What are the lessons of the war in Ukraine for the French army? It is a very confidential observatory that studies the conflict on a daily basis and provides the first lessons. How do we wage war in 2022? How should our soldiers adapt? Several members of this cell responded to RTL.
The first way, detailed by Major General Pierre-Joseph Givre, head of the French Army Doctrine and Education Center (CDEC), is to equip our soldiers differently. Observation he makes in the light of the Ukraine war. “We can imagine doubling the French soldier’s equipment,” he explains. “Of course he has an assault rifle. We could also give him a secure telephone terminal with many applications.
Enable these applications encrypted communication between the soldier standing in the fire and his command behind. Communication via civilian messaging (telegram, signal, etc.), the soldier would also have access to ready-to-use military applications.
More agility off-road
“When the soldier is in contact with the enemy,” General Givre continues, “For example, he could take a photo of a lens, with that photo being geolocated. And then he could immediately transmit it to an effector, for example an artillery piece that could fire almost instantly with the coordinates. (…) This is what Ukrainians have done against Russian targets on several occasions”.
The soldier who has contact takes a photo, the cannon positioned a few kilometers behind immediately fires at the target. This agility, this rapidity in decision-making, is the effect sought today by the French army. Because that is exactly what is working today on the battlefield in Ukraine.
An evolving doctrine
This advancement of the material also implies the advancement of military doctrine. This is based on the initiative of the soldier. The Ukrainian army gives her more and more initiative.
“We have to get down to the lowest level (…) every soldier has this ability to gather and pass on information”, says Pierre-Joseph Givre. “The only way to gain the initiative in this type of battle, with a high troop density and a barrage of fire, is to speed up the decision loops between those who are gathering the intelligence and those who are going to set off the lights,” he said.
So it is one Alliance of modern means of communication and traditional means of war, such as artillery. Because on such a front as in Ukraine (nearly 900 km), a traditional war is actually being fought: weapons, troop movements…
A Ukrainian model?
Going to war in 2022 means bolstering your traditional means, it is appreciated in the army. But when asked about his means, he remains very discreet: Modernization of the Leclerc tanks? Purchase more drones? Increase in stocks of ammunition (given the thousands of shells dropped on the plains and cities of Donbass every day)? The compromises will – ultimately – be of a political nature.
The army draws conclusions from what the Ukrainian people are doing. How can a whole country be associated with the war on the model of the cohesion of the Ukrainian population? That is the question regularly asked in the army of moral forces.
The model comes from the Ukrainian application Diia, created by the Ukrainian government. Originally intended to be used to leave identification papers there, it has become the Ukrainian equivalent of “vigilant neighbors” (a citizen reports a problem there to alert the police). The Ukrainians used it massively to tell their army where the Russians were hidingan armored vehicle driving to such a place, a truck hidden in such a building.
Vital civilian intelligence
This was particularly crucial during the battle for Kyiv, said Colonel Frédéric Jordan, head of the Ukraine Observatory set up by the army. “If you know where the enemy is when this application sends you the exact geolocated position of a convoy passing under the windows of a Ukrainian citizen“The fog of war”, as Clausewitz writes, is dissipating. And they can focus their efforts like artillery fire on the discovered forces.”
Thus, this Diia application allows the Ukrainian army to position rockets, soldiers and cannons in the right place – thanks to the citizens. Russian command posts were hit. It is a form of intelligence that is particularly responsible for the deaths of many of Vladimir Putin’s generals.
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