The day dawns in Ocheretine, shrouded in fog, the best defense against Russian air supremacy. Ukrainian self-propelled artillery took the opportunity to fire a shower of shells at the enemy that lasted about 20 minutes until the sky began to clear in this village on the Avdiivka front in the east of the country. The area is constantly controlled by Russian drones. Artillery operations are extended for a short period of time to avoid identification. Last Friday morning, the Ukrainian guns were trained on the crucial part of the battle, six kilometers away: the railway tracks that connect the city of Avdiivka with free Ukraine.
Ivan plucks a few dry blades of grass and uses them to reproduce on a table the map of the area in which his men are fighting. Like all soldiers interviewed for this article, Ivan prefers not to give his full name. His job is to coordinate assault companies of the 47th Mechanized Brigade, one of the Ukrainian brigades established with NATO weapons and training. He was a civil engineer himself and completed a year’s training before entering the war, including four months in Germany and Lithuania. His men defend the railway tracks on the northern flank of Avdiivka: this railway line is elevated, it serves as a retaining wall against the advance of the tanks, and from there the movement of the infantry can also be stopped. “If the Russians take control of the streets, it would be a catastrophe,” says Iván. Before the war Avdiivka had more than 30,000 inhabitants. Now they don’t reach 2,000.
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By “catastrophe” this officer means that the Russians, who control the roads, can ensure the advance of their troops to the encirclement of Avdiivka from the north. The attack is focused on the area surrounding the coking plant in this city, the largest production plant for this fuel in Europe. The problem is that the enemy has already gained access to a three-kilometer section of the railway line. “They have no control, in one day we can take up positions there three times and lose, the battles take place at 30 meters,” explains Ivan, “they come again and again, in platoons of 10 to 15 men.” “They don’t listen “The losses on the Russian side are countless, says Ivan, but they are also very high on the Ukrainian side: he himself killed his entire platoon, 17 companions, and captured them by the enemy.
The bulk of the 47th Mechanized Brigade was moved to Avdiivka in mid-October when the current Russian offensive to capture that city began. Ivan and his men previously took part in the failed summer Ukrainian counteroffensive on the Zaporizhia Front. The 47th Brigade suffered most in the first three months of the counteroffensive, when Kiev opted for a large tank column attack strategy. Russian minefields and fortified defenses slowed the advance, and enemy artillery and drone bombs easily destroyed vehicles and troops.
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Military sources on the Zaporizhia Front assured this newspaper last September that the 47th Brigade had lost more than 30% of its soldiers, almost 2,000 of its 5,000 units. Iván claims that he witnessed the deaths of 16 of his companions. “But emotionally it is even worse in Avdiivka,” he adds, “because the defense is morally more difficult than the attack, you have to pray, protected in the trench for four days, the time it takes for the relief forces to unite their artillery “Don’t kill” and then resist the attack and another infantry attack.”
Destroyed buildings and vehicles in Ocheretine, Ukraine.Cristian Segura
The Russian casualties in the siege of Avdiivka amount to hundreds of armored vehicles and thousands of lives. Ukrainian military propaganda profiles on social networks have shared many videos of the destruction inflicted on the invader, particularly by cluster munitions provided by the United States. But Ivan shakes his head back and forth as a sign of disapproval: Except for the formation of troops, the Russians are superior in everything and also have plenty of resources. “If they take the railway tracks, they will send the armored vehicles again, and if 10 vehicles leave their second line, our artillery will hit them, yes, but four will pass and reach their destination.”
In Zaporizhzhia, Ivan understood the main difference between the armies of Kiev and Moscow: his squadron surrounded a Russian position defended by professional soldiers from an airborne division. According to their story, they ran out of ammunition and were repeatedly asked to surrender. The enemies blew themselves up with grenades: “I don’t know any Ukrainian who did that. “They have a different idea of life: Russians are more prepared for war and death.” His words echo statements made by Valeri Zaluzhni, commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in The Economist in November this year. His biggest mistake, Zaluzhni claimed, was believing that the 150,000 Russian deaths in Ukraine would, in his estimate, be enough to provoke Russia’s opposition to the war. It wasn’t like that.
