What is Putin waiting for to get rid of Wagner’s head, which continues to insult Russian military leaders? And why is he doing this?
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But what is Vladimir Putin waiting for to get rid of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the Wagner Brigade? Although denied by those directly involved, the rumors published by the Washington Post about his possible betrayal (informing Ukrainians about the position of Russian regular army troops in exchange for Kiev’s withdrawal from Bakhmut) may have tipped the scales given the The camel already broke the back of Prigozhin’s constant criticism of the Russian military leaders. As well as, in recent days, to an unspecified happy grandfather who was convinced that everything was fine, in whom many saw Vladimir Putin himself. So what’s waiting for the tsar to put him out of the way?
Maybe the right question, because he’s waiting. And the question Andrei Soldierov and Irina Borogan from the Center for European Policy Analysis, co-founders of the website Argentura.ru, which monitors the activities of the Russian intelligence services, are trying to answer on the Foreign Affairs website. The two analysts certainly do not deny that Prigozhin is causing growing irritation – a euphemism – in many corridors of Moscow. But not in all. To understand the relative strength of Prigozhin and Wagner in Russia, one has to consider how the mercenary company is viewed by four different parts of the Russian state: the military intelligence agency known as the GRU; the military in general; the state security agency known as the FSB; and Putin himself.
To sum up and simplify: Gru was always the most benevolent towards Wagner. Also because many members of both come from the same ranks: those of the Spetsnatz. These are – as Pietro Batacchi, director of the Italian Defense Review explained to RaiNews – special units that are not only present in Russia but also in other countries and essentially have to carry out three special missions: the so-called MA, Military Assistance ( military). assistance), the detailed reconnaissance of the targets to be hit and the movements of the enemies, finally the direct action, i.e. hitting, neutralizing and even killing the target. They are a public subject, they have nothing to do with the “contractors”, the so-called mercenaries, that is, private subjects paid by the Russians to fight. However, within the Gru there is a department that oversees the activities of mercenary groups, including Wagner.
A few months after the first report of Wagner’s existence (in 2015, editor’s note), a GRU official confirmed to us – Soldierov and Borogan write – the existence of this new detachment, apparently made up of Spetsnaz veterans. For the GRU, Wagner offered a practical means of denying its operations at a time when Russia was publicly denying its direct involvement in eastern Ukraine, around the time of Crimea’s annexation and Moscow’s support of the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.
The two analysts emphasize some analogies between Wagner and the American Blackwater, others, perhaps stronger ones, with past periods of Russian history: For the crane, Wagner also represents the continuation of a much older tradition, going back to the Soviet Union, as Der Kremlin used proxy forces to intervene in conflicts around the world. “Just like we did when we had our military cloaked during the civil war in Spain,” a GRU official told us in 2017 when we asked him why the agency needed a private military company like Wagner. (…) For the GRU, Russia’s experience in the Spanish Civil War became a convenient justification for its support of Wagner’s troops in Ukraine, where the Kremlin insisted they fight the fascists again. And sources contacted by Soldierov and Borogan confirmed to them that the Wagner is still viewed as a useful tool within the Gru.
On the other hand, the attitude towards Prigozhin and his men from the army and the FSB, the heirs of the KGB (from whose ranks Putin is known to come), is not so benevolent. After all, the Wagner founder aimed his arrows more and more virulently at the army commanders. Even if, given the power struggles in the Moscow armed forces, there is always someone who supports Prigozhin’s statements (for example, among the supporters of General Sergei Surovikin, who entrusted the campaign in Ukraine to Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, one of them). the favorite destinations in the videos of the Wagner boss). As for the FSB, hostility towards Wagner is evident, even if the authority of the intelligence services is only slowly rebuilding after the shortcomings in Ukrainian resilience already pointed out at the beginning of the invasion (so it is also said). Putin probably only listened to those who who told him welcome lies, and not uncomfortable truths.
None of the three positions on Prigozhin and Wagner considered so far – Gru, the armed forces and the FSB – carry as much weight for Soldierov and Borogan as the fourth: that of Vladimir Putin. Which, in turn, is due to the Tsar’s complex relationship with the military. In his early years in power, one of Putin’s greatest challenges was bringing the military under control. As one of the largest militaries in the world in a vast country where everything is done in-house, the Russian military has a long tradition of ensuring that the outside world knows as little about its activities as possible. This means that the usual forms of public administration and control, whether by parliament, law enforcement agencies or the media, simply do not take place in Russia. During his first decade in office, Putin sought to increase his influence in the military by appointing former KGB general and close friend Sergei Ivanov as defense minister. But Putin was forced to replace him in 2007 when it became clear that Ivanov’s efforts to launch comprehensive military reforms had failed. Later, Putin tried again to gain more influence with Shoigu, another outsider in the military. But now, after more than a year of war in Ukraine, there is little evidence that Putin had any more success with Shoigu than with Ivanov.
But there is more. And it has to do with Putin’s obsession with potential threats to his rule. Putin understands that in times of war, the military tends to gain more power within the state. He knows that the longer the war lasts, the greater that power becomes and the more difficult it becomes for him to exercise control. And because he tends to see the world as a threat, he worries about the military’s relative power, in some ways even more than the military’s performance on the battlefield. From this perspective, Putin would not see Prigozhin as a threat, but as a useful pawn to line up those who might actually threaten him.
Here, too, the two analysts draw a precedent in Russian history, but one that dates back much further than the Soviet era: In the 18th century, Tsar Peter the Great made Alexander Menshikov, his version of the court jester, the country’s most powerful prince for the same reason: Menshikov had Due to his humble origins, he had no position within the Russian aristocracy and was brutal, ruthless and absolutely loyal to the tsar, who beat him with a stick.
However, Prigozhin’s calculation that he could be Putin’s Menshikov could prove risky: what Prigozhin doesn’t seem to understand is that, try as he and Putin might, Putin’s Russia is not the Russia of Peter the Great. Many sections of Russian society, particularly the country’s bureaucracy, view the Wagner boss’ raids with horror and disgust. And they could take advantage of a possible military setback at Wagner Field – after so many lives and military equipment were sacrificed in the siege of Bakhmut – to ask for his head.
Which, fortunately for him, could be more metaphorical than real. In fact,Soltov and Borogan recall that the Russian president has a long track record of effectively exploiting failed bureaucrats, politicians and other stooges: former President and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev springs to mind. Prigozhin could be next.