by Federico Rampini
Xi and Putin continue to face a united front against the West, but signs of tension are mounting and “Chinese concerns” about the war in Ukraine are surfacing
The Samarkand summit will not go down in history because of a divorce between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin. At least as long as there is a united front against the West, the alliance between China and Russia will hold. However, the balance in their relationships is changing and signs of tension are increasing. In the official reports of the summit in Uzbekistan, the Chinese leader never mentioned the war in Ukraine so as not to have his fingerprints on a possible Russian withdrawal. Xi forced Putin to act as his spokesman by revealing that there were “Chinese concerns” about this war. Beijing is blackmailing cheap energy supplies from Moscow (“Chinese are tough negotiators,” Putin concedes), but these economic gains do not offset all the damage done by a global economic situation that puts the People’s Republic at a disadvantage. American sources confirm that Xi has so far denied military supplies to the Russian army in Ukraine to prevent major Chinese companies from falling into the crosshairs of Western sanctions.
When the two last met at the Beijing Winter Games on February 4, Putin must have displayed a triumphant version of his military prowess and his own vengeance skills on the European theater. The last seven months have devalued its prices. But there is an ideological glue that resists between the two leaders, and ideologies can be at least as powerful as material interests. Xi maintains narrative that war in Ukraine is NATO’s fault; sees the overthrow of an international order dominated by America; regards the West as a civilization in irreversible decline. By proclaiming this vision, Xi has poisoned his relationship with the United States, but also with the European Union: The recent Brussels sanctions against human rights violations are another signal. Freezing with the West is one of the many headwinds Xi faces, along with a battered economy and the high cost of his stubborn Covid stiffness.
The Chinese President is convinced that his hostility towards the West will not have serious consequences because we cannot break free from our dependence on Made in China. For now, this certainty is partially supported by the data. There is an outflow of Western capital from China, but relocation of manufacturing activities is still modest and rewards Western countries only marginally. Apple is relocating some production, very little at first, from China to Vietnam. A reindustrialization of America has begun in semiconductors, financed by generous public subsidies. 2022 will end with the return of 350,000 foreign jobs to the United States, still a tiny fraction of the many millions of jobs that have migrated to China in thirty years of globalization.
Xi affirms that no matter what affront he inflicts on us, we cannot do without him. His geopolitical bet includes several scenarios. Putin’s victory in Ukraine was the most likely to accelerate the downsizing of the West. However, a partial defeat of Putin will have “redirected” US military resources and strategic attention to Europe; moreover, an impoverished Russia is condemned to the role of a Chinese colony.
Beijing hopes to play well against the non-aligned world. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization – which organized the Samarkand Summit – is a heterogeneous mess: India and Pakistan are also part of it, and they are bitter opponents between them; and New Delhi has a heated rivalry with China. A weakening of Russian influence in Central Asia, however, accelerates Chinese penetration thanks to those investments in infrastructure (Belt and Road or New Silk Roads) that the West does not even try to counter with its alternative proposal. A clear analysis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization can teach us a lot. On the one hand there is a huge world, even a majority, that has chosen not to join our sanctions against Moscow. On the other hand, there are several countries on the “non-aligned” maps that have nonetheless condemned aggression against the sovereign state of Ukraine. There are areas of the world where we can counter the influence of China and Russia if we want to and provide the means to do so.
The Ukrainian tragedy should cure us of naivety about omnipotence and infallibility of autocrats. They too are wrong, at least as wrong as the rulers of the democracies. To make matters worse, illiberal political systems lack internal mechanisms for balancing, reporting, and correcting mistakes. A former teacher at the Training School for Chinese Communist Leaders, Cai Xia, who now lives in exile in the United States, writes in Foreign Affairs magazine. The professor who trained the communist cadres describes Xi as a failed leader who accumulates wrong decisions while not having to admit his mistakes because he eliminated all internal rivals with the methods of a mafia boss.
An important test lies ahead of Putin and Xi’s bet on the irreversible demise of the West. Winter will be crucial in understanding whether we have the temperament to resist energy blackmail. In the 1970s, European economies – much less prosperous than today’s – emerged from the first energy shocks bruised but without irreparable damage. Now, as then, a mix of conservation measures, source diversification, technological innovation, and transition to new energy models should lead to similar results. Halfway through winter, 2023 will be able to offer the panorama of a Europe on the path to “detoxification” from its dependence on Russian oil and gas.
Nothing is as successful as success, the principle also applies in reverse. Among other things, a weakened Putin would have to pay an ever-increasing price for the conditional support of his friend Xi.
September 16, 2022 (Change September 16, 2022 | 22:59)
© REPRODUCTION RESERVED