Leonid Savin*, Prensa Latina employee
For this purpose, the experience of the US anti-terrorist units stationed around the Capitol in Washington could be used.
Another suggestion is to use conventional ammunition and commercial technology. As demonstrated by coalition forces in Iraq from 2004 to 2011, conventional military munitions scattered in the early days of the conflict, combined with modern commercial electronics and ingenuity, aided the Iraqi resistance in a deadly and effective campaign against the United States and to start their allies. Improvised explosive devices were used to attack and ambush coalition vehicles. As a result, the motorcycle and scooter repair shops on the streets of Taipei could quickly be repurposed for military use.
The United States is likely already training instructors in Taiwan to conduct insurgency operations. At the very least, these methods are consistent with US Special Operations Forces’ special warfare. And Taiwan is part of the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility of the US Special Operations Command (SOCPAC).
Likewise, US military experts recommend adequate reconnaissance to identify units that could be used to take China. Particular attention should be paid to landing parties and whether they include urban combat special units. This will help predict whether operations on the island will be extended, preventing a quick recognition of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan.
The United States is also keeping a close eye on China’s mobilization and logistics capabilities, which it believes are quite effective. In this context, the Taiwanese military is advised to advance several countermeasures at the same time. First, to improve the ability to transition from peacetime to wartime operations. Second, it is about strengthening intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, thus extending the timeframe for early warning by obtaining critical information about PLA material mobilization and transportation. The third is the integration of long-range precision strike weapon systems to enhance Taiwan’s “unified suppressive warfare” (lianhe zhia zuojian, 联合制压作战) based on the global defense concept.
These attack systems should be combined with cyber and information warfare to launch attacks against PLA logistics mobilization nodes to disrupt their combat rhythm and strategically seize space and time. These measures could exploit the existing shortcomings in the logistical support and mobilization of the PLA. The Americans believe that if the PLA wants a quick victory in the invasion of Taiwan, it must rely on its mobilization and logistical support plan to work well. Consequently, it will be crucial for the Taiwanese military to sabotage the PLA’s logistics and mobilization systems early in the war. Or perhaps in the preparatory phase, which would involve sabotage of Chinese territory and cyberattacks.
global defense concept
In 2017, Taiwan’s then-Chief of the General Staff, Admiral Li Ximin, proposed a new approach to Taiwan’s defense, called the Global Defense Concept.
This is essentially an asymmetric strategy that uses mobility, stealth, swarm tactics, and innovative approaches to complicate the PLA’s ability to find and destroy Taiwanese platforms (targets), particularly in the early stages of the conflict. Like all concepts of this type, it is based on maximizing the defensive advantage and aims to defeat the enemy at the moment of vulnerability, that is, when he is in the coastal zone. Thus, the first phase of military action according to the Global Defense Concept consists in maintaining one’s own forces during the PLA’s first attack on the island and its blockade. Taiwan’s military must represent a large number of small mobile units that can leave bases, conceal their positions and make detection difficult. Then it comes to the decisive battle in the hundred kilometer long coastal zone. The key elements for this are minefields and anti-ship cruise missiles. Underwater drones, planes or ships can be used to create minefields around the island. US military experts call this part of the “porcupine strategy”. Taiwan has already requested MK-64 Quickstrike air-dropped sea mines from the United States for back-supply so they can be deployed quickly at the start of a conflict. Taiwan also has WWII-era MK-6 mines it purchased from the United States and regularly tests for reliability. In addition, the Chung Shan National Defense Company has been producing mines since 2002.
As for missiles, Taiwan currently has truck-mounted Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles that can hide in a secluded location to avoid initial hits and then attack them when PLA ships start crossing the straits. To avoid retaliatory attacks, they must change location immediately.
The third phase of the Global Defense Concept is aimed at destroying the enemy in the “beach zone”, stretching about 40 kilometers from the planned landing sites. In this phase, the Taiwan Navy must lay both deep-water and shallow-water mines near potential landing zones. A new fleet of high-speed automated mine launchers is being built for this mission, the first of which is scheduled to be launched in August 2020. Various classes of surface ships could be fitted with mine guides. They are also known to be included in the design of the corvettes expected to become part of the Taiwanese Army. Due to the minefields, the first invasion ships are forced to slow down and are then attacked by swarms of small fast attack boats and anti-ship cruise missiles launched from trucks. In particular, it is important to hit important PLA ships, especially amphibious assault ships (marines) with personnel and vehicles and armor with fast reaction ships.
To be successful in this campaign, Taiwan must have a substantial stockpile of ammunition, as the island’s potential PLA blockade will make it difficult to rely on Allied supplies during the conflict. Sufficient staffing is also required. This is probably why Taiwan decided late last year to increase the length of conscription to one year. Compulsory military service will apply from January 1, 2024.
Currently, the biggest unsolved problem for the application of this model is Taiwan’s stagnant defense budget, which cannot sustain enough investment in both asymmetric coastal defense and conventional long-range attack capabilities.
The Ukrainian experience and broader approaches
US experts also highlight the role of unmanned aerial vehicles in the Ukraine conflict, suggesting that these tools would be used heavily in a possible war in Taiwan. They believe a mix of capabilities is needed from the Air Force, which uses manned aircraft and drones that can target Chinese weapons systems for rapid destruction. Only unlike the U.S. Air Force UAVs deployed in Ukraine, they require longer range, survivability, autonomy, and sophisticated sensors and payloads to utilize true coercive influence.
This requires a balance between creating a large number of inexpensive drones and the strategic and operational requirements faced by the US Air Force in the Indo-Pacific region.
Finally, in the United States, there is a general belief that China will employ a combined strategy toward Taiwan that falls within the concept of a gray area. Therefore, opposition to Beijing cannot be pursued solely through political or military means.
With that in mind, experts at the American Enterprise Institute suggest the United States is exploiting China’s vulnerabilities in four areas.
Economic: Greatly reduce US dependence on China and search for alternative markets;
Diplomatic: counter China’s coercive measures by strengthening alliances;
Military: Stabilize military balance in Asia by investing in critical defense capabilities. Undermining China’s efforts to put pressure on the Taiwanese government and prevent the Chinese Communist Party from attacking Taiwan;
Democratic: Against China’s human rights erosion with the help of friends in Qingjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and elsewhere.
Here we see an evolution of the “air-sea battle” strategy.
Therefore, it is necessary to keep in mind not only Taiwan’s military-industrial complex, US arms supplies, and Taipei’s ongoing reforms, but also other dimensions that can be used to deploy hybrid warfare tools against China.
rmh/ls
*Researcher and Associate Scientist at the University of Russia.
(Taken from selected companies)