Factors that could prevent Putin from using Russian nuclear weapons

  • President Vladimir Putin has confused the West by putting Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert.
  • Knowing when these weapons will not be used is one of the most difficult tasks under the current circumstances, but there are two reasons to believe that Putin will think twice.
  • Eric Hartzke is Professor and Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at the University of California, San Diego.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that he was putting his country’s nuclear forces on high alert during an unprovoked attack on Ukraine has left the West bewildered. This, no doubt, was part of Putin’s purpose when he made such a threat.

Presumably, the war in Ukraine reflects Putin’s desire to change international conditions, which would be pointless if he intends to destroy the world in the process. Such is the paradox of nuclear weapons, always ready but (almost) never used.

The development of technology has led to the fact that an increasing number of countries have an ever wider range of weapons. Humanity has dedicated much of its collective ingenuity to creating more and more diverse ways to destroy other people.

In this context, one of the most important and difficult tasks is to find out under what circumstances certain weapons will not be used. In the case of nuclear weapons, this may determine national policy. Indeed, were it not for the plausibility of Putin’s threat, the West could now be more actively and directly involved in the defense of Ukraine.

Russian nuclear weapons

A projectile, a replica of the largest Soviet nuclear bomb ever detonated, AN-602 (Tsar Bomba), in Moscow. Maxim Zmeev/Reuters

War dogs that don’t bark can now outperform those that do bark. Such is the case in the ongoing war in Ukraine, where many of the Russian army’s most brutal weapons have yet to be used in combat, although the situation may change rapidly. Why not use military weapons in war? There are several reasons. Here I will focus on just two:

The first reason is that weapons can be redundant. Either the weapon will not do the task that the political or military authorities desire, or it will do it too well. A nuclear bomb in Ukraine would definitely end the war, nominally in Putin’s favour, but what would be left would hardly be worth controlling. Putin seems to want to pacify and control Ukraine, not to kill most of its population and poison its territory.

That’s why Russian forces were initially reluctant to escalate the fighting to what British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace called “total tonto.” This destroys much of what an invader might try to capture, including the good will of society.

This does not mean that the aggressor will refrain from later resorting to the very weapons that were initially shunned. Frustration caused by unsuccessful initial measures often leads them to resort to other weapons, just as we are now seeing Russian forces swell and resort to more dangerous weapons, including thermobaric missiles, in Ukraine.

Expecting to be welcomed with open arms, but instead receiving armed citizens, Russia is now beginning to use a much more vigorous and barbaric form of mechanized warfare against the inhabitants of Ukrainian cities.

NATO

US troops as part of the NATO Mission to Enhance Poland’s Defenses at a welcome ceremony in northeastern Poland, April 13, 2017. Associated Press

The second reason for not using certain weapons is that it leads to escalation. It can be expected that the use of weapons will cause an undesirable reaction from others. We are witnessing public discussions in the West about possible Russian retaliation for certain actions, such as the deployment of NATO “boots on the ground” in Ukraine.

The German public was worried about the certification of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, fearing that Russia would turn off the heat supply to Western Europe in the middle of winter. More recently, officials in Washington debated whether to use American cyber weapons against Russia, postponing for now in part because of fears that Russia would retaliate in kind.

The main goal of any competition is to win. Any action taken by governments either advances or delays the achievement of this goal, depending on whether these efforts cause more or less harm to the enemy than he does himself.

Thus, there is always a winner and a loser from any initiative in a war. Either the use of this or that military or civilian means helps us more than they do, or vice versa. We direct our efforts towards actions that, in relative terms, benefit us and hurt our adversaries.

But the enemy also has free will; they will try to do the opposite. Ideally, governments would like to checkmate the enemy by taking actions that are not adequately responded to. Achieving this state of so-called “escalation dominance” is appreciated and relatively rare.

More often than not, the actions a person takes induce the enemy in turn to shift the contest in such a way that it favors him and harms his own side.

Parade of Russian ballistic missiles on Red Square.

Russian nuclear missiles on parade in Moscow. Alexander Zemlyanichenko/AP

This is what is happening in all spheres in the midst of this war. In cyberspace, where both parties can potentially harm each other through interconnected electronic communications, there is more stalemate and mutual deterrence than many might have imagined.

As with nuclear weapons, Western fears that Russia would use these tools prevented a cyber war against Russian assets. And Russia, for its part, is reluctant to initiate a broader rivalry that will almost certainly reduce rather than increase Russia’s chances of winning in Ukraine.

Thus, there is a strong hint that Russia is ready to use weapons that are not yet used – cybernetic, nuclear and other – but also a clear hint that Russia does not seek, and does not want to use these capabilities unilaterally. , preemptively and unnecessarily, even in the context of his aggressive war against Ukraine.

Eric Harzke is professor of political science and director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies (cPASS) at the University of California, San Diego.