1695542914 China is buying ports as strategic posts news

China is buying: ports as strategic posts news

Beijing has poured a lot of money in recent years into investments in ports around the world, from Athens to Singapore and Hamburg. More recently, it was the Chinese state-owned company China COSCO Shipping Corporation that acquired a stake of almost 25% in a container terminal in the German Hanseatic city.

In 2016, the Chinese company took over most of the port of Piraeus in Athens, the most important in the Mediterranean in terms of the number of passengers and cargo. Both agreements – key word: critical infrastructures and strategic interests – provoked long and heated political debates.

A network around the world

In recent years, China has been trying to gain influence over strategically important oceans, shipping lanes and ports in Asia and around the world, he said in a recent commentary in Foreign Policy magazine.

Hamburg Container Port (Germany)

Getty Images/Taikrixel The entry of Chinese state-owned company COSCO into the port of Hamburg has caused controversy over critical infrastructure

Accordingly, companies from the People’s Republic own varying amounts of shares in almost 100 ports worldwide or are their operators and have continually expanded their portfolio – most recently to include a stake in the Tollerort terminal in Hamburg and a in the Solomon Islands in the Pacific.

Not uncommon in itself

Of course, foreign participation in port infrastructure is not a problem in itself, says the North American magazine; the Netherlands, Singapore and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), for example, also own or operate “dozens” of seaports.

China, however, would use the ports as outposts to gather critical information. However, the two authors of the commentary, Elaine Dezenski and David Rader of the conservative Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) in Washington, do not have an answer to the question of exactly what they are. The think tank is close to the Republican Party and both authors were former US government officials.

A “spy vs. spy” race

In any case, the fact appears to be that China and especially the US have significantly increased their secret service activities. The “New York Times” recently wrote about a sort of “spy vs. spy” race between the two superpowers.

The People’s Republic is trying with remarkable “aggressiveness” (keyword: spy balloon) to spy on the USA, which in turn tried with a similar strategy to slow down China’s military and technological progress under President Joe Biden.

Skillful filling of key positions

In any case, the Foreign Policy article said, China has some form of involvement in at least half of the 75 major container ports (outside the People’s Republic). This allows you to control access to terminals, docks and storage areas.

Piraeus container port (Greece)

Getty Images/iStockphoto/Milangonda China – along with many others around the world – has for years been the majority owner of the port of Piraeus in Athens

More than half of Chinese investments affect key points of international maritime transport, such as in the Indian Ocean (Sri Lanka), the Red Sea (Djibouti), the Suez Valley in Egypt and the Mediterranean, such as Haifa in Israel or Piraeus in Athens.

Resistance to Beijing’s expansion

These participations “open the door”, according to the US political magazine, to intelligence gathering “and other strategic activities”. In the case of the Hamburg terminal, one of the fears was that Beijing could also resort to espionage and cyber activities; the German Office for the Protection of the Constitution warned that one should not “become dependent”. Several German ministries spoke out against Chinese entry.

For China, the world’s largest trading nation, port investments are an important part of its “One Belt, One Road” (BRI) infrastructure initiative. This gigantic project, launched in 2013 by state and party leader Xi Jinping and involving billions in investment, aims to create not only commercial corridors by land, but also by sea – with investments in several important ports along maritime trade routes. . to and from China.

Even cranes under suspicion of espionage

According to Foreign Policy, China is today the main player in maritime transport, with a huge fleet of container ships and tankers, ships carrying liquefied natural gas and cargo ships carrying coal and cereals. More than 90% of shipping containers are manufactured in the People’s Republic, and the same applies to naval cranes.

China’s maritime activities and involvement in ports are being used to collect “large-scale” data and observation, the op-ed continues. The US called the Chinese logistics platform LOGINK, which records trade routes, trade volumes, geospatial data, licenses and all kinds of other data, a risk.

In the spring, even port cranes came under suspicion of espionage. The suspicion at the time: they could collect data, such as information about cargo or, in military ports, about military equipment being loaded or unloaded, and pass it on. The US conducts military operations and bases around the world, including in countries neighboring China.

The boundaries between civil and military are blurring

Finally, Chinese naval forces, now the largest navy in the world according to the US political magazine, have also benefited from access to ports owned or participated in by the People’s Republic around the world. So far, China operates just one overseas naval base – in Djibouti, East Africa, on the Red Sea – compared to the US Navy’s “extensive global network”.

But: Chinese-owned civilian ports also serve as a point of contact for military purposes; in the event of a crisis, they could serve as supply and repair bases. To this end, China is “increasingly committed to civil-military interoperability in maritime infrastructure” and other areas. China is blocking data from its own ships, wrote “Foreign Policy”.

The line between civilian and military is blurring; ports built with Chinese assistance (not those with participation) would also be adapted for use by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army war fleet. The People’s Republic’s warships have already reached about a third of the ports where China is involved. But control over data, port infrastructure, logistics and distribution routes alone would give Beijing enormous power in the event of conflict – without any direct military means.