources will most likely decide the war. Take Western anti-aircraft systems as an example. They are making a significant difference right now, as they are achieving high death tolls from ongoing Russian strategic airstrikes.
But the question is: “Can Ukraine maintain these firing rates in the coming months?” Especially if the Russians continue to attack as they did in the first days of the New Year with large numbers of drones, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons. Given Russia's existing precision, every missile would have to be shot down. An ultimate defensive success is only possible if there is a steady flow of rapidly produced anti-aircraft munitions to Ukraine. At a strategic level, Ukraine currently needs anti-aircraft systems, including ammunition, to be able to protect the depths of its space against the second Russian strategic air campaign that is currently underway.
Europe and, to a certain extent, the USA have not yet created the conditions to be able to fuel a war of attrition. It's not just about industrial capacity, but also the associated costs. In this context, it is also about unity, community and, as a result, the attitude towards our – repeatedly invoked – Western democratic values. What are we willing to sacrifice for this? While the Russians spend manageable sums to overhaul their combat vehicles and make them combat-ready, equivalent vehicles in the European Union cost many times more. Some experts speak of a cost ratio of 1:40 per combat vehicle. Russia therefore produces not only effectively, but above all efficiently.
Ukraine itself also suffers from the fact that its military-industrial complex has been largely destroyed or is exposed to the constant threat of Russian attacks. She can hardly produce herself. What was crucial on the battlefield in 2023 were the cheap, mass-produced weapons systems that were quickly available. The use of First Person View (FPV) drones stands out here. Its use currently prevents any deployment and maneuvers on both sides. What barbed wire and machine guns did in World War I, drones do in the 21st century. They create a “glass battlefield” and thus nip any attack, especially mechanized ones, in the bud.
The Curse and Blessing of Modern Weapons Systems
At an operational level, it would be necessary for Ukraine to target the Russian command structure and logistics through available long-range surface-to-surface or air-to-surface weapons systems (e.g., ATACMS or GLSDB long-range surface-to-surface missiles). This would give Ukraine time to reposition itself. Although additional anti-aircraft systems (including a Patriot and IRIS-T system) are arriving, delivery of the GLSDB has been delayed until 2024. The ATACMS appears to have been delivered only once. At the tactical level, however, anti-drone systems (C-UAS) are currently of utmost importance. However, available C-UAS systems are only entering the country sparsely.
This development is clearly harmful for Ukraine. However, only the belligerent party that possesses weapons that help overcome the dilemma described above will be able to take the initiative again. The objective is to control the electromagnetic field. To do this, they are looking for the “miracle weapon” that the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, General Zalushny, spoke about in his sensational essay.
The traditional factors also apply this year: power, space, time and information. Whoever can influence this in their favor with new weapons systems will remain victorious. At this point, a positive example should be set for Ukraine: it managed to utilize fast-moving, long-range, unmanned surface drone systems (force) based on an “in time” situational picture (information) provided by the West, defeat the Russian Black Sea Fleet, which will be expelled from the western Black Sea in just a few months. This is a clear success – and it happened so quickly (in time) that the Russians still have no real answer for it. Software increasingly plays a role in supporting target recognition. This is where artificial intelligence comes in.
Despite these lessons, the capabilities of conventional weapons systems are still very important. The main battle tank, for example, is still the only means that can take possession of the terrain with combat and impact. It is highly mobile, has strong armor and high firepower. But it can only develop its advantages in collaboration. Just as he currently and in the future needs infantry to protect him when necessary – for example in urban terrain – in the future he will need short-range air defense (=SHORAD or VSHORAD). Without it, he could quickly fall victim to the FPV or kamikaze drones that currently dominate the battlefield. Dozens of videos of successful FPV attacks on Leopard MBTs and Bradley MBTs demonstrate this very well! The online platform Oryx currently lists, among other things, 33 damaged or destroyed Leopard and Challenger main battle tanks, as well as 73 damaged or destroyed Bradley, CV90 and Marder main battle tanks.
