by Massimo Franco
Relations with China and Russia, the secret agreement with Beijing and the conflicts with the Orthodox world are under scrutiny, while Taiwan and other thorny issues such as a possible renunciation remain open
Speaking to diplomats accredited to the Vatican on Monday, January 9, Francis stated that a respectful and constructive dialogue between the Holy See and Xi Jinping’s China would continue. And because of this, it was agreed to extend the interim agreement on the appointment of bishops, agreed in Beijing in 2018, for another two years.
In addition, the pope reiterated his call for an immediate ceasefire in the conflict on Ukrainian territory started by Russia.
These are two thorny issues in Vatican foreign policy. And they will become decisive in the clash with the traditionalist front, and not only with regard to the next conclave, when it will take place.
The break with Father George
Yesterday’s conversation between Francis and the former prefect of the papal household and Benedict’s secretary, Monsignor Georg Gnswein, put the spotlight on the bitter controversy following the funeral of the pope emeritus.
But behind a personal rift that has unfolded almost in slow motion over the years and was only a harbinger of new poisons from the past, there is a creaking sensed that is destined to weigh on the Church’s future.
The decisions of diplomacy under Francis’ papacy are proving divisive. They exacerbate the problem of resignation, which is being attempted to be settled almost ten years after Benedict’s resignation. The solution was to be entrusted to a small group led by the Jesuit Gianfranco Ghirlanda, former rector of the Gregorian University and the Pope’s trusted canonist.
The hypotheses on the possible renunciation
Renunciation and foreign policy are two issues that often come up together. But in relations with China, as with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, the currents urging a different approach are more homogeneous.
On the other hand, when it comes to retiring, there are disagreements between both supporters and opponents of Jorge Mario Bergoglio. Some Catholic traditionalists have already said that Joseph Ratzinger’s resignation must remain an isolated case. And who, on the other hand, is willing to accept that it becomes a practice, hoping that Francis will leave the pontificate as soon as possible: a sign of uncertainty.
The disputes over the secret agreement with China
In the case of the agreement with Beijing, on the other hand, the fronts are clearly defined. The text of the agreement remains secret: in the sense that its content is not known due to the Chinese will. And that creates distrust.
And the Vatican’s extreme caution in condemning the crackdown on Hong Kong protests and silence on the persecution of Chinese Muslim Uyghurs in the country’s far west are seen as a by-product of the 2018 deal.
For traditionalists, confirmation that Francis would have sacrificed the Chinese secret Catholic Church on the altar of dialogue with Xi; and that, for the same reasons, he failed to adequately protest the arrest last May of the ninety-something Cardinal Emeritus of Hong Kong, Joseph Zen, who was later released on bail by Chinese police and received by Francis in recent days.
The Taiwan node
Zen an inveterate critic of the agreements with Beijing. And behind him we can suspect a current of the Church that is convinced that the agreement will end with the pontificate of Francis, explains a cardinal.
The judgment of these Catholic sectors that Xi is a ruthless dictator who would seek to indoctrinate Catholics and move to a state church, relying on the Holy See’s fears of undermining dialogue.
But it’s not clear where the concerns are coming from and to what extent they are mingled with hostility towards the Argentine pope. The fact that the issue intersects with the issue of Taiwan’s independence, the island that China wants to regain and which is a Western bastion in Asia, further complicates matters.
The balance between Moscow and Beijing
The Vatican continues to maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan, but not with China: again at the behest of Beijing.
Finally, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and Chinese solidarity with Putin have also led to relations between papal Rome and Moscow.
The basic criticism is directed at the Argentine pontificate and the Secretariat of State for privileged relations with autocratic regimes in this decade. With China in the long-term hope of converting at least part of this vast country; and with Russia to promote dialogue between Catholics and Orthodox. But the results so far are poor.
Xi Jinping does not evade a communist nationalism that sees religion as a phenomenon that needs to be normalized. It is significant that on the rare occasions when it would have been possible for him to meet Francis, he was careful not to do so: despite the papal cordial availability.
The contrasts with the Russian patriarch
As for Russia, the Vatican mediation was ignored by Putin. And subsequently, the openings have receded, culminating in 2016’s embrace of Cuba with Moscow Patriarch Kirill: the same one Francis now defines as Putin’s altar boy.
And meanwhile there are people in the West who accuse Bergoglio of not having taken a clear enough position towards Moscow, at least initially.
There was never any news about Russia, even if there was a different analysis from Benedikt’s side. When a position was taken on the Ukrainian question, the monastery let it be known that the pope emeritus preferred to remain silent.
January 9, 2023 (change January 9, 2023 | 22:53)
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