“Like zombies”
The fog clears in Ocheretine and the soldiers of the 110th Separate Mechanized Brigade become nervous. The troops are taking shelter in underground bunkers and pick-up vehicles with large-caliber machine guns are parked between the trees to shoot down the soon-to-arrive drones. Seth, code name of an infantry company commander, confirms what experts and other officers interviewed on the Avdiivka front suggest: One of the biggest changes in the war was Russia’s leap forward in drone technology and production. Soldiers like Seth emphasize that this air superiority over the defending army is overwhelming. The most frequently mentioned models are the same: Orlan reconnaissance drones observe everything from a height of three kilometers; They identify the target and within minutes the Lancet bomb drones arrive. Seth also points out that they have noticed an increase in the enemy’s Zoopark radars, which detect the coordinates of artillery pieces through their sound waves.
Seth refers to the Russian infantry as “zombies” because they advance without being turned back by certain death. As he was able to determine, the enemy troops have the task not to retreat, otherwise they will be executed on the orders of their superiors. The US intelligence community assured last October that they were sure that the Russian high command’s order was to shoot those who retreated during the attacks.
“It’s like in Bakhmut, they’re advancing like crazy, like zombies, because they want to take Avdiivka at any cost,” agrees Alexander, commander of a unit that operates an American Paladin howitzer in the 47th Brigade. Alexander refers to the Battle of Bakhmut, which lasted nine months and ended with the defeat of the Ukrainians and the destruction of the city. As in Bakhmut, Alexander stated that there were days in Avdiivka when there were 300 drones in the sky between the two armies. The main difference, he warns, is that his Paladin does not have enough ammunition: if they fired between 100 and 150 shells a day in Bakhmut in April and in Orijiv – on the Zaporizhzhia front – in the summer, they could shoot 15 in Avdiivka Grenades, 10 times less. And that’s not all: According to this military veteran, howitzers lose precision when used so frequently. In the summer his Paladin had a margin of error of seven meters on goal, now it is 70 meters.
Inferiority of ammunition
The lack of ammunition for artillery was confirmed by the government and by Zaluzhni himself, who estimated in an essay published by The Economist that his troops would not have a sufficient arsenal to go on the attack for at least a year. Their NATO allies have practically exhausted their missile reserves and the Western military industry will not be fully operational to arm their countries and Ukraine until the end of 2024, according to estimates from Zaluzhni and the US and US defense analysis centers. Europeans.
The lack of ammunition would also explain one of Russia’s biggest advantages in the war: its trenches, according to Roman, commander of a mortar unit in Ukraine’s 110th Separate Brigade. “The Russians think a lot about trenching,” says Ivan, who agrees with other soldiers consulted on the various Donetsk fronts this fall: “The Russians advance 300 or 500 meters and dig, they advance 300 meters and dig now again.” .” dig. Trenches deeper and safer than ours. They gain ground and secure it. If we win their position, we will be happy because we will be safer than in ours.”
Roman replies that the Russian ability to build trenches is because they did not have enough ammunition to prevent it. If at the beginning of the war, according to his calculations, his mortars could fire one of three enemy projectiles, today the difference is one in eight. “We can’t operate for long either because the airstrikes are constant,” this soldier adds.
Zaluzhni, writing for The Economist, explained that the conflict had entered a new phase, that of trench warfare, in which large maneuvers and rapid advances had been abandoned. Deterrent fire and infantry attacks on specific positions would now predominate. To this end, the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces asked his international allies for the most advanced technology to take control of the air, using drones and electromagnetic wave weapons against the enemy’s unmanned vehicles. Zaluzhni’s writings were disavowed by President Volodymyr Zelensky. His pessimism was a shock for the Ukrainian population and the international community, but not for his soldiers, says Ivan: “Nothing he said is new for us. It was a message to our partners abroad to warn them that this is the case.”
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