Vladimir Putin announced on Sunday March 26 that he was preparing to store some of his nuclear weapons in neighboring Belarus. THE High Representative of the European Union for foreign affairs denounced “an irresponsible escalation and a threat to European security”. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry spoke of “new provocation by Putin’s criminal regime”.
Does this initiative matter? Not really – but it could well turn against its author if the West knows how to use it wisely.
The more moderate response from the US Department of Defense was the most appropriate: “We see no reason to adjust our own position on nuclear strategy.” Above all, Putin’s decision is rash and confusing. As far as talking about nuclear weapons near the Ukrainian border is a provocation, then yes, but only for show – and there is no need to get excited about it. .
A way to maintain your nuclear threat without taking any risks
Here’s the situation: Russia has about 2,000 “tactical nuclear weapons,” that is, relatively short-range weapons with a rather weak explosive charge, intended for use against military targets on the ground. Some are missiles, others bombs that can be dropped from airplanes; Most are located in western Russia or can be taken there.
Placing another dozen on Belarusian soil will not give Putin any advantage and will not change the strategic situation in any way. No Russian nuclear weapon will be closer to Ukraine than today. And a nuclear weapon fired by Belarus will not rid Russian soil of Western nuclear retaliation. The weapon used would still be Russian and fired from Russia (Putin has made it clear that he will not transfer control of these weapons to the authorities in Minsk; Moscow will remain in control, just as Washington controls American nuclear weapons at NATO bases ). Therefore, Russia would be the target of a retaliatory strike.
Putin seems to be making this move for show, and it’s completely groundless: it’s a way to keep his nuclear threat front and center without taking huge risks.
From Russia or Belarus the consequences would be the same
For a moment I wondered if this approach did not contain a new strategic subtlety in terms of nuclear deterrence, an unusual subtlety in Russian military thinking that would run counter to my conclusions. So I emailed Sir Lawrence Freedman, Professor Emeritus of War Studies at King’s College London and one of the foremost scholars and researchers in the field of military strategy.
Here is his answer: “The principle of deterrence theory is risk assessment and has nothing to do with science. But any nuclear weapons launched by Russia against people would be treated equally, whether they came from Russia or Belarus.”
“Remember Cuba,” Freedman added, referring to the 1962 missile crisis when Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev stationed nuclear missiles in Cuba. President John F. Kennedy had warned him that an attack on the United States from these Cuban bases, just 150 kilometers off the coast of the country, would count exactly as an attack from bases on Russian soil.
Perhaps President Joe Biden should say the same thing to Putin at some point, should one of the Russian President’s astute advisers convince him otherwise: Any Russian nuclear attack, be it from Russia or Belarus, would have very serious consequences.
A completely stupid decision towards China
But it’s also entirely possible that Putin just put a very unnecessary bullet in his foot. Four days earlier, at their pompous summit in the Kremlin, he and Chinese leader Xi Jinping signed a joint statement that said, among other things, “All nuclear-armed states must refrain from deploying nuclear weapons beyond their borders. That statement was meant to be a jab at the United States, the only country that deploys some of its nuclear weapons abroad — a hundred in five NATO countries that can be loaded on bombers.
Pushing aside an article about his brand-new deal with his “dear friend” from the East may be brazen of Putin, but most of the time it’s downright foolish. Above all, the joint statement – and the summit in all its guises – reflects Moscow’s clearly subordinate role in this partnership, and Xi, like his fellow dictator, has no patience for protests from dependent and smaller powers.
Xi had backed away from his description of Sino-Russian relations as a “borderless” partnership shortly before the invasion of Ukraine. The phrase was not repeated at the top of the Kremlin last week, and despite Putin’s vain hopes, Xi also signaled no moral or material support for Russia’s sluggish military.
Putin committed another act of self-destruction
Biden is keen (although not overly so, given the political realities) in finding ways to ease tensions in US-China relations, to examine common interests and prevent differences from turning into wars degenerate.
First of all, it is not in the interests of the United States to have absolutely hostile relations with both Russia and China; Second, reducing the risk of a major war in Asia is in itself a good thing. Secretary of State Antony Blinken was about to travel to Beijing to meet with Xi – a possible prelude to a summit with Biden – when the balloon crisis hit. The meeting was cancelled; tensions escalated. But the crisis turned out to be much less serious than many would like to believe. A new opening is quite plausible in the near future.
As part of that overture, Biden could, among other things, point to the blatant betrayal (and what is more inexcusable, more absurd) of saying that Putin just signed with Xi. The latter seems aware that his partnership with Putin carries risks, that his only value to China is the embarrassment he causes in the United States and Europe, and that he might be worth the effort if the real great powers – including Russia – giving up is certainly not a part – develop a way of cooperation.
If Biden and Xi manage to reintroduce the lubricant of diplomacy into their relationship, it could well happen, as Putin has just crossed the line and committed another act of self-destruction. And that, in the end, could be the main consequence of his nuclear game in Belarus.