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On February 24, 2022, the Russian army stormed Kiev with the intention of putting an end to it quickly. A year later, the conflict has stalled and Ukraine – with military support from the West – has even managed to recapture part of the territory captured by Russia at the beginning of the war.
Russia’s failure to achieve its original goals did not happen overnight. France 24 asked two military experts – Gustav Gressel, a specialist on Russian military issues at the Berlin-based European Council on International Relations, and Sim Tack, a military analyst at Forces Analysis, a conflict monitoring firm – for their opinion on the main battles that brought the opposing forces into the current one Situation.
Observers believed at the start of the conflict that “the likelihood of Russia’s quick victory would depend on its control of the air and the way it exploits it,” Gustav Gressel recalls.
But Moscow failed to assert itself in the sky, a failure with “significant consequences for the rest of the conflict,” affirms the German expert.
The Russians, however, had followed the first rule for gaining aerial dominance: use intense electronic jamming to blind Ukrainian anti-aircraft defenses to facilitate bombing of targets such as air bases or defensive installations. But “they followed the bombings carelessly and didn’t realize that they caused a lot of damage but little destruction,” Gustav Gressel notes.
At that time, the Russians were in too much of a hurry: they sent the troops to the ground before the air raid had ended. “In order to make the ground invasion possible, they had to stop interfering with the electrical equipment so as not to prevent their troops from communicating with each other,” Gustav Gressel points out. Result: the Ukrainian armed forces were able to restore and reorganize their anti-aircraft defenses.
The Russian army tried to overtake its opponent by advancing towards the Ukrainian capital on February 24.
The failure of this strategy shows “the ability of the Ukrainians to organize an effective defense quickly, even if they are surprised,” assures Sim Tack.
Symbol of this battle for Kiev, the Russian attempt to capture Antonov (or Hostomel) airport from February 24th. “They deployed special forces by helicopter, supplemented by traditional transport aircraft and then supported by Russian motorized units that came from Belarus,” explains Gustav Gressel.
However, the Ukrainians managed to repel the transport planes, leaving the troops who had arrived by helicopter isolated. “The tanks were fast, but not fast enough to reach these units in time,” says Gustav Gressel.
Russia’s failure to cross the southern Bug River at Voznesensk, northwest of Kherson and Mykolaiv, to head south “marked the end of Russian hopes of taking Odessa,” says Sim Tack.
The Russian forces had already tried in vain to cross this river at Mykolayiv. So they rushed north, hoping to end up there in a smaller and perhaps less well-defended city like Voznessensk.
“Russia has tried to copy the approach taken by American forces in Iraq in 2003: send small units forward to quickly capture target areas,” notes Sim Tack. But they did not have the same air support as the Americans, which greatly facilitated the Ukrainian defense. “The main result of this Russian strategy was to stretch the Russian army, which gave Ukrainian troops more time to organize between two attack waves,” explains Sim Tack.
Located about forty kilometers from the border with Russia, the city of Kharkiv represents a very important sluice that Moscow has to break. “It is an indispensable city for quick access to large areas of central Ukraine,” says Sim Tack.
Therefore, already on February 24, the Russians tried to capture it. But here, too, the Ukrainian defenses held out for months and despite an intense campaign of Russian airstrikes.
“This battle proved that the Russian army has a hard time in urban environments, especially in big cities like Kharkiv. In its defense, it is one of the most complicated combat environments, and even the United States has not found a silver bullet for urban battles,” Sim said tack
Russia’s failure is all the more glaring because Moscow has sent “some of its elite units that will be missing elsewhere at the front” to Kharkiv, Sim Tack asserts.
The port city of Mariupol, south of Donetsk, was a major asset for Russia. “Its control allowed Russia to establish continuity between the Donbass region and the occupied Kherson region,” Sim Tack notes.
The battle for Mariupol lasted much longer than Moscow expected. The Russians began by occupying the port, then they rose towards the city center and then had to destroy the pockets of resistance one by one.
Symbol of this merciless struggle: the siege of the Azovstal factory, where the last Ukrainian fighters were holed up. A final act of this battle, followed by the whole world.
“In Mariupol, Russia began its strategy of intensive bombing of cities when an infantry offensive was not enough,” explains Sim Tack.
The clashes over control of the Donets River are “the great battle that determined the course of the war,” assures Sim Tack. They formed an important natural line of defense between northern Ukraine and areas further south.
Unsuccessful attempts to cross the river, whether at Izium in March or at various other crossing points between this south of Kharkiv city and Lysychansk, have greatly contributed to the stagnation of the Forehead.
From that moment on, the Ukrainian conflict assumed the semblance of a war of position rather than a war of movement.
These repeated mistakes by the Russians were also a reminder of “the strength of geography. Even with the equipment specific to a modern conflict, crossing a river remains a very complex operation that requires perfect coordination,” stresses Sim Tack. The Russians learned this the hard way, losing significant numbers of men and equipment on these attempted crossings.
The violent clashes that began around the town of Popasna in March illustrate the actions taken by the Russian army after the first wave of major maneuvers early in the war. “It is typical of the spearhead strategy to break through opposing defenses,” summarizes Gustav Gressel.
For the advance, “the Russian artillery provides considerable firepower to break through the defense lines and clear the way for the infantry,” explains the German expert.
At Popasna, the Ukrainians struggled to counter this strategy, but the Russian army’s coordination problems “resulted in this breakthrough not materializing in a significant change in the front line because the infantry did not follow quickly enough,” adds Gustav Gressel.
This battle “still defines the dynamics of the war today because it paved the way for the Russians to Bakhmout,” Sim Tack says.
“It’s a perfect example of making the most of limited resources to gain an advantage,” notes Gustav Gressel.
Outnumbered and almost 100% dependent on Western military equipment, Ukraine managed to launch a counter-offensive around Kharkiv that resulted in Moscow being “put in a very delicate position between recognizing the war it had lost or… the decision to have to choose military mobilization,” summarizes Gustav Gressel. On September 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the partial mobilization of civilian reservists.
Kiev began pretending that a major operation was being prepared near Kherson, urging Russia to move some of its troops there. As soon as the Russian defense line “proved to be too extensive, the Ukrainian army struck on the Kharkiv plain,” Sim Tack notes.