On December 2, 1823, American President James Monroe presented in his annual report to Congress the so-called Monroe Doctrine, the principles of which have accompanied the foreign policy of the United States over these two centuries. On the occasion of this bicentennial, we can reflect on what elements determined this proclamation and what relationship it had with Cuba. It is worth returning to this discourse because, among other factors surrounding it, it is not a thing of the past, as it is still used today to justify the policies of northern imperialism towards Latin America.
Cuba was one of the factors that played a role in Monroe’s decision in 1823. Before the United States emerged as an independent nation, interest in taking over the nearby island was already indicated. After the nation’s founding, President Thomas Jefferson, one of its founding fathers, said in 1801 to James Monroe, who had done diplomatic work in France in the Washington administration:
“As our present interests may confine us within our own borders, it is impossible not to foresee the distant times when our rapid multiplication will extend beyond these borders and cover the whole of the north, if not the south, of the continent.”
From this general statement looking to the expansive future, he moved to the Cuban case in 1805, when he told the English envoy in Washington that “he considered East and West Florida, and successively the island of Cuba, the position of which was necessary to development .” The defense of Louisiana and “Florida…would be an easy conquest.” Jefferson insisted on this interest several times and it would be an important precedent for future decision.
In April 1823, Secretary of State John Quincy Adams formulated the so-called “low-hanging fruit policy” in his instructions to the American representative in Madrid. Here the projection on Cuba was already defined: the island had to remain in the hands of Spain until the United States was able to take it over, which, however, would not be immediately. In Adams’s perception:
Indeed, such are the geographical, commercial and political ties between the interests of this island and those of this country, created by nature and fostered and gradually strengthened over time, that when we look back at the course of events in the will take place in the next fifty years, one can hardly escape the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be essential for the continued existence of the Union and the preservation of its integrity.
According to Adams, when Cuba separated from Spain due to the law of gravity, it had to fall into the hands of the United States.
In this context, which was also marked by the process of independence in continental Latin America, the English Foreign Secretary Lord Canning sent a proposal for a joint declaration to the United States on August 20, 1823. This proposal referred to the Spanish colonies in America that had gained their independence, declaring that their governments (those of England and the United States) had no intention of acquiring any of these former colonies and that they were not indifferent to it would be the cession of part of these territories to another power. President Monroe consulted this proposal with a view to the possible response. Jefferson answered the question clearly:
First we have to ask ourselves a question. Do we want to acquire one or more Spanish provinces for our confederation? I freely confess that I have always considered Cuba to be the most interesting addition to our system of states that could ever be made. The control which this island, together with the tip of Florida, would give us over the Gulf of Mexico and the lands and isthmuses adjoining it, and all the waters flowing into it, would fill the measure of our political well-being. Be.
Former President James Madison asked, “Does this include further plans to take over Puerto Rico, etc., as well as Cuba?”
Secretary of State John Quincy Adams noted in his diary:
“[Los habitantes de Cuba o de Tejas] You can exercise your main rights and apply to join us. They certainly won’t do the same with Britain. So by joining her in the proposed declaration, we are entering into a positive and perhaps uncomfortable commitment with her without actually receiving anything in return. (…)
We should at least remain free to act
how events present themselves and we don’t bind ourselves to any of them
Principle that could later be invoked against us.
The results of the consultations made very clear the US leadership’s perspective on future expansion, with interest in taking over Cuba occupying an important place, although this was seen more in the medium-term future. Ultimately it was decided that there would be no joint statement and that the President’s annual message on December 2nd would be an indirect response to Lord Canning. In fact, many scholars credit Adams with the actual authorship of the so-called “Monroe Doctrine” that the president would lay out.
Monroe said:
The occasion was considered an opportune occasion to reaffirm, as a principle affecting the rights and interests of the United States, that the American continents, by reason of the free and independent state which they have acquired and maintain, are henceforth no longer entitled to do so They cannot be considered objects of future colonization by any European power.
The President’s statement in this speech is the so-called Monroe Doctrine, which in its years of use has been referred to as “America for the Americans…of the North” because its purpose was to thwart any European attempt at expansion preventing his system from extending to any part of this hemisphere as it would be considered “dangerous to our peace and security,” leaving the continent a closed reserve for American expansion if subsequent development permitted it.
As already explained, the British proposal encouraged a range of considerations about the future interests of the United States, of which the interest in acquiring Cuba played a major role.
To this day, the Monroe Doctrine has held a firm place in American discourse about its continental interests. In this way, the control of the American region by the United States throughout its imperial development is argued. The United States presents itself in its speech as the great protector of the continent to justify its measures of hemispheric control. It is a 200-year-old discourse that has been adapted to new realities, changing scenarios, but is used permanently. During President Kennedy’s time (1961-1954), he explained that it retained the same significance in terms of opposing the expansion of power of a foreign power in the hemisphere, justifying pressure on the OAS to “go to the communists.” isolate threat.” in Cuba. More recently, during Donald Trump’s presidency (2017-2021), this speech was picked up during his Secretary of State’s trip to Latin America and said that this doctrine had in some ways the same relevance as when it was written to grapple with what he called “foreign ideologies” when referring to China and Russia and their relations with our countries.
Born 200 years ago, Monroeism is still present in the hegemonic discourse of the United States, adapted to new realities but preserving the spirit that gave rise to it.
