1701054146 The new constitutional proposal Its not the same

The new constitutional proposal: It’s not the same

The new constitutional proposal Its not the same

The sudden regret of some Democratic Socialist leaders over their support of Approve in the 2022 plebiscite, where rejection triumphed, was coupled with the ongoing complaint that the ongoing new constitutional process would suffer from the same defects, vices, or problems of the failed convention. However, whatever parameter we choose to analyze one phenomenon or another, there are no arguments that allow us to support this complaint; at least not formulated like that, without the nuances and clarifications of the case.

Form

The most obvious differences lie in the forms, i.e. in the rules of the game and the tone of the debate, which characterized both processes. If the majority of the Convention was determined to vigorously attempt to remake or reestablish the country’s political, social and economic structure based on the worst possible reading of the so-called “blank page” (absence of a standard rule), this will be in this year experts and consultants respected the 12 institutional bases or boundaries; Boundaries that were agreed in the National Congress from left to right and, beyond the associated innovations, are compatible with Chilean constitutional development.

A similar contrast becomes clear if we compare the respect for the elementary modalities of civic dialogue that prevailed during the ongoing sober process with its systematic violation – through folk festivals and other performances – that abounded last year. There’s no denying the distance on this plane.

The floor

An equally or more important difference becomes clear when one considers the Convention’s hostility to the fundamental institutions of constitutional democracy. It was no coincidence that this body ended its working sessions with a group of conventional members proudly shouting: “The people, united, advance without parties.”

This was the natural consequence of a project that, among other problems, aimed to abolish the bicentennial Chilean Senate; which gave high doses of power to a House of Commons, which maintained the semblance of the Convention; this threatened the independence of the judiciary and the electoral court, which became dependent on the consulted Judicial Council; and this made future constitutional reform extremely difficult (anything “essential” required a quorum of 2/3 or 4/7 plus a plebiscite). And all this under a government identified with Approve, which would implement its proposal in the event of a victory. Something not far from almighty power.

It is worth remembering that it was these kinds of shortcomings that led various voices across the political spectrum to warn about the dangers of an eventual power grab if consent were enforced, a dynamic typical of the new authoritarianisms of the 21st century .century. Well, nothing comparable can be said about the proposal that will be put to a referendum in December.

In fact, it may more or less coincide with the changes in the political system and the anti-fragmentation measures contained therein – many lawyers and political scientists consider them a step forward – but the truth is that, regardless of this debate, such changes fully respect the separation of powers and the other pillars a democratic republic. The text rejected on September 4, 2022 did not have this quality.

A single sector text?

Of course, given the upcoming referendum, a broader consensus would have been desirable. And regardless of the election result, it will be a matter of clarifying what responsibility lies with the Republican Party (shouldn’t we give in and talk more from the start?), the Left (was it sensible to bet on everyone). or nothing in the negotiations ?), and the Council in general (a 100% elected body that the ruling party demanded as a condition for the new process and that would inevitably put a certain stamp on the experts’ preliminary draft).

But even in this dimension it is necessary to consistently formulate comparisons and criticism. Finally, the available data show that half (50.1%) of the Council’s votes received over 90% support from its members, while in the Convention only 8.4% of votes exceeded this support threshold. The contrast is eloquent.

And if it is added – rightly – that the numbers are not meaningful in such matters and therefore a qualitative examination is required, it must equally be recognized that the new draft constitution contains not only relevant agendas for the majorities of the Council, but also a series of flags or demands raised in the past by center-left or independent groups.

They range from strengthening decentralization and temporary and flexible exit parity in parliamentary elections to constitutional recognition of indigenous peoples, welfare, climate change and respect for animals (among several other issues). Could something similar be said about the Convention and its majorities?

The insistence on saying that “the same problems” have now arisen only confirms the more or less serious loss of a political world that still does not understand the gravity of the events in the Convention and does not fully assume its responsibilities in this regard. Apart from the legitimate points of criticism that the new constitutional proposal allows, “the same mistakes” were not made in the current process. Is not the same.

Claudio Alvarado R. He is a lawyer and executive director of the Institute of Society Studies (IES).