US President Joe Biden on Sunday described the prospect of Israel reoccupying the Gaza Strip as a “serious mistake”. This could raise a question that is still largely ignored in the debate over a possible ground military operation in Gaza: What would happen in the event of an Israeli victory?
“A serious mistake.” American President Joe Biden wanted to warn Israel on Sunday, October 15, about the prospect of a new full occupation of the Gaza Strip at the end of the Israeli ground military operation aimed at eliminating the threat posed by the radical Islamist movement Hamas should serve.
This is the first time that the United States has tried to “put a limit on the operation planned by Israel in retaliation for the Hamas attack.” [samedi 7 octobre, NDLR]”, specifies the Washington Post.
The impossible return to the time before 2005
A way of presenting yourself that may seem premature. In fact, discussing a possible reoccupation of Gaza by Israel at this stage requires taking many “ifs” for granted. First, Israel must decide to launch its military ground operation in Gaza, and second, its army must succeed in eliminating the Hamas threat.
However, “this is an important debate that needs to be had now,” assures Jacob Eriksson, a specialist on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at the University of York. “We are focusing our preparation almost exclusively on the tactical aspects of this operation, without taking the time to consider the long-term impact of a ground confrontation in Gaza. We must therefore ask ourselves what would come after a possible elimination of “Hamas’ influence on this enclave,” adds this expert.
The idea of Israel regaining control of this area “may be on the agenda of some of the most extremist elements of the current government, who believe that Gaza is part of Eretz Israel.” [le “Grand Israël” dans le sens biblique, NDLR]. But the most sensible voices in Tel Aviv will want to speak out as quickly as possible,” assures Ahron Bregman, a political scientist and specialist on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at King’s College London.
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The hypothesis of an army occupation after a possible victory over Hamas actually means “a return to the situation before Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005,” emphasizes Amnon Aran, a specialist in conflicts between Israel and the Arab world in the city. University of London.
“If Israel left in 2005, it was because of Ariel Sharon [alors Premier ministre] concluded that it had become too difficult to deal with [1,4 million] Hostile Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Today it’s the same [avec une population qui dépasse aujourd’hui les 2 millions]”, summarizes Ahron Bregman.
“This would require mobilizing too many resources over too long a period of time,” said Shahin Modarres, a specialist on Iran and Israeli-Palestinian relations at the International Team for the Study of Security (ITSS) in Verona. In fact, an Israeli occupation of Gaza “would mean that Israel would have to take care of everything from the proper functioning of schools and hospitals to the sewage system. And since the residents of the Gaza Strip will never accept such an administration, it would be necessary to provide soldiers for it.” “To protect the administration on the ground. This will cost a fortune and clashes with the local population would quickly occur,” says Ahron Bregman.
Fatah, an acceptable partner?
Not to mention the diplomatic implications of reoccupying Gaza. “The image of Hezbollah’s fight in southern Lebanon would be strengthened, Israel’s relations with other Arab countries could suffer – particularly the ongoing negotiations with Saudi Arabia – and such a decision would run counter to the American desire for a two-state solution.” Conflict in the Middle East,” believes Jacob Eriksson.
Hence Joe Biden’s warning. But who would replace Hamas in the Gaza Strip if reoccupation could not be on the agenda? “If Israel achieves its goals of destroying Hamas’s military capabilities, there will inevitably be a transition period during which the Israeli army will have to provide security on the ground. However, a more appropriate solution must be found.” “We will be sustainable quickly, otherwise it will become a de facto occupation,” said Amnon Aran.
For him, the natural option would be “an agreement with the Palestinian Authority, which is already at the helm of the West Bank.” Its president, Mahmoud Abbas, “has also begun to distance himself from Hamas by ensuring that the actions the Islamist movement does not ‘represent the Palestinian people’,” emphasizes Shahin Modarres.
A signal to the Israeli government to reassure it that it would be a more acceptable interlocutor. Which doesn’t mean that Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah would be welcomed with open arms by the Palestinians in Gaza. “Their popularity ratings are already low. If the Palestinian Authority takes power after an Israeli military operation, it will have great difficulty asserting itself in Gaza,” said Amnon Aran.
“It is certain that Fatah is not the ideal solution, but there is no alternative and the local population could resort to it because there is nothing better,” assures Shahin Modarres.
A demilitarized zone?
With such a weak power struggling to contain Gazans’ resentment toward Israel, the Jewish state may also be tempted to “establish some sort of security buffer zone, similar to Lebanon.” [avant le retrait israélien du Sud-Liban en 2000]” explains Amnon Aran.
The UN could also intervene “to establish a kind of demilitarized zone under UN control, with clauses allowing the Israeli army to intervene if it detects immediate risks to the country’s security,” adds Ahron Bregman.
Two options that would lead to a little further exploitation of the already very limited area in which Gazans can live.
But it could also be that the Palestinians in Gaza don’t want to hear about Fatah’s rule at all. In this case, there is still the possibility of chaos in Gaza. “There is a possibility that a military operation could create a vacuum at the top of this enclave. This is perhaps the most dangerous result,” said Jacob Eriksson.
For him, a military attack on a group like Hamas makes it possible to physically eliminate those responsible for the organization, but the violence used “tends to fuel resentment and anger toward those they attack. Applications,” he explains. In other words, a possible successful ground military operation could create or strengthen another group that is just as threatening to Israel. “The Israelis have to think about the next day. But at the moment they seem – understandably – too angry to think rationally,” concludes Ahron Bregman.