Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenko appears to have won a prestigious victory by negotiating the deal between Vladimir Putin and Yevgeny Prigoyine, but he may regret the price when he sees the lumbering leader of paramilitary group Wagner arrive at his home.
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In a surprise statement late Saturday, Lukashenko’s press office said he spent the day negotiating with Prigozhin, with the support of the Russian president, eventually getting Wagner’s boss to halt his advance on Moscow.
The deal represents a coup for Lukashenko, who has ruled his country with an iron fist for nearly 30 years and has been an outsider in the West since the hotly contested 2020 elections and his backing of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The 68-year-old leader is also facing nagging questions about his health after he appeared in very poor condition at ceremonies commemorating the victory over Germany in World War Two in Moscow last month. Before it disappeared for several days.
After the negotiated agreement expires, Prigoyine will have to live in exile in Belarus, the Kremlin said, without specifying whether he would bring members of his militia with him.
The phone call during which Putin thanked Lukashenko, according to the Belarusian presidency, must have sounded like sweet music to the Minsk strongman’s ears.
AFP
But for Katia Glod from the European Leadership Network in London, Lukashenko inherited a hot potato. “I don’t think it’s Lukashenko’s will. I think it was used by the Kremlin,” she told AFP.
Her presence in Belarus will pose “several risks,” she adds, in a country where security force loyalty is paramount after the 2020 election that sparked protests and a crackdown. “The only advantage the Belarusian leader could derive from this would be to use Prigozhin’s men as a personal army against a possible uprising.”
The idea of the leader of the world’s most famous mercenary group settling in Belarus does not please his neighbors.
Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda, whose country is hosting the NATO summit next month, has warned that the alliance should strengthen its eastern borders “in case Prigozhin or any part of the Wagner group lands in Belarus with unclear plans and intentions”.
Since 2020, Lukashenko has been increasingly dependent on the Kremlin for his political survival, posing as Putin’s vassal. And what the opposition sees as a major blow to Belarus’ sovereignty is that the country is now harboring Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
“The deployment of nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory means Russia’s slow-motion annexation of Belarus,” notes William Alberque of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). “I think Lukashenko already feels cornered. Of course, if Putin says to him, “Do me a favor,” he will do so in hopes of exerting pressure.”
For the Belarusian opposition, whose leader Svetlana Tikhanovskaïa went into exile the day after elections she allegedly won, Lukashenko’s dependence on Russia makes their decision dangerous.
“Prigozhin is not a gift for Lukashenko because Putin, the autocrat, will never forgive the humiliation he suffered,” said former Belarusian culture minister Pavel Latushko, who is now in the opposition.
“It’s a small tactical, artificial and superficial victory for Lukashenko that could turn into a strategic problem,” he added on Polish opposition channel Telegram Nexta.
According to human rights group Viasna, internal repression has intensified and there are around 1,500 political prisoners.
According to Katia Glod, Lukashenko’s rule rests on two pillars: violence and Russian support. But “he’s obviously worried now because the Kremlin isn’t as strong as it seemed to be,” she said.
For her part, Hanna Liubakova of the Atlantic Council notes that Lukashenko’s position could be strengthened through his mediation. But “in the longer term, his regime will suffer the effects.”
Because if he showed “unwavering loyalty” to the Kremlin, he was making a “risky bet” on Russia’s quick victory in Ukraine. “As Putin’s authority weakens, the Minsk regime may find less backing and backing from Russia.”