Since the invasion of Ukraine began, Russian President Vladimir Putin and various other members of his regime have often made not-too-veiled threats that Russia would use its vast nuclear arsenal if the West interfered with its military operations in Ukraine. Also this week, in response to the meeting at Germany’s Ramstein airbase between more than 40 countries, including many NATO members, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov accused NATO of engaging in a “proxy war,” and specifically spoke of a “nuclear war.” “. .
The next day, a comment arrived from Putin himself, repeating a concept already voiced at the beginning of the invasion: “If someone intends to interfere from the outside […] He needs to know that our response to counterattacks will be lightning fast.”
Lavrov’s and Putin’s threats, which have been going on in various forms for months, have reignited discussions about Russia’s military arsenal and, in particular, the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
The most commonly mentioned are the so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons, which have less power and range than traditional nuclear bombs, which in the popular imagination are those capable of destroying an entire city and are defined as “strategic”. (but this distinction is more complex than that, let’s go back to it).
Russia’s nuclear arsenal has undergone a modernization process that has lasted for over twenty years. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists estimates that the Russian military currently has 4,477 nuclear warheads that can be mounted on both long-, medium-, and short-range launch vehicles. Of these, 1,588 are operational, mounted on ground launchers, anti-submarine rocket launchers and aerial bombers. In addition to traditional ballistic missiles, Russia also has next-generation hypersonic missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads: Russian forces deployed some of these missiles in Ukraine in late March, but without the nuclear warhead.
In December 2021, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said that almost 90 percent of Russia’s nuclear arsenal consists of modern (hence probably non-Soviet) weapons. Putin summarized the reasons for this modernization as follows last year: «It is absolutely unacceptable to stand still and watch. Change is now happening at an unusually fast pace in areas critical to the military. It’s not even Formula 1 speed, it’s supersonic speed. You stop for a second and you’re immediately left behind.’
Mainly because of the threats from Putin and other members of the Russian regime, there has been talk of the possibility of a nuclear escalation and the possible scenarios associated with it since the invasion of Ukraine began.
Most analysts continue to believe that Russia’s use of nuclear weapons in Ukraine is at least unlikely, but it’s still an issue that continues to be talked about, at least in the context of military analysis, because, among other reasons, Russia’s military doctrine dictates the use of Nuclear weapons and in some cases even for their preventive use.
By “military doctrine” we mean the complex of analyses, studies and arguments of people dealing with military strategy in the armed forces and politics of a country, which define that country’s attitude towards warfare and warfare: the study of the ” A country’s “military doctrine” usually means understanding whether its armed forces are better suited to using certain weapons than others, or certain strategies rather than others.
Russia’s military doctrine when it comes to confrontation with NATO is influenced by the fact that in a conventional conflict the Russian military would be quickly overwhelmed by NATO forces. For this reason, as the US State Department wrote in 2018, “Russian strategy and doctrine emphasizes the coercive potential and military use of nuclear weapons. […] Moscow threatens and is practicing the pre-emptive deployment of a limited nuclear force, with the erroneous expectation that nuclear threats or limited pre-emptive deployment could cripple the United States and NATO, thereby ending a conflict on terms favorable to Russia.
When we talk about the “limited” use of nuclear weapons, we are primarily talking about “tactical” nuclear weapons with reduced destructive potential that are used to achieve very specific purposes.
Today, the most powerful nuclear warheads, labeled “strategic,” can unleash hundreds of kilotons of energy (one kiloton is equivalent to the energy produced by detonating a thousand tons of TNT). Such powerful weapons would cause unimaginable damage and would in all likelihood provoke a corresponding response from the United States: hence the discussions concern the less powerful warheads that can be used precisely in a tactical key.
These warheads would not be used to achieve maximum destruction, but rather to target smaller tactical objectives, such as: B. destroying a column of armored vehicles or disabling enemy aircraft carriers. These are targets for which nuclear warheads of a few kilotons are better suited, and for this reason are commonly referred to as “tactics”.
Russian armed forces often simulate the use of tactical nuclear weapons during their military exercises: They recently simulated a nuclear attack on US troops in Poland. Another possible scenario is often described by American General Philip Breedlove, who at various conferences hypothesized how Russia could attack one of the Baltic countries, hit the first NATO forces attempting a counterattack with a tactical nuclear weapon, and then take advantage of the paralysis of Horror to negotiate a profitable truce (however, we are talking about military simulations and not real scenarios).
In any case, the most widely accepted definition attributed to “tactical” nuclear weapons is quite complex, especially as there is no traditional distinction between “tactical” and “strategic” weapons. How did it explained Pavel Podvig, a researcher and analyst at the UN’s Disarmament Research Institute, the difference lies less in their power than in the purposes for which they are used.
Podvig cites the example of the bombs dropped by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II: their warheads were of relatively low power, 15 and 20 kilotons, so today they could be considered tactical. In this case, however, they undoubtedly played a strategic role, as they were instrumental in breaking Japan’s resistance and winning the war.
A series of Russian Tupolev Tu-95 bombers used to carry and launch nuclear missiles since the 1950s (Wikimedia Commons)
Although Russia’s use of nuclear weapons is well researched in military theory and considered a possibility not to be underestimated, this does not mean that Russia will use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.
According to Podvig, the borders are blurring in the war in Ukraine and, above all, Russia would have no particular advantages in the use of tactical nuclear weapons: there are no tank columns or aircraft carriers to destroy. It would make more sense for Russia to strategically use nuclear weapons to force Ukrainians to surrender, but it is not a given that this would happen or that such a – very drastic – decision could then benefit Russia militarily.
Most analysts think Russia’s use of nuclear weapons is unlikely, if not entirely out of the question, as it would lead to war. on a new level, not necessarily convenient for Russia. “Who on earth would defend the use of nuclear warheads in Ukraine?” has written Michael McFaul, international relations expert and former US Ambassador to Russia. “Now much of the world has not taken a stand on this war, but that could change if Putin uses nuclear weapons.”