President Vladimir Putin, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu (left) and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Valery Gerasimov at a military headquarters in Rostov-on-Don on Nov. 9. GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/POOL/AFP via Getty Images
- Both the Russian and Ukrainian militaries lack junior officers who can lead large forces in combat.
- This is a long-standing problem for Russia and is becoming more impactful as the Ukrainian military expands.
- Both militaries may find it difficult to train more officers as their combat operations continue.
The difference between an army and a well-armed mob often lies in the presence of good junior officers. The same applies to the staff work that ensures that combat operations are properly planned, synchronized and supplied.
Both Russia and Ukraine are learning this lesson as they field newly formed armies with masses of inexperienced soldiers that require cadres of capable and experienced officers to be effective.
“Both Russia and Ukraine have struggled to build offensive combat power in 2023,” Jack Watling, a defense expert at the British think tank Royal United Services Institute, wrote in a recent commentary. “The high turnover of experienced junior officers and trained field personnel has limited the extent to which offensive actions can be synchronized.”
The Ukrainian military has had the unenviable task of absorbing a constant stream of inexperienced replacements to cover losses while training its forces on new Western equipment and tactics – all while launching a counteroffensive against strong Russian defenses.
Ukrainian troops at a headquarters in the basement of a building in Bakhmut in April. Viktor Fridshon/Global Images Ukraine via Getty Images
To make matters worse, a Ukrainian headquarters unit in the field can only control a fraction of the troops under its command. “Essentially there are brigade command posts that command about two companies at a time,” Watling said on a recent “War on the Rocks” podcast.
In many armies, a brigade headquarters is responsible for approximately 15 combat companies as well as support units. In modern warfare, these headquarters units must coordinate maneuvers and fires with multiple weapons – infantry, tanks and artillery – while providing air support and supplies and coordinating operations with neighboring formations.
The Ukrainian headquarters’ limited capacity is due to a “lack of trained battalion-level staff officers who can receive and synchronize intent,” Watling said. “So there has been, let’s say, a lot of criticism in the Western media as to why [are] The Ukrainians are not accumulating more capacity. The answer is that when they do that, things lose their synchronization.”
Instead of ambitious tank attacks, Ukraine has switched to short bite-and-hold attacks by small units, responding both to these synchronization problems and to the difficulty of massing forces while being watched by Russian forces equipped with long-range drones, artillery, and missiles.
Ukrainian troops work on a U.S.-made Bradley fighting vehicle at a secret workshop in the Zaporizhia region in July. Ed Ram/For The Washington Post via Getty Images
The situation may be a little easier for Russia, as it has moved from attack to defense on much of the front in Ukraine. Holding a trench line is less strenuous for small staffs and inexperienced troops than an offensive against a well-entrenched enemy.
Still, Russia should know better than most the importance of good officers. Although the Red Army was numerically superior, the lack of officers and staff hampered its effectiveness against German forces on the Eastern Front in World War II.
Although the Soviets were masters at planning strategic-level operations such as the Stalingrad Offensive, German battalions and regiments—commanded by officers encouraged to take initiative—regularly outmaneuvered their Russian counterparts, resulting in enormous Soviet losses.
The same pattern can be seen today in Ukraine, where Russian operations have been characterized by rigid tactics and slow response times on the ground and in the air.
Enlisted Russians during partial mobilization during training in Rostov in October 2022. Arkady Budnitsky/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images
Another noticeable consequence is the high losses among Russian commanders. It is estimated that more than 30 generals and colonels were killed in Ukraine. This problem dates back to World War II.
The shortage of junior and mid-level officers, as well as the lack of a solid non-commissioned officer corps like in Western armies, means that senior Russian officers are expected to go to the front and take command. No matter how heroic these officers may be, when they become victims it upsets the command structure.
The Russian military has long been trying to recruit more officer candidates. A 2018 program, for example, tried to lure soldiers and NCOs with a six-month course designed to commission them as officers. “The problem was that the number of applicants for the program was negligible because most soldiers and non-commissioned officers did not plan to stay in the army for too long,” noted Pavel Luzin, an expert on the Russian military, in a recent paper Article for the Jamestown Foundation, a US think tank.
In July 2023, reserve personnel – Russians aged 50 to 70 – became eligible to sign contracts to join a special mobilization reserve, which could be called up for combat operations at any time. “For soldiers, sergeants and NCOs in the reserves, this would provide some impetus for officer training,” Luzin wrote.
Costumed folk singers pose with a Russian military officer during a celebration in Moscow in September. Contributor/Getty Images
In fact, the Kremlin may be so desperate for officers that it is calling up old Soviet-era personnel. Luzin believes that the special reserve means that “Russian top brass is probably planning to convert the last, but still relatively large, generation of Soviet reserve officers into officers of the acting mobilization reserve who are loyal enough and may be motivated for such service.” “
Both Russia and Ukraine could be caught in a vicious circle in which a shortage of officers leads to less effective command and control, complicating operations on the ground and leading to more casualties, resulting in even more inexperienced officers and Soldiers are deployed.
Throughout the winter and into 2024, Kiev and Moscow will likely continue to raise troops, expand their training and build or buy weapons for use. But the lack of experienced junior leaders raises the prospect of a conflict fought between two unwieldy armies unable to wage more than static trench warfare.
Michael Peck is a defense writer whose work has appeared in Forbes, Defense News, Foreign Policy Magazine, and other publications. He has a master’s degree in political science. Keep following him Twitter and LinkedIn.