by Federico Fubini and Viviana Mazza, sent to Kyiv
Gazprom boss from Brussels is pushing for Orbn’s veto. Also unaffected is Vladimir Potanin, Russia’s richest gas tycoon, and Leonid Mikhelson
The US administration’s message about the millions of dollars Moscow sent to friendly parties returns to put sanctions at the heart of the European agenda. But not with a view to loosening Moscow, also in view of the modalities of the covert financing by the Putin secret service for foreign activities (SVR). Indeed, the very measures taken in Brussels over the past six months are actually obstructing Russian channels of support for certain European politicians.
Moscow money is often channeled through international trade to the beneficiary parties. Some exporters to Russia have been allowed to charge amounts well in excess of the market value of their goods in order to create funds that can be passed on to beneficiary parties in the form of donations from an entrepreneur to a political force in their country. Sanctions break this mechanism because they reduce European exports to Russia (which is why American diplomacy is suspicious of any request to relax measures). Dasha Zarivna, spokesman for the office of Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, told Corriere: “My personal impression is that the sanctions have created many difficulties for these operations. It therefore seems likely that pressure against Moscow, or at least a defense of the decisions already taken, will return to the Brussels agenda in the coming months. Primarily because Ukraine is asking for it now that the weakening of the Russian military-industrial complex is being felt on the battlefields. Andriy Yermak, Zelenskyy’s chief of staff, said on Friday that it would be wrong to talk about easing now that we are asking our partners to tighten sanctions. Are the Russians by any chance slowing down the offensive or have they stopped killing Ukrainians?
Certainly there is still a long way to go, as the Brussels arrangements aimed at financially undermining the Putinian system still have visible flaws. The most unique case concerns Alexei Miller, the perpetrator of Vladimir Putin’s gas blackmail against Europe as close CEO of Gazprom. Even today, Miller is not on the lists of European sanctions: his assets are not confiscated and he himself, like any of his compatriots, can travel in the European Union. The reason known to many in Brussels palaces: Viktor Orbn’s Hungary is vetoing Miller (and has just signed a very good supply deal with Gazprom). For now, Vladimir Potanin, who is considered Russia’s richest man with a fortune estimated by Forbes at $24.4 billion, and gas tycoon Leonid Mikhelson (owner of similar assets) are also safe from sanctions. In this case, the veto seems to have come from Paris, say some European observers. Certainly the strategic role of Potanin in the supply of nickel to the European auto industry and Mikhelson has agreements with the French Total. Hungary also rescued train tycoon Andrei Bokarev.
The same sanctions against banks still reveal holes in the network. And not just because the institutions affected by Brussels are only nine of around 750 that can be used to circumvent trade bans with Russia. there is more In late July, in light of Ukraine’s wheat export deal, Brussels unfrozen some activities of Bank Rossiya (controlled by Yury Kovalchuk and Nikolay Shamalov, two of Putin’s allies) and Promsvyazbank (the bank most used by Fly’s military industry). A further step backwards came in the summer with the easing of certain sanctions that made it more difficult for Russian oil to be exported to countries such as India or China. it was undoubtedly an attempt to calm international crude prices. But Brussels’ silence on all these setbacks shows embarrassment. And it shows that this economic war with Russia will require nerves of steel, as it remains long and riddled with pitfalls.
September 15, 2022 (Change September 15, 2022 | 07:32)
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