Giada Oricchio April 09, 2022
Russia is really thinking about using it nuclear weapons? Paul Luzinpolitical scientist and scholar Russian Armed Forces he gave an interview to Fanpage.it for the Riddle think tank. in which he explained what the 2,000 tactical or “nonstrategic” nuclear weapons (smaller and shorterrange than the original nuclear bomb) in Russia’s possession are, according to the magazine “Scientific American”.
Luzin admitted: “With a tactical nuclear weapon it can easily be decided when Putin believes his military on the ground is on the verge of defeat. The option is now an integral part of Russian military thinking. there War doesn’t go according to plan of the Kremlin. So the probability is there. I can’t tell if it’s 5% or 35%. But it is a realistic hypothesis. The political scientist also believes that “the first blow would only be demonstrative, psychological. In uninhabited territory or in the open sea. The aim is to demoralize the opponent and force him to accept defeat.
The sticking point is the concept of “escalation for deescalation, because Putin does not know a priori the reaction of the Ukrainians, his allies and the Russian soldiers themselves: “What would be the political and social effects in the country? And what would the international community do? The use of nuclear weapons is generally considered unacceptable and an existential threat. After such an attack on Kyiv or Kharkiv, who would guarantee Putin not to be confronted with a coalition of all nuclear powers, from the US to China through France, Britain, India, Pakistan and Israel, determined to stop the nuclear power? crazy? “. In practice, the theory of “escalation by deescalation is based solely on psychology and the Kremlin’s fallacy of “being able to easily use the atom.
A risky calculation, according to Pavel Luzin, because the chain of command for using a tactical nuclear weapon is long: “How much? Much. Putin, Defense Minister Shoygu, the Chief of Armed Forces Gerasimov, the leaders of the 12th Directorate, those responsible for storing the warhead, the officers who have to prepare it for use, right down to the department head who has to shoot. And sabotage is possible at any time. (…). The weak point is the lack of trust between political power and the armed forces and between military hierarchies. And then the morale in the armed forces is low. The thought of launching a nuclear offensive is very unrealistic. But the Kremlin believes it can be done.”
The scholar concludes with a sad reflection on Russian society, which has always been the cradle of great culture: “A barbarism is taking place. People want to hear this propaganda, they have to believe in a fairy tale to drive out the creeping fear and demoralization. There is a degradation of education, culture and civilization. (…). Even if the war declared the end of the current political leadership, barbarism and fragmentation will long prevail.