Experts assess Russias weaknesses in the face of Ukrainian counteroffensive

Experts assess Russia’s weaknesses in the face of Ukrainian counteroffensive

1 of 1 Bombings in the city of Bakhmut in the Donetsk region of Ukraine — Photo: Libkos/AP Photo Bombings in the city of Bakhmut in the Donetsk region of Ukraine — Photo: Libkos/AP Photo

Since December, the Russian army has built large fortifications along the entire war front in Ukraine. Satellite images show that the troops that entered the country on February 24, 2022 are fortifying strategic points in the occupied territories and preparing for a counteroffensive. According to British Intelligence, the world has not seen strongholds of this size in decades.

Also, the Portal news agency records thousands of new fortresses located on the borders of Russia and in the south and east of Ukraine: ditches, ditches and roadblocks stretching for hundreds of kilometers, in addition to the socalled “Dragon’s Teeth”. Second World War.

According to Rob Lee, Associate at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, Moscow would have learned from the successful Ukrainian counteroffensive of 2022: “After the Kharkiv offensive, Russia realized that defeat is possible, and that it can lose territory again. I think it was recognized that Ukraine is capable of offensives.”

What the satellites show

Trenches are mainly dug for the soldiers to stand in, reinforced with sandbags and stones at the front. They are designed to protect Russian infantry from bullets, shrapnel and artillery fire, reports Brady Africk from the American Enterprise Institute in Washington based on an analysis of satellite images.

There are now numerous such posts along major thoroughfares and near strategic cities. Observers also report minefields.

Everything indicates that the Russians are expecting an offensive by the Ukrainian armed forces precisely in those areas where the largest defenses are being built. Such posts are concentrated in the southeast of the Zaporizhia region, in eastern Ukraine and around the isthmus connecting the Crimean Peninsula, annexed by Moscow in 2014, with the rest of the invasionhit country.

“These are serious fortifications that were built in six months,” said Oleh Zhdanov, a military expert and a colonel in the Ukrainian reserve.

However, he points out that these are localized installations only. For example, the railway network east of Melitopol is free of such bulwarks.

Fortresses are also a disadvantage for Russians

Niklas Masuhr from the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Polytechnic School in Zurich assesses the situation: “The fortifications provide a certain degree of predictability and structure future operations. This mitigates Russia’s weaknesses, as Ukrainian armed forces tend to do better in improvised situations and changing militaries.”

“On the other hand, stationing troops in fortified areas makes them more predictable for Ukrainians who know the locations,” Masuhr adds. Rob Lee agrees that concentrating fewer troops on a defined sector is an advantage for the Ukrainians, as they can advance deep into Russianheld territory. This way they will be able to destroy more other fortified lines and make a bigger advance.

However, the artillery positions are still not visible on satellite images, Zhdanov notes and explains that the Russians will only occupy them shortly before the fighting begins. Another important factor would be the Russian air forces, which, however, rarely penetrate into the space controlled by Kiev, thanks to the current effectiveness of the Ukrainian air defenses.

“It is important that the attacking forces of Ukraine have sufficient air defense systems that directly protect the troops. They will be accompanied by air defense at the tacticaloperational level, which will cover entire areas. This is a very serious factor to consider,” Zhdanov warns.

Soldier morale is vital

However, the retired colonel points out that the outcome of the counteroffensive does not depend solely on Russian bases in the occupied territories, which analysts say are capable of stopping a large advance of the Ukrainian army.

“The most important element of defense is that no matter how much soldiers bury or fortify themselves, it all depends on their readiness to defend themselves and their emotional and psychological state.”

Zhdanov recalls that during the occupation of Kherson, the Russian military built three rows of bulwarks in front of the city for almost half a year. However, this did not prevent them from being released by the Ukrainian armed forces.

“Ukraine’s goal should be to immobilize the Russian military leadership and panic Russian soldiers,” FranzStefan Gady, an expert in modern combat tactics and an analyst at the Institute for International Strategic Studies in London, told CNN. He believes tactical surprise, battlefield leadership and battle morale will be crucial in the first 24 hours of the offensive.

Oleh Zhdanov recalls that when the Kharkiv region was liberated, highly mobile units penetrated the gaps between fortified structures and trenches without getting involved in the fighting. “They made sure to create chaos and panic among the enemies, and then the main unit’s assault troops carried the battle through.”

Unprecedented situation for Ukrainian armed forces

Lee of the Foreign Policy Research Institute believes that Ukrainian main battle tanks and other armored vehicles must work in concert with engineers, artillery and even aircraft to breach Russian forts and liberate occupied territories. For this purpose, newly delivered western military equipment will be helpful.

Among them, Zhadnov highlights both the American M58 MICLIC (Mine Clearing Line Charge) mine clearance system and the Germansupplied Biber temporary bridging tanks, which make it possible to overcome small obstacles; and Dachs technical tanks. In addition, Ukraine received mine clearance tanks.

For Niklas Masuhr, Western support will also be important to enable Ukrainian armed forces to operate in combined armed groups, uniting and concentrating different units for effective combat. Both the provision of weapons with ammunition and further information support will be of crucial importance, the security expert emphasizes.

According to retired Australian Major General Mick Ryan, intelligent planning on the part of Ukraine could be even more crucial than Western weaponry, with “the training of members of battalions, brigades and leadership for complex combined armed group operations” given the extremely difficult ground operations.

Masuhr agrees and warns: “We have never seen attacks by the Ukrainian army on such heavily fortified Russian positions. Previous counteroffensives were aimed at weakened, scattered Russian troops. The current situation is completely different.”