“Moscow carries out a huge robbery disguised as an invasion”. Bret Stephens on NYT makes an alternative analysis of the Kremlin’s performance. “It is always wiser to treat your opponent like a sly fox than like a madman”
“It is always wiser to treat your opponent more like a cunning fox than a madman,” writes the Pulitzer Prize columnist in the New York Times. Bret Stephens.
The former Jerusalem Post editor and former Wall Street Journal columnist was also one of the most vocal critics of former US President Donald Trump, along with other conservative Jewish journalists. Now in the columns of the Times Stephens opens an original yet disturbing read on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. “Common sense is that Vladimir Putin catastrophically miscalculated his forces” before attacking. But what if it isn’t?
Stephens summarizes the interpretation given by many Western pundits and observers to the Kremlin’s moves in what he calls “common sense”: Putin “thought that Russianspeaking Ukrainians would welcome his troops with open arms. But not there.” They did. He thought they would quickly overthrow Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government. But they didn’t. He thought he was splitting NATO. Instead, he condensed them. He thought he had sanctionproofed his economy. And instead they did it in pieces. He thought the Chinese would help him. But they avoid exposure. He thought his modern army was making mincemeat of the Ukrainian armed forces. It’s the Ukrainians who are doing it, at least on some In short, Stephens summarizes: “Several analysts have likened Putin to a cornered rat, more dangerous now that he is no longer in control.” events. We should give him a safe way out of the corner he’s locked himself in.”
Up to here actually the reading of the “common sense”.. Which the NYT columnist concedes is “completely plausible” in any case. But what if it was wrong? What if the West plays Putin’s game again?
This possibility, says the journalist, is suggested by the memory of the Russian siege of Grozny during the first Chechen war in the mid1990s. “In the initial stages of the conflict, highly motivated Chechen fighters wiped out an entire Russian armored brigade, which amazed Moscow. Then the Russians retreated and razed Grozny from afar with artillery and air force. Today, Russia operates drawing tactics from the same “playbook. When Western military analysts argue that Putin cannot win militarily in Ukraine, what they really mean is that he cannot win by playing fair. But when has Putin ever played fair?
“Let’s assume for a moment that Putin never intended to take over all of Ukraine,” continues the Pulitzer Prize, but that “from the start his real targets were the energy riches in the east of the country, which contains the second largest known natural gas deposits in Europe (after those of Norway). Combine this with Russia’s previous territorial conquests in Crimea (which has vast offshore energy fields) and the eastern provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk (which contain part of a vast shale gas field), and Putin’s attempt to control most or all of Ukraine’s coast , and Putin’s true ambitions are clearly taking shape: he is not concerned with bringing the Russianspeaking world together, but with securing energy domination. “Putin is conducting a massive heist under the pretense of invasion,” said Canadian energy expert David Knight Legg.. As for a largely landlocked Ukraine, this would likely become a welfare case for the West, which would also have to relocate refugees to areas outside of Russian control. In time, a Viktor Orbanlike figure could take over the Ukrainian presidency, emulating the strongman political style that Putin prefers to his neighbors. If this analysis is correct, then Putin does not seem to have miscalculated.
Closing pieces: “Attacking civilians,” says Stephens, “would be a way to compensate for the incompetence of Russian troops: the mass killing of civilians puts enormous pressure on Zelenskyy,” who could thereby yield “what Putin has always demanded: territorial concessions.” and Ukrainian neutrality. Demands that will find growing support in the West, adds the journalist, who wants to reduce the number of civilian casualties, especially if he is convinced that a mentally unstable Putin is ready to use nuclear weapons.
“In Russia, the war has already served other purposes for Putin’s policies. Many dissidents have gone into selfimposed exile. Finally, the incompetence of the Russian military could lead to targeted topdown purges. And the wealth from Russia’s newly acquired energy sources could ultimately help Moscow break free of the sanctions grip. “This alternative analysis may be wrong,” Stephens concludes. “But in war, in politics, and in life, it is always wiser to treat your opponent like a fox than like a madman.”
(Translation by Enrico Cicchetti)