Four weeks before the first round of Argentina’s presidential election, Javier Milei dominates the demographic scene. He is not far behind Sergio Massa, the heir to the outgoing Alberto Fernández, with 30%. Patricia Bullrich, the traditional right candidate, is in a similar range: 26%. Schiaretti and Bregman, fourth and fifth, would be much further out of the race, under 5%. This is the data showing an average of the last 18 polls conducted after the August primaries (PASO), excluding undecided people from the average calculation base in order to get as close as possible to the result expected by the polls.
In fact, the polls did not predict the number of votes that Javier Milei’s party achieved in the PASO, a usual test of strength before the presidential elections: in these primaries, in addition to clarifying the candidacies (which often arrive already finalized), the flow of votes for each formation is calibrated based on how many citizens choose to participate in each primary election. The Houses of Representatives have underestimated Milei, which has already become a global rule when it comes to candidates from outside the system, with a base that has yet to be defined and filled with people either because of their socio-demographic profile or because they tend to distrusting the system (including surveys) are not captured as well by these methods.
But it has also become common (and actually desirable) for these same polling stations to update their processes as soon as the error is discovered. That’s exactly what the Argentines seem to have done, and that’s why they’re now conquering Milei’s territory.
However, this dominance would not give him a chance to win in the first round. According to electoral law, a candidate needs 45% or 40% and 10 points over the runner-up to advance to the final. None of the surveys analyzed predicted the first possibility, and only one (from August) predicted the second. This happens even if undecideds (which are found with different frequencies in the surveys) are not included in the calculation base, which tends to increase the percentages.
Since no clear winner is expected in the first round, the question now arises as to who would compete against each other in the second round. According to the analysis, Milei was almost guaranteed the place: the only study that didn’t give her first place gave her second place. Now his companion would be more controversial. With Schiaretti and Bregman out of the picture, it’s a fight between Massa (who would make the runoff in 16 of the 18 polls analyzed) and Bullrich (in the remaining 2).
A ratio of 8 to 1 seems very favorable to the official candidate, but this dichotomous view hides the fact that the estimated margin between the two varies greatly depending on the polling station.
Massa’s average lead is actually less than five points: it would be enough if Bullrich were underestimated by 2.5 points (reaching 28) and Massa was overestimated by a few more (and remained at the same 28) to see that There is no clear solution for the race. This development fits perfectly into the remaining weeks. There is also room for an error of this size, which is relatively common in surveys in any country, because it is really small. This could be an opportunity for Bullrich to gain public recognition beyond his usual political sphere of influence (Buenos Aires and the province of the same name).
On the other hand, Massa has in his favor the closest thing to the law of gravity that 21st century political science knows: polarization. Milei has built a discourse essentially based on this, and it has worked for her, at least for now. This also gives him an advantage in the race by accompanying him in the runoff to whoever is furthest away from him. For two reasons: First, it gives you the full reaction and prominence level. Every time he speaks of “left,” the image that pops into the voter’s mind is not exactly that of Bullrich. In doing so, it mobilizes precisely this base. Second, if his own base is devoid of anything, then those are the very people he is insulting. Because of the novelty and heterogeneity of the phenomenon, it may be (and is) difficult to profile Milei’s voter, but there is little doubt that he will lean more to the right than to the left. So if it steals votes from one of the blocs that played a prominent role in Argentine politics in the 20th century, it is anti-Kirchnerism.
Bullrich, on the other hand, relies more on the other big electoral factor, especially in Argentina and even more so in Argentina today: material values. Economy and security. The Together for Change candidate is interested in what is most damaging to those carrying the backpack of the outgoing government. In the meantime, Milei waits for now.
Average methodology. This average takes into account the most recent version of each poll published by polling stations registered in the CNE and published and conducted after the PASO, taking into account all polls published by the media and regularly collected on Wikipedia. Some of these surveys exclude undecided voters from the calculation basis for their voting intentions, while others do not. In order to make them comparable and bring the number as close as possible to the picture perceived in the polls, the average is taken, excluding those who are undecided from the calculation basis. So, for example, if a poll shows 50% for Candidate A and 40% for Candidate B and 10% undecided, Candidates A and B’s percentages are recalculated based on the total number of decided votes, which in this case would be 50 +40 =90. Candidate A would have 50/90=55.55%. Candidate B 40/50=44.44%. All surveys captured in their original versions are listed below.