THE NEW YORK TIMES It might be the longawaited Ukrainian counteroffensiveThat could be at an early stageis just as hopeless as the Russian winter offensive (northern hemisphere). Defenders usually have that Advantages over tyrants at trench warfareand the Russian army had months to establish itself. But it is also possible that the Ukrainians will make advances that could end the war that is looming later this year. So how is this supposed to end?
We can start by listing ways this shouldn’t happen. The first, proposed last year by French President Emmanuel Macron: “We must not humiliate Russia,” he argued, “so that one day the fighting will stop and we can use diplomatic means to build an exit ramp.” At the time, the motto was “not to humiliate Russia” to allow Moscow to preserve its illgotten gains while its troops were still on the offensive.
Incorrect. A crushing and clear defeat is exactly what is needed to put an end to Russia’s imperialist ambitions. It’s easy to forget today that after invading Georgia in 2008 and taking over Ukrainian territory in 2014, Vladimir Putin launched a third war of conquest, intimidation and annexation against his neighbors with last year’s invasion. This is not the case. These include the cyber war against Estonia, assassinations on British soil, the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 or the annihilation of Grozny.
Photo by the Russian Defense Ministry shows a Russian tank firing on Ukrainian frontline positions. Photo: Russian Defense Ministry / via AP
Each act of aggression essentially went unpunished, enticing Russia to undertake the next. If the war in Ukraine ends with Putin achieving some of his goals and with no irreparable consequences for his regime, the only “exit ramp” the West has found will serve as an entry ramp for Putin’s next crimes.
If Ukrainian troops breach Russian lines in a way that forces Putin to seek a deal likely with Chinese mediation there will also be those who argue that a ceasefire and a Koreanstyle truce risks a dramatic escalation are preferable. The Kremlin may try to encourage this mindset by brandishing its nuclear saber again, this time even sharper.
While the nuclear threat should never be dismissed out of hand, upon closer inspection it appears hollow.
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The reason Putin hasn’t used tactical nuclear weapons in this war so far isn’t because of moral qualms, which might go away if he feels cornered. It’s just that these weapons, originally intended to destroy large concentrations of armor and fortifications, make little sense on a thin battlefield. And the Biden administration has also threatened unspecified “catastrophic consequences” if Russia uses these weapons — possibly sinking the Russian fleet in the Black Sea or a violent but nonnuclear response from NATO.
The biggest problem with the ceasefire model is that it would freeze the conflict in a way that would allow Russia to resume it after licking its wounds and regaining its strength. As for Ukraine, the country should become a fortified state, even if its economy is crippled by the war.
Those who draw the South Korean analogy miss two elements. First, Russia is fundamentally more powerful than North Korea. Second, the peace on the Korean Peninsula has been preserved for 70 years by a large and continuous US military presence a presence that relatively few Americans would replicate in Ukraine.
The alternative is victory. It is what Ukrainians deserve, what most of them want and what they demand from their political leadership. That goal has been both complicated and facilitated by President Joe Biden’s great willingness to arm Kiev with the tools it needs to win. And also hampered by his own ambivalence about the outcome he really wants, one that doesn’t allow Russia to win or the whole world to be blown up in the process.
A Ukrainian soldier covers his ears as he fires a mortar shell at Russian frontline positions near Bakhmut. Photo: Efrem Lukatsky/AP
Victory has two recipes. The first and riskiest is to provide Ukraine with the weapons its armed forces need, mostly longrange missiles, more tanks, Predator drones and F16 fighters, not just to smack Russia out of the territories captured in that war drive out, but also the reconquest of Crimea and the breakaway “republics” in the east. This is what Ukrainians want and what is their moral and legal right.
But retaking Crimea will be difficult, and even success will come at a cost, primarily in the form of populations not necessarily eager to be liberated by Kiev. That brings us to the second recipe: help Ukraine restore its preFebruary 2022 borders and nothing else with compromises in the form of EU membership and a bilateral security treaty with Washington modeled on US security cooperation. Israel.
Would this increase US vulnerability to Russian aggression? No, it would decrease. And for the same reason, Putin did not dare to attack the Baltic countries, NATO members, but twice attacked Ukraine: dictators hunt the weak, not the strong. Would this satisfy Ukraine’s security needs? Yes, with guaranteed access to both European markets and American weapons.
And would that humiliate Putin? Yes, in the best way possible, to show him and other despots inside and outside Russia that attacks on democracies never pay. / TRANSLATION BY GUILHERME RUSSO