It is sensational and disturbing that Israel is receiving “advice” from the United States on how to conduct anti-Hamas operations in Gaza. Who could know the situation on the ground better than the Israeli military? What else can the soldiers sent by Washington to provide “support” know?
The Pentagon’s deployment of General Glynn to Israel and the many other suggestions and warnings passed to the press by the White House and the National Security Council are not episodes of ordinary governance. They represent one of the many anomalies of this war, which from the very beginning with the surprise attack by Hamas has weakened the reputation of the Israeli intelligence service and the Israeli armed forces.
The alliance between Washington and Tel Aviv has been a geopolitical constant since 1947 (foundation of the State of Israel) and especially since 1967 (Six-Day War). It is normal for information and advice to be exchanged between allies. This is even more true when one of the two is under constant siege and the other historically wields strategic influence in the Middle East. Nor should aid be understood as one-sided aid: When America suffered the tragic defeat of September 11, 2001, US intelligence was eager for information and help from Israel’s Mossad.
In normal times, however, mutual help and advice takes place in secret and with discretion. Today, however, we see a Biden administration flaunting its surrogate role in media outlets around the world and inflicting downright humiliating indiscretions on its ally. He sends a general whose express task is to “explain” to his Israeli counterparts all the unknowns of an urban war in Gaza, highlighting the lessons Americans have learned in Iraq. As if the Israeli military had not studied them …
In the American media, inspired by the White House or the Pentagon, rumors are circulating about the danger that Israel’s military response is “emotional, vengeful and without a long-term strategy.” Various US experts with ties to the current administration are wondering aloud whether the Tel Aviv government and armed forces have a plan that contemplates the second, third, fourth chapter of this story after the first offensive against Hamas. You wonder whether all the strategic implications of a possible expansion of the front towards Hezbollah in Lebanon or towards Iran have been calculated. They fear that Israel’s strategy does not take into account the need to assemble a front of quasi-friendly Arab countries, from Saudi Arabia to the Emirates to Qatar, including, of course, Egypt and Jordan. All of this is happening not in a closed debate between Joe Biden, Anthony Blinken and the War Cabinet chaired by Benjamin Netanyahu, but in a kind of a priori public process about what Israel will do.
It’s not a normal situation. The anomaly that has characterized the relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv in recent days is not alleviated by comparison with the early stages of the war in Ukraine. Yes, the similarities are obvious, very strong. Even in February 2022, Ukraine was initially surprised by Putin’s aggression and, in this case, was guilty of not heeding the warnings of American and British intelligence that predicted this invasion. From that moment on, the early stages of the Russian attack were marked by America’s deep distrust of Kiev and of Zelensky in particular. Like Netanyahu, Zelensky also inherited a bad relationship with Biden. The Pentagon had serious doubts about the resilience of the Ukrainian army. This initial phase was overcome thanks to the behavior of Zelensky and his soldiers. But this is where the parallel ends: the reputation of the Israeli army and intelligence certainly cannot be compared to that of the Ukrainians; Furthermore, US-Israel relations are much older and deeper.
Today, Israel is suffering from a loss of credibility, which is primarily linked to Netanyahu. He is accused of too many mistakes and has never done anything to respond to criticism from US Democrats: in fact, since the time of Barack Obama, he has acted as if only the Republican Party existed in the United States. His preferred axis with Donald Trump is a flaw that adds to many others.
As for the CIA and the Pentagon, they wonder whether the proverbial effectiveness of the Israeli intelligence services and military has not been seriously undermined by the destruction of civil society wrought by Netanyahu.
Finally, the White House is also concerned about the fate of the American hostages and wants to keep some lines of communication active with Hamas (particularly through Qatar) for their release. The keen awareness of global risks is reflected above all in the “disregard” resulting from the many news leaks caused by Washington.
Biden’s team takes seriously the risk that an anti-Western axis made up of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea could cause further conflict. The White House believes that the thaw between Israel and Saudi Arabia – and with it the immense potential for peace in the Middle East – can still be saved if the counteroffensive in Gaza is kept within limits acceptable to moderate Arab leaders.
As the unprecedented story of Hamas fake news about the bombed Palestinian hospital shows (against which there were no antibodies even in the West), the Arab streets are ready to explode on command, influencing those leaders who would like to argue and act on a cold mind. The Biden administration fears loneliness. Watch how the Palestinian cause is bringing the Global South even closer than before to the sphere of influence of China, Russia and Iran. He notes that in the case of Ukraine he managed to organize a fairly coherent and coherent response from Europeans, while Europe plays no role in the Middle East. He sees increasing Chinese provocations in Asia (most recently against the Philippines) as a worrying sign of the possible opening of a third front.