In a brief interview with Israeli radio, Jerusalem Affairs Minister Amichai Eliyahu said that dropping a nuclear bomb on the Gaza Strip was “an option.” He was soon suspended by Prime Minister Netanyahu and opposition leader Yair Lapid called for his resignation. Eliyahu explained that he spoke of the bomb “metaphorically.” Okay, but he said it. It would be crazy to drop a nuclear bomb on Gaza, but Eliyahu brought Israeli nuclear power out of the closet.
To move away from theories and metaphors: today, in a scenario with Iran’s involvement in the war, the picture would be different, and everyone involved in the conflict knows this.
Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions in 1945, military and civilian officials have considered using nuclear explosives on battlefields. Between 1950 and 1968, three American presidents (Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson) rejected at least a dozen requests to use nuclear weapons in Korea, China and Vietnam.
At this time, a young American professor named Henry Kissinger emerged with a book discussing the use of lowexplosive nuclear devices as tactical weapons.
A history of clairvoyance, tenacity and diplomatic acumen has been built on the Israeli side. David BenGurion began studying the bomb in 1945, shortly after the Hiroshima explosion. He was a Zionist leader in Palestine and the State of Israel was just an idea. His interlocutor was a young scientist who made explosives for Haganah fighters.
In April 1948, six months before the founding of Israel, Ben Gurion began recruiting scientists. Years later, at the age of 29, Shimon Peres became director of the Ministry of Defense. He would begin talks with France about building a small reactor in Israel. BenGurion would say clearly: “I want the nuclear option.” In 1957, Peres signed the contract to build the reactor at Dimona in the Negev Desert. The United States was suspicious of this reactor from the start.
Israel secretly built an underground facility to reprocess the plutonium used in the reactor. Seven inspections by American scientists and diplomats did not suspect (or did not want to suspect) its existence.
In 1967, Israel already had two artifacts. Today it would be between 60 and 400. Its use was described as “Samson’s option” by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, the one who destroyed the Philistine Temple. Unlike India, Pakistan and North Korea, Israel denies ownership of the bombs. (In 1969, President Nixon asked Golda Meir if she had any “dangerous things,” and she replied that she did. As Golda left the meeting, he told her, “Be careful.”)
Israel has been producing and stockpiling nuclear weapons for decades. Their denials keep an open secret. Israel’s enemies cultivate the illusion that a country would allow its destruction without using all the weapons at its disposal. Amichai Eliyahu may be a crazy radical, but his “metaphor” reflects reality.
He took the bombs out of the closet and brought the discussion about the war to the right level. One thing is the operations against Hamas in Gaza. A completely different scenario would be an expansion of the war with Iran possibly entering the conflict. In this case the risk is different.