The Brazilian military government set it up in 1982 Argentinaduring the Falklands Waran “Information Search Network” for the confrontation between the neighboring country and the Great Britainindicate documents of the General Staff of the Armed Forces kept in the National Archive (A).
The country also took advantage of the British Vulcan bomber landing in Rio to take possession of a Westinghouse AGM45 Shrike antiradar missile, disassembling and examining it before returning it to the British.
The history of these Brazilian actions in the war can be reconstructed from the papers recently sent to the National Archives. Another part was located by João Roberto Martins Filho, a professor at the Federal University of São Carlos, who publishes the book O Brasil ea Guerra das Malvinas: Entre Dois Fogos (Alameda, 318 pages). Martins Filho also researched the British and Itamaraty archives. THAT Estao had access to the documents and the book, which will be published in June.
It is clear from the documents of the General Staff of the Armed Forces that the purpose of the system set up in Argentina almost a spy mechanism involving attachés and officers from Brazil who attended courses at Argentine military schools should bypass the censorship of the local dictatorship ironically criticized by Brazilians in a report. At the time of the war over the South Atlantic archipelago 40 years ago, Brazilians and Argentines the latter under siege were living in dictatorships. In Argentina, all information was controlled by the government.
“To circumvent this obstacle, in addition to the normal contacts with the intelligence (information) sectors of the MS (General Staff) of each of the Argentine Armed Forces, a closer relationship was established usually evasive and reserved with other reliable military attachés. , who monitored the conflict more actively and dynamically,” says the document 1982/1983 Operation Rosário (continued) Recapture of the Falkland Islands. Rosario is what Argentines called the invasion of the Falkland Islands (Falklands for the British), the South Sandwich Islands and South Georgia on April 2, 1982.
The document describes the network: “We had the valuable cooperation of our cadet officers enrolled in the General Staff Schools of the Argentine Army and Air Force, the SNI officer at Side (Intelligence Secretariat), as well as Brazilian and foreign journalists, representatives of newspapers and magazines from Brazil and other countries who came to our embassy to evaluate their analyzes and assessments of the conflict.”
euphoria
They were Brazilian student officers who took them to Brazil and were then commanded by General João Figueiredo, Information on the euphoria that gripped the Escola Superior de Guerra after the Argentina action. At the school, the document states, “teachers cannot hide their enthusiasm, going so far as to say that defeating terrorism and regaining the Falkland Islands legitimized the revolutionary government.”
A month after the invasion, the English operation to retake the islands began. Brazil helped the Argentines with intelligence and weapons, but struggled to maintain good relations with the United Kingdom.. The report states that the military junta met on the night of March 26, 1982. Its members were the general Leopoldo Galtieri, Chief of the Army and President of the Republic; Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, for the Air Force; and Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya for the Navy. Foreign Minister Costa Méndez attended the secret meeting.
In it, the decision was made to launch the operation to retake the Falkland Islands. The archipelago had been under the rule of the United Kingdom since the early 19th century, but was claimed by the Argentines. “The plan was a ‘state secret,’ known only to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CommandersinChief,” reports a Brazilian Air Force (FAB) attaché, who describes planning problems, political problems and even a bit of the environment a dream lived by the Argentines with the invasion.
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We had the valuable collaboration of our student officers (…) of the SNI officer, as well as Brazilian and foreign journalists (the Armed Forces General Staff).
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“Not even the general officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were aware of it. The lack of knowledge on the part of the other levels of the armed forces was a very negative factor as a number of measures were not taken.”
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The internal scenario worsened with union demonstrations. On April 1, few would bet on Galtieri remaining in power. The next day, the Argentines were taken by surprise. “Galtieri managed to gather an impressive crowd in the Plaza de Mayo and speak to the people. (…) It brought the nation together and made them believe that it was possible to defeat the Third World power.”
According to the documentation, information from the local Air Force General Staff indicated that “on the day of the invasion, April 2, 1982, the operation (Rosário) was planned for May or June, when weather conditions would be less favorable to the British. “
Back then, during Cold WarThe Argentine military dedicated itself to political repression it is estimated that up to 30,000 people have disappeared. But the insecurity of the military means for an external confrontation, especially with professional troops from a power like the United Kingdom, was obvious and would not advise adventure. “The US position has been misinterpreted,” the document said.
“Argentina’s cooperation in the troubled Central American region (military advisers training the Nicaraguan contras) would lead one to believe that the US government would force a diplomatic exit.” Bloodless action was expected to bring the UK into negotiations would. “The English reaction was not appreciated.”
uranium
Martins Filho looks at another way Brazil received information from Argentina. The country would have deciphered the code of the encrypted communication of the law firm of the neighboring country. One of the main concerns was obtaining information about USSR, Cuba and Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya aid to Argentina.
Libya reportedly undertook to send Soviet SAM6 and SAM7 missiles via the Tripoli, Canary Islands, Recife and Buenos Aires route. Five Aerolíneas Argentinas Boeing 707 flights were operated and more than a hundred missiles were delivered. Brazilians were still watching Argentina’s nuclear program. This was announced by the Navy Information Center Argentina’s negotiations with the USSR provided for the delivery of 100 kilos of enriched uranium to Buenos Aires. The establishment of Russian bases in the country was feared.
While keeping tabs on the Argentines, the Brazilians seized on a unique opportunity of the war: capturing an Americanmade AGM45 Shrike missile. He was on a Vulcan bomber that landed in Rio on June 3 after failing to refuel in flight. The plane was returning from the Falkland Islands, where it had fired two missiles and bombed the airport in Port Stanley, the island’s capital, and flew to Ascension Base.
The crew tried to get rid of sensitive material. He threw one Shrike into the sea, but the other got stuck with the warhead activated. Upon landing in Rio, the plane was held back at Argentina’s request. After negotiations, the Brazilians agreed to release the Vulcan while she was disarmed.
The missile was held back. The United States joined British pressure for recovery. Martin’s Filho shows the reason for both countries’ concern: It was a weapon with a modern guidance system. And Brazilians might be snooping around. That happened. London sent a message to its ambassador to Brazil, George William Harding. “You should be aware of the news that they may be messing around with the missile.” Copies were sent to Washington, the UK Ministry of Defense and the Royal Air Force Intelligence Service.
That is, British intelligence was informed about the action of the Brazilians, which journalist Roberto Godoy revealed through FAB sources. Godoy wrote Estao that the missile was examined by Luftwaffe experts. The equipment was secretly dismantled Brazil wanted to develop its first rocket. In addition to Harding, American ambassador Anthony Motley also put pressure on the country. After several delays, the gun was secretly handed over to England on July 6, 22 days after Argentina’s surrender.