Hundreds of people attend a campaign rally for Colombian presidential candidate Federico Gutiérrez in Medellín Santiago Mesa
Every democracy is based on an agreement: the governed agree to be governed in exchange for the governors solving problems and making decisions that involve conflicts of interest. If there are no solutions, or if the decisions always fall on the same side (if always the same ones lose), the agreement breaks down. The first casualties of the rift are the representatives themselves. But if the lack of response persists, the next casualties will be platforms that support them (the parties). And if it stays that way, the main institutions and their functioning will be in the sights of the governed. Finally, if the erosion is sufficiently intense and sustained over time, the idea of democracy will eventually collapse. The discontent of the Colombian citizens has already taken its toll on the first two victims (politicians and traditional parties) and is now reaching the third level.
So while the average rating of democracy as a system remains more positive than negative, dissatisfaction with its functioning in the country could not be greater. 80% describe themselves not only as little or not at all satisfied, but this dissatisfaction is almost universal. The less negatively minded groups are, perhaps not coincidentally, on the right-wing ideological spectrum: this is the ideology of the outgoing government, and it is also perceived as a fact that the left has not governed the country in its spirit of 200 years of independence. But outside of this group, which represents less than 1 in 5 Colombians, no one is satisfied: neither the upper socioeconomic class (27% are “fairly” or “very much”) nor those over 55 (26%). According to a 40db survey for EL PAÍS, the numbers become negligible among young people (11%), women (16%) and the lower classes (16%).
Trust in the central operational institution of democracy, which is responsible for elections, is even lower. Only 10% say “a lot” or “quite a bit”. Here, too, there are the left, the young, the lower classes and the women (even) fewer. The ideological effect is particularly strong.
All of this does not fully transfer to the abstract evaluation of democracy as a system. For a clear majority of 67% there is no better alternative. It is worrying that the observed divisions according to gender, age, class and ideological position in relation to certain institutions are reproduced in the overall assessment as follows: young people, leftists, lower classes and men have more systemic concerns.
It is also worrying that the trend has worsened, with two exceptions in 2014 and 2018, affected by the electoral situation, Colombians have their approval of the idea that democracy is a system superior to its rivals , decreased. This erosion has been deeper since 2012.
This makes Colombia, along with Peru, one of the countries in the Americas that exhibits greater systemic detachment than the quality of its freedoms would suggest on paper. Typically, the more restrictive the norms and institutions, the less trust the electorate has in democratic superiority. But in the Colombian case, as in the Peruvian case, this negativity is above what is observed in countries with similar institutional qualities (Paraguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Dominican Republic).
This gap is likely filled with perceptions of unresponsiveness, of breaking the basic agreement between the rulers and the ruled.
Another sign of how discontent is destroying Colombia’s institutional defenses is the trend of three indicators: pride and even demand for support for the political system have declined since 2008-2010 (with an extraordinary peak in 2018 due to the election date that was shipped quickly). But the idea of respect for institutions has been retained and even slightly increased.
This difference reinforces the notion that erosion has not yet fully permeated trust in democracy and its essential institutions. It has dramatically affected leaders, platforms and even the first institutional line (electoral mechanisms, temporary satisfaction with democracy). And it has started filtering the least recognized sectors in current decisions and processes. But it didn’t shake the foundations. At least not yet. Tolerance of an executive coup justified by excessive corruption, a practical indicator of abstracting respect for democracy as the best system of government, had fallen in 2018 but has recovered in 2021 without reaching, yes, levels seen in the most recent been seen in the past.
A citizenry deeply dissatisfied with the way those in power are upholding their end of the democratic compact presents the perfect opportunity for someone to come along and propose their break. Whether it’s a newcomer promising a democracy that truly responds to public demands, or the ruling elites vowing redemption in the face of a new threat. And here comes the paradox, an unfulfilled pact must be reformed, but its reform risks increasing erosion if existing expectations are again not met.
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