Invisible allies and supporters
Russia could not fight or win this war alone. But, and this makes a huge difference: it can be based on the “global south” (although this term is also geographically imprecise!). Weapons from North Korea and Iran helped the Russians fill the shortages. This meant that the Russian front lines could be continually reinforced and supplied. Through diplomatic initiatives, Russia was able to consolidate its position in the global south and even form new partnerships. New conflicts, such as those in the Gaza Strip or the Houthi attacks in the Red Sea, are causing increasing problems in the “global north”. From the Russian point of view, this is a success and gives self-confidence to the Russian leadership. Furthermore, this allows the Russian side to appear correspondingly powerful in information warfare, gather its own population and continue to attack massively.
The Pope summed it up well last year when he spoke of a “world war in installments”. The current situation is extremely difficult. Many Western allies are increasingly resigned and are already thinking about a divided Ukraine behind closed doors. At a strategic level, nuclear weaponry on both sides – between NATO and Russia – means a stalemate, comparable to the situation in the “Cold War” before 1990. The US continues to be dominant in all types of weapons compared to the main states. that threaten it, namely China and Russia. However, China in particular poses an increasing challenge to the US in the maritime area, and the US has this in mind when supporting Ukraine.
NATO also still has powerful air forces in Europe, with corresponding potential for conventional deterrence. On the other hand, the state of most of NATO's ground forces is fatal. In this case, only a few countries, such as Poland, have recognized the seriousness of the situation and are undertaking massive modernization. In the worst case scenario, if Russian troops advanced into the territory of NATO states, NATO would be faced with the decision to respond by using nuclear weapons. This is exactly what they were created for. We can only hope that this event does not occur in the medium or long term. Russia, on the other hand, has a wide range of hybrid options to choose from. These include, among other things, active “conflict proliferation” and fear-mongering in the information space.
Putin sees Russia's “historically authorized” borders in eastern NATO, but in addition to Ukraine, these could include parts of Poland or the Baltic states. The population of these countries naturally sees things differently, as, like Poland, for example, they had traumatic experiences with the Soviet/Russian occupation in the last century. These states, therefore, would never give in to a Russian attack. They learned from their story!
A miserable war with an increasingly global dimension
The right of people to self-determination applies. It is therefore, first of all, up to Ukraine to decide how it wants or can proceed. Right now, the clear desire of the majority of the population is to completely liberate the country and become part of the EU and NATO. Historically, we in the West have not been aware of the pull effect that we – the West – created in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Soviet Union. It was not the USA and Europe that “forced” these countries to join the EU and NATO, but rather these countries and their populations wanted to be part of this community. “Central Europeans” no longer wanted to be “Eastern Europeans”. Consumption and prosperity, that is, “soft power”, were simply too tempting. In a way, this was a repeat of a development that occurred in Western Europe after the Second World War – remember the seductive reputation that the USA had in the 1950s and 1960s.
Russia could not and cannot offer this. While much of the Russian population, especially the youth, looked to the West as a role model in the 1990s and early 2000s, this was not true of the Putin-era Russian leadership. On the contrary, a “counter-model” of traditional values was propagated – combined with the patriotic mission of leading Russia back to the greatness it deserves. For a long time, we in the West did not take this danger seriously, thinking, as Francis Fukuyama wrote in 1989, that the “end of history” had arrived. Added to this was the positive thought that wars were a thing of the past. It got us!
What would you say to a Ukrainian who says from the bottom of his heart: “I want to belong to Europe! Benefit from its prosperity!” If our selfish response was, “Sorry, we can't do that because we would anger the Russians!” We ourselves secretly wish that everything would return to normal as soon as possible. And this is mainly for convenience. So that we can continue to enjoy the prosperity to which we are entitled. A war like this on the margins of the EU is extremely unpleasant. And we have only a rudimentary interest in the fate of the world, the global south, the Chinese, the Indians, the Africans and many others. This is exactly the dilemma, because there is a fear that these, from our point of view, “good old days” will end.
The global world is currently reorganizing itself. The “global South”, strongly positioned through technological, economic and demographic evolution, is demanding its place. If we compare this to a table where everyone wants to sit down to eat, i.e. to distribute resources: So far, we as Europeans have sat very well, but if we are not careful, this will no longer be the case in the future . And we are not prepared for that. Many European countries have remained in a state of sleeping beauty for at least a year, if not since the start of the conflict – despite all the lip service paid to them. It’s up to us to make a difference – in our own interests.