Ukraine why is Europe irrelevant Divided and without an army

Ukraine, why is Europe irrelevant? “Divided and without an army, so it will be crushed by the line…

Ukraine why is Europe irrelevant Divided and without an army

Interview with analyst Fabrizio Maronta, Head of International Relations at Limes: “Prodi is sorry? His generation brought countries into the Union that see Moscow as a threat that the founding states don’t see. France, Germany and England have opposed it for different reasons.” common army. And the replacement of the United States was convenient for everyone.

“A’Broken Europe Alignment between Russophobic countries and the United States is a dramatic problem today, but it will continue to be so in the future because the Russia it was complementary to our interests. It is a historical debt which, combined with the lack of a common army, eventually brought us all in the tow of the American strategic line”. Word of Fabricius Maronta, Scientific Advisor and Limes International Relations Manager, who also tells “It is unlikely that the Ukrainians will take everything back or that the Russians will arrive in Kiev. A negotiation should seriously consider giving up territories. It would be one Pyrrhic victory for Putin a lot expensive appear unjustified of Russian public opinion itself. However, a preferred solution is a an expansion of the conflict that will unmanageable“.

Romano Prodi complains about the insignificance of Europe, Biden is not going to Brussels but to Warsaw, where Putin’s line of defeat prevails.
I’m sorry you regret it, but you should do it partly with yourself. L’Europe to which he has contributed so much, he has fueled the idea and rhetoric of “international power of law” and – probably – forgetting that legal power does not work without a corresponding military deterrent. It is not warmongering speech but is based on the historical reality of the facts. Prodi’s generation grew up during what we call the “pax americana”. Cold Warbut in reality it was a long peace for us Europeans, dictated by the balance of power that had resulted from the Second World War.

And how is the balance of power now?
They are equal. L’Europe not only does it have no unified purpose, but it is also not a military tool with a deterrent function, created with the aim of not using it. For this reason, it has no say in a historic moment when it is also being used by other powers as a foreign policy weapon. Certainly the Russia, which is actually a medium-sized power, although it is wreaking havoc in Europe. But also perspective China, which could be a much greater power. It is they who challenge the international order, that is, the “American-centric” international order that results from the victories of World War II and the Cold War. Hence our towing USA.

Who divides Europe?
Putin has even quite openly attempted to separate it from the United States through the weapon of energy blackmail. One of the reasons why it failed was that the European countries armed themselves differently. The United States With their LNG export they have filled the Russian gas shortage. They used power factors that we might define as “hard power”.

Are you saying that Europe wants peace but cannot ask for it?
I think that apart from the post-war experience of Soviet rule, we Europeans have mentally freed ourselves from the mere idea that international competition also takes place through non-peaceful means. But in reality, and unfortunately we are now rediscovering it in a rather traumatic way: soft power alone doesn’t go very far, if you will lasting peace and we don’t have it.

Who rowed against a European defense system?
France and Germany. In which order you decide. France has always had the “fallen empire” complex, which will not give up. Also macron he has a retro Gaullist thought: like every French president, he says “Europe” and thinks “France”.

But there has been talk of a “European army” since the middle of the last century
Talks about Europe’s strategic autonomy and common defense began in the 1960s. They went nowhere because they were alternative, if not antagonistic, projects to that Born. The US shook the entire “peace dividend” and prevented Europe from integrating its own army into the NATO system. In their absence, the European projects have proved just as unrealistic as the war in Libya.

Has Germany also got in the way?
He erased the idea of ​​”normal potency” and we now see him in labor scholz. It would also have the “power factors” inherent in it, among other things, as the natural linchpin of the eurozone and the European Union, especially since the UK left. If the Germany There are no post-war mitigating circumstancesEnglandwhich has shunned the idea of ​​a European project because of its special relationship with the United States. We see it even now: London is using its support for Ukraine to solidify this relationship at a stage of Brexit difficult, sometimes even unsuccessful.

And we come to Italy.
We contributed to this “strategic aphasia” and probably for the same reason as Germany. We lost the war and as a result we never made a proposal, maybe a little bit Andreatta. But we never had the specific weight of the French and Germans to make us advocates of a slightly healthier relationship conditions United. Do we want to tell the truth? The idea of European Defense who entrusts United States convenient for many: the resources that we had at our disposal in the first post-war period and during the Cold War to build our “welfare states” that we are so proud of have been “unlocked” by the military guarantee. the hands of the United States. And it was convenient for everyone.

