Wladimir Putin Level up the battle again and select the Hypersonic missile Kinzhal to issue a warning to the NATO-EU bloc. A technologically very advanced weapon, difficult to intercept for defense systems also thanks to the great speed and resilience with a nuclear warhead which would bring the conflict to a level not seen since the war. “For now, this act should be read as Putin’s warning to the West – he explains to Ilfattoquotidiano.it Gabrielle Iacovino, Director of the Center for International Studies (Cesi) – But now his strategies can no longer be read in the realm of total rationality or from a Western perspective. We must not underestimate the message he is sending us today.”
See also
Hypersonic missiles, the images of the exercise that Russia released before the invasion
Iacovino, how should we interpret this recent Kremlin demonstration? The Kinzhal can also be loaded with a nuclear warhead, is that a warning or are we close to the nuclear option?
This is clearly a warning from Putin to the NATO-EU bloc. Not only because this missile can be loaded with a nuclear warhead, but because it is being used in a war context for the first time. In fact, it’s still an experimental, very new technology. And it’s an act of violence because we’re talking about technology that the United States doesn’t have yet.
So far, however, observers have stated that Russian endowments, technology and even war tactics are outdated compared to those that could be put in place by the NATO-EU bloc.
And you are. The Federation generally lags behind in the military and technological fields, but with some exceptions. For example, in the missile field, they are very strong and have developed very advanced technologies. But the use of hypersonic missiles in Ukraine should be read not only from a military point of view.
And in what way?
Think about using this gear in a context like the Ukrainian one. We’re talking about a cruise missile, which means it can be aimed and fired from long ranges to limit involvement of its troops in a war scenario. But here the troops are already in the field and no special defense systems need to be demolished. It is therefore more of a message to Ukraine’s allies than a threat of widespread use of this technology in the Ukrainian scenario.
So is it part of Putin’s military communications strategy?
Exactly. There is indeed the use of technologies of this type. But also, as has been sensed, to show the use of countermeasures against possible chemical attacks, such as gas masks or decontamination tools provided to the military. But to these examples must also be added the nuclear threat and targeted attacks on civilians. All of these are messages to raise the level of the struggle and to test the opponents: are we ready to respond to these threats by escalating the conflict?
There was also talk of tactical nuclear weapons. What exactly are they made of?
They are small devices that should, at least in theory, have a territorially limited destructive capacity compared to large nuclear warheads. But that’s always theory, they’ve never been used in a conflict so we don’t know the real impact even in the medium term.
Do you think their use is an option on the table?
Surely. We don’t know when, but Putin has already considered this possibility. Obviously this would be the last or almost last step of the escalation. We need to stop thinking about a fully rational evolution of Putin’s point of view, it’s a way of interpreting this conflict that is now outdated since he has opted for a full-scale invasion. It is part of a more ruthless plan which, as we have seen, also includes deliberate attacks on civilians, as illustrated by the bombings of Mariupol and Kharkiv, cities where it was decided to apply the Grozny Aleppo strategy.
We talked about chemical and nuclear weapons. Could they represent the red line for NATO intervention?
The problem is the cost of a procedure and whether you are willing to pay for it. Certainly, a failure to intervene in the face of the use of chemical or nuclear weapons in Ukraine would mean a serious loss of credibility for the alliance.
There is no doubt that Putin needs to unblock the conflict. Are there other ways before nuclear power?
Luckily yes. Meanwhile, there is the capture of Mariupol and Odessa, the latter not being so easy due to the need for a long logistical arm. Also because this could become an exhausting trench warfare for the Russian troops without a release in the next few days. Then it could also start an air war on Lemberg. In short, nuclear power is an option on the table, but an extreme one.