Aggression pays off this was the conclusion Nicolás Maduro came to when he sat in front of the President of Guyana, Irfaan Ali, and Lula's advisor Celso Amorim on the Caribbean island of São Vicente. The Venezuelan dictator won the first round and reached direct negotiations with Brazilian mediation over Essequibo.
Amorim traveled on November 24th. to Caracas to calm tensions caused by Venezuela. Failure: After the March 12 referendum, which the Brazilian government condescendingly described as an “internal matter,” Maduro escalated aggression. The Venezuelan redrew the map of the two countries to include 70% of Guyana; appointed Governor General of “Guiana Essequiba”; announced the granting of citizenship to the residents of Essequibo; authorized the state oil company PDVSA to issue exploration licenses in the “annexed” area; moved an army division to the border. The violation of Guyana’s sovereignty has not yet reached military means.
Brazil, a regional power and neighboring country, agreed to remain silent. They sent half a dozen armored vehicles to the border, at least signaling that they would not fight in a hypothetical military invasion. But instead of a formal condemnation, Planalto and Itamaraty limited themselves to empty phrases about “dialogue” and “peace”.
Brazil would never be at the negotiating table if Bolivia decided to reopen the “Acre issue” through unilateral measures similar to Maduro’s. Guyana had to reaffirm that the appropriate forum for the dispute was the International Court of Justice, inform it about conducting air exercises with the US and express its willingness to host an American base.
Maduro does not know how to govern his country, but he knows the path to escalation and announced a visit to Moscow on December 8th. It was enough to threaten: the specter of meeting Putin, the master of the war of conquest, brought him new (and fruitful) contacts with Brazil. Hence the meeting in São Vicente and in return the temporary suspension of travel to the Kremlin.
The direct involvement of external powers in South American affairs seems, rightly, to be an old taboo for Brazil. This factored into the decision to persuade Guyana to sit down at the diplomatic table with the aggressor. However, there is more: the longstanding alliance between Lulismo and Chavismo. In São Vicente, Amorim had the opportunity to make the dialogue conditional on a reduction in Venezuela's unilateral aggressive measures. Driven by political affinity, he preferred to let the stone roll down the mountain, guided by an illusory appeasement.
For Maduro, Essequibo is another name for oil and internal oppression. The 11 billion barrels of light oil from Guyana's presalt are of greater value than the viscous oil produced in Venezuela. But above all, the territorial adventure offers the dictator the opportunity to intensify the repression of opponents and to deprive the agreement on free elections of its substance.
The regime signed the agreement with the opposition in return for the suspension of US sanctions on Venezuelan oil exports. Maduro knows that he will face certain defeat in the elections and sees Essequibo as an excuse to stage a new electoral farce by wrapping himself in the national flag. After the referendum, he has already arrested 14 opponents and accused them of “treason against the country” because they were allegedly involved in a conspiracy between “American imperialism and Exxon”.
However, the operation depends on incessant provocations towards Guyana, on the theatrical stage of “dialogue” and “negotiation”. Brazil still has the means to stop the dangerous spectacle. As Kissinger explained, “A threat of violence that proves ineffective is an admission of impotence.” To clip Maduro’s wings, all he has to do is denounce the blackmail and refuse to play a supporting role in the play staged by a village tyrant.