Hamas’s plan went beyond the first attack on October 7 and included a second phase with further attacks in other major Israeli cities as far as the West Bank. The ultimate aim was to provoke a violent response from Israel and trigger a regional war, with heavy casualties also feared among the civilian population in Gaza. This was revealed by The Washington Post based on evidence analyzed by over a dozen leaders and former intelligence leaders from Western and Middle Eastern countries.
The first clues come from the bodies of the killed Hamas fighters, the newspaper says: Maps, sketches, notes, weapons. Some of them had enough food, ammunition and equipment to last for several days and had been ordered to move deeper into Israel if the first wave of attacks was successful, potentially hitting major urban centers and military bases. The attack troops managed to advance as far as Ofakim, an Israeli town about 15 miles (24 kilometers) from the Gaza Strip and about halfway between the enclave and the West Bank.
According to two senior Middle Eastern intelligence officials and a former U.S. official, one unit had reconnaissance information and maps that suggested it intended to continue the attack to the West Bank border. Hamas has increased its contacts with militants in the West Bank in recent months, although the group says it did not inform them in advance of its plans for October 7.
“If that had happened, it would have been a major propaganda victorya symbolic blow not only against Israel, but also against the Palestinian Authority,” emphasized the former American 007, the government that exercises partial control in the West Bank. However, it is not clear, the WP specifies, whether Hamas leaders had realistic expectations of advancing to the West Bank. Furthermore, they apparently weren’t even sure that almost all of the October 7 strike teams would achieve their original objectives. Instead, they were certain that there would be widespread Israeli retaliation in Gaza. Their primary goal was to bring the Palestinian issue back to the forefront and to block the normalization of relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The evidence collected also sheds new light on Hamas’ tactics and methods to deceive Israel’s vaunted intelligence system and thwart the Israel Defense Forces’ initial efforts to stop the attack.
This is a plan developed over a year and with the knowledge of only a small number of Hamas leaders, with above-ground exercises that went unnoticed, mapping with drones and satellites, information from some Gazans with permits to work in Israel, photos of real estate and posts on social media reported that they described life in the kibbutzim. Information not particularly sophisticated, but methodical. “When you’re in a prison, you study the prison’s security system,” explains Ali Soufan, formerly of the FBI.
Finally, the misleading signals from Hamas leaders, starting with its military leader Yehiya Sinwar, who in recent years has displayed pragmatism by making it clear that the movement does not want any more wars. But it hit Benjamin Netanyahu’s moment of greatest distraction and weakness when he was threatened by a historic protest against his judicial reform.
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