The Al-Aqsa deluge began at 6:30 a.m. Saturday with a barrage of rockets targeting Israeli positions on the Gaza border. It was a devastating blow on Israel’s longest day.
The outposts
One soldier told the website The hottest place in the hell: “I had just woken up when the attack started, we didn’t know what to do.” The militiamen from Nuvka, an elite Hamas unit, blinded the surveillance systems by blinding them with sniper fire, while the turrets equipped with remote-controlled machine guns were destroyed by drones. There are those who say that they also resorted to electronic means, a detail that needs to be confirmed.
The besieged were without precise orders and were overwhelmed by their enemy. Only a few experienced elements were among the first to die, as one platoon of the Golani Brigade was wiped out. Nevertheless, the secret service had sent a message in which it had detected unusual movements during the night. Except that the army and the Shin Bet have decided not to raise the alert level. Furthermore, the effort was weak. For several reasons: trust in the wall and in the sensors; the battalions deployed in the West Bank to protect the colonies; the idea that the enemy would be unable to carry out long-range actions; the coincidence of the holiday.
A distorted picture due to the attack on the division headquarters, where the most important officers were concentrated. Those who were supposed to lead the response were wounded, killed or captured. Air support would have been important, but target designations were needed. But the positions were paralyzed and some were hastily abandoned.
Everything dissolved before the shoulders of over a thousand mujahideen, who were themselves surprised by the speed of the advance. Salah al Aruri, number two in the Politburo, confirmed this: We had control in three hours.
The reaction
Not even the General Staff probably understood it. The army’s first statement at 6:30 a.m. referred to the firing of rockets and only at 7:40 a.m. did it speak of an “infiltration” from the Gaza Strip. By now it was late as the militants were at this point spreading out to engage in the major massacre.
The recordings from the video cameras at the entrances to the town show the arrival of the terrorists between 7 and 7:30 a.m., with the guardhouses almost always unguarded, perhaps because the security personnel had reached the shelters due to the bombardment of over 2,000 “rockets”. The collapse or the absence of it Effective opposition has allowed Hamas to deploy fighters and then predatory groups.
The countermovements were sporadic: twenty members of the Shaldag elite unit were brought to Be’eri by helicopter, many came under fire.
The tricks
Mohammed Deif’s robbers say they have been preparing for two years. Probably. They certainly spied and studied and developed a meticulous plan.
The reports – still summaries – provide some clues: Some were disguised as Israeli soldiers and managed to fool guards to surprise motorists who thought they were finding help instead; others were assisted by some Palestinian workers who acted as guides and conducted reconnaissance work; Maps showing the weak points of Israeli tanks and photos of satellite maps showing the targets were recovered from the bodies of the militiamen.
In addition, there was the ability to carry out exercises with hang gliders, explosives and boats as a routine.
The resistance
Many episodes of heroism. Inbar Lieberman is a woman in charge of security at Kibbutz Nir Am, just 500 meters from the Strip. When he heard the first explosions, he opened the armory and distributed rifles to collaborators and civilians; Then he arranged them to form a perimeter. So they kept the guerrillas at bay and killed at least three of them.
A colleague of his did the same in another village while a handful of guards tried to use weapons to fight the commando who was descending from the sky on hang gliders to the rave festival. Stories that must be taken into account as authorities develop countermeasures to protect communities.
There must be local shielding. The army cannot be everywhere, armored bunkers are not always the solution. In some cases they represented salvation, but in others they became cruel traps. When the attackers failed to break in, they set the houses on fire.
The freedom
A New York Times reconstruction reconstructed how much time passed from the moment of the attack to the liberation of some places. Nir Oz: 8.5 hours. Rave meeting: 8 hours. Kfar Aza: 20 hours. Be’eri: 7.5 hours. A very long “window”, the chronicle of an ordeal.
Jerusalem needed to understand what had happened, gather reinforcements, and hunt down the fedayeen. Meanwhile, the enemy took over a hundred hostages, leaving behind a mass of casualties and national trauma.