The last few days have been hectic in Asia. For the first time since the start of the Covid19 pandemic, Chinese President Xi Jinping has left China for an international trip. He decided to embark on a regional trip mainly focused on interests connected to the rebuilding of the Silk Road, one of his government’s most important and boldest projects.
In addition, taking advantage of the official meeting of heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian institution uniting China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Xi met with Russian President Vladimir Putin yesterday (15). It was the first meeting between the two since the beginning of the war in Ukraine in February of that year.
By covering their conversation, Putin sought to strengthen their mutual affinities. He said he had praised what he saw as “China’s balanced stance on the conflict in Ukraine,” calling the Chinese president a “comrade” and an “old friend,” and Russia’s commitment to the “China single” (a direct message to Taiwan ) and to have taken the opportunity to once again criticize the performance of the United States on the international stage.
However, as has become customary lately, what draws the greatest attention is between the lines of this meeting. The Chinese side’s report is much more concise and factual than the Russian demonstration.
The official document released by the Beijing government carefully chose the words used. He limited himself to speaking about “strong mutual support on issues affecting their respective core interests”, the importance of “preserving the security of the region” and “preserving the common interests of developing and emerging countries”. He mentioned the BRICS, among other strategic organizations, mentioning cooperation in trade, agriculture and connectivity. No direct word about Ukraine.
At the same time, President Putin himself made it public that during the meeting, Xi raised “questions and concerns” about Ukraine, which he believed to be legitimate. Although he has tried to downplay the importance, the signage is nonetheless a sign of Chinese unease at the unfolding war.
Putin is keen to strengthen the alliance with China to give validity and weight to his own decisions, especially at this delicate moment in the conflict when Ukrainian forces have recaptured part of lost territory. The SinoRussian alliance is fundamental to Putin’s “antiWestern” discourse and also to keeping the United States and European powers in particular on constant alert.
For the Chinese, in turn, it is convenient to reinforce the narrative of the relative decline of the existing order and the need to seek new pacts and rules for the game of international politics. It is also a way of responding to the hardening of US crackdowns on the Chinese in recent years and an opportunity to defend its domestic political model in terms of the longevity of the Communist Party and the principle of noninterference in its internal affairs. . .
Despite all of this, however, it is clear that we face a partnership that involves major asymmetries, major sensitivities, and a pact that is driven, above all, by Chinese convenience and by a utilitarian vision of what the Russians can stand for in Beijing, in this Moment.
Putin is trying to forge a marriage with China. For the time being, Xi seems to be banking much more on uninhibited flirting with Russia.