The consequences today?
There division. At the moment there is a strongly “anti-Russian” part of Europe, the entire eastern flank is mating with the American line. That is why I say that Prodi is sorry if he should regret himself: we have welcomed a number of countries into the European Union, which joined to protect the sovereignty regained after more than half a century of Russian-Soviet rule , while the other part of ‘Europe, that side of the curtain, has a different idea of ​​relations with the Russia. It’s a historic error that presents the bill, a historic lag between the two parts. One way or another, Russia will continue to exist.

How long will public opinion in Europe be able to hold its ground?
Corresponding to the pressure of two elements. The socio-economic and the geographic. countries like that Poland and others play a game in which they see an opportunity to deliver a very hard hit Russia, even in a propaganda way, even by exaggerating the potential threat that Russia may pose to the rest of Europe or NATO territory. I speak for good reason, shall we say. In these countries, a large part of public opinion and elites effectively and objectively believe because of their history and geographic position Putin a danger. Letting him do this and giving him his will, even partially, sets a precedent for them that will make Russia demand more.

And we, meant as Italy, Germany etc?
The perception is different. For the Western public, this threat does not exist: while they morally condemn the war, they do not really feel it Russia as such. They are convinced, and I would rightly say so, that we will not meet the Russian army the day after tomorrow RomeTo Paris or similar Berlin, like a Baltic or a Romanian claim. Except that Russia Unless you do incredible things like dropping atomic bombs, Western European public opinion will tend to tire.

And on the economic front?
Here, this is the other big variable. Now the rhetoric has taken hold that “Putin lost the gas war”, but I’d be careful: now and maybe for next winter we’ve dodged the bullet of energy shortages, but let’s not forget that we pay for gas no less than before the war. We didn’t change the energy paradigm, we simply replaced the Russian one with something else. With what long-term impact on inflation? What about purchasing power? The same applies to the relocation of production by American companies outside the game China in strategic sectors. These are questions that go to the heart of Europe, starting with Germany.

Berlin is already in trouble.
And there are more and more. There Germany had an economic policy based on exports, thanks to two pillars: cheap Russian gas and the ability to export anywhere, including China. Now Russian gas is gone and exports to China have become more difficult due to the trade war, so how much will Germany and the other economies suffer? And then, how long will the countries with the largest presence of Ukrainian refugees have to take care of these refugees and how much will it cost? They are backup variables too Kyiv that help determine the orientation toward war.

And the US in all this?
The United States are geographically distant from the conflict and were much less exposed than the Russia also from an energy point of view. With the shale gas revolution, that is, the hydraulic fracturing of unconventional hydrocarbons, the United States has become a net exporter of energy again, hence all the cheap and infrastructural side plans of biden They work. But that doesn’t change Europe’s proximity to Russia. Neither does the fact that Europe And Russia they are contiguous and complementary. The first relatively small, poor in materials, but highly industrialized, has as a horizon of choice the second, huge, rich in raw materials and with a ridiculous manufacturing economy. It was no coincidence that the energetic relationship connected us.

Could anyone object to her trading peace for comfort?
I’m just saying that if some key countries, particularly the Germany and contrary to all the logic of the good investor who diversifies his wallet, they threw themselves wholeheartedly and solely into this relationship, not because it was obscenity, on the contrary, it had its own compelling logic. She United States they know it well: they are masters at it.

In what sense?
It’s okay that there is war, but there are bonds that cannot be forgotten out of the blue. If Henry Ford did mass motorization in the United States Oil absorbed it Texas. The fact that it happened with the combustion engine and not with the electric motor that also existed at the time is partly due to the fact that Texas was full of oil. I do not mean that Texas It is for Detroitthe capital of the car, such as Russia It is for Stuttgart. But in short, we’re here, so historically there’s this underlying reason.

And does that affect our perception of the conflict?
countries like thatItaly and the Germanywhose leadership but also public opinion seem to have an unacceptable “intelligence service against the enemy” somehow know that with the Russia we still have to live together. Not out of laziness, but because Russia is an inevitable presence. It shouldn’t be an excuse to give upUkraine, but a viaticum for a sustainable peace and a negotiated end to the war. An idea that doesn’t necessarily lead to a total Russian or Ukrainian defeat, because the problem is that this is the current logic: the rhetoric that the Ukrainians have to win everything back, otherwise the Russians will take everything. This war probably won’t end like this.

And do you think how it will end?
As if I don’t know when: not now. It seems difficult to me that the Ukrainians, assuming they succeed, they take it all back. As much as the Russians get Kyiv or just one Odesa. The negotiation must start from principles of reality. It doesn’t mean allowing Putin to do what he wants. But that you also had to accept giving up larger territories than on February 24, 2022 in order to have them Putin and the Russia they will have caused very high prices, so disproportionate to human life that they appear wholly unjustified to Russian public opinion. However, this solution is preferable to an unmanageable expansion of the conflict.