In the heat of the war in Ukraine, Finland and Sweden have considered joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The hypothetical benefits of joining the Washington Treaty lie in the extension of the collective security guarantee contained therein in the event of an armed attack on their territories. Legally and theoretically, such a claim is impeccable. Whether this operation will increase their security and transatlantic security is another question. In this sense, it is necessary to point out several aspects.
The invitation to join NATO can be extended to any European state capable of contributing to its goals and effectively enhancing security in the North Atlantic region. Is Europe, and thus the transatlantic region as a whole, safer if the organization is expanded to include new members in times of maximum tension with Russia? lens, no. There is no reason to believe that the two Nordic countries are threatened by Russian aggression. Their situation has nothing to do with Ukraine’s as they never belonged to the USSR and are members of the EU. Although they regularly take part in NATO’s work, even in some of its operations, their formal non-alignment is their best guarantee of security. If the main bone of contention for European security is Russia’s perception of an enveloping threat from NATO on Russian territory, including Finland, one of the few countries bordering the Russian Federation to remain outside the alliance, at this point this can only be interpreted to mean that as a provocation at the highest level. Until now, Helsinki’s official policy has been that its military strength and the difficulties of its territory provide a sufficient deterrent to any attack. This has allowed him to guarantee his security and above all not to create a security dilemma for Moscow and avoid being seen as an enemy, which will happen when it finally joins the organization.
On the other hand, the accession of new members of NATO should bring additional security. When it comes to arousing a previously quiet situation, the change looks more like a worsening of allied security than a strengthening.
Another point to consider is that states do not formally apply to join NATO until members of the organization invite them to do so. Turkey has just raised its voice to oppose this decision, which must be adopted unanimously. It is doubtful whether Ankara’s will includes a firm rejection of the Nordic countries’ accession or whether it is simply a maneuver to obtain certain benefits in exchange for forgoing it; for example, forgetting certain behaviors interpreted by Washington as disloyal, its political development contrary to the principles of democracy, individual freedoms, or its internal and international actions against the Kurds, endangering international and allied peace and security as happened in Syria. If his veto remains, the demand for accession will only be a symbolic position.
The impulse and the positive decision for the membership of Sweden and Finland brings with it some inconveniences. The first is the contradiction to the position recently expressed by Jens Stoltenberg himself, in which he explains the reasons why Ukraine could not become a member of the alliance. In that case, the Secretary General clearly stated, a confrontation between Ukraine and Russia would mean a direct confrontation between NATO and the Russian Federation because of the collective security obligation under Article 5 of the treaty. This situation of direct confrontation between NATO and Russia would lead to a clear and probably irreversible escalation of violence between two nuclear weapons candidates. This risk would be multiplied if we assume that Bosnia, Georgia and Ukraine expect to be accepted by the allies.
And it’s not that countries aren’t sovereign in wanting to join a defensive organization or accepting others to do so, it’s about strategic convenience and the sovereign choice to leave that is most conducive to peace. It should not be forgotten that under the UN Charter, NATO countries have pledged not to use the threat or use of force. The entry of new members into NATO around Russia is easily understood as a threat to use force. Just think how we would react if Finland, Ukraine, Moldova and even other former Warsaw Pact countries decided to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
From the Spanish point of view, before or at the same time as the proposal to extend the NATO umbrella to new countries, we should demand any decision and make it conditional on this protection explicitly covering our two autonomous cities. Solidarity with non-members is pure rhetoric when we don’t even guarantee who we are.
Nativity Fernandez Sola She is a professor of international law at the University of Zaragoza and a researcher at Agenda Pública.
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