- In just one week, Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated the transformation of European security.
- European countries have come together to help Ukraine, and many are planning to strengthen their military.
- US presidents have long complained about Europe’s contribution to NATO’s collective defense principle.
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One week later, with the most serious battles yet to come, Russia’s war against Ukraine has accelerated the transformation of European security.
Vladimir Putin could achieve his immediate military goals in Ukraine, but victory will be a feast. The post-Cold War celebration of hard power and difficult choices is finally over.
For more than half a century, American presidents have complained about Europe’s freeriding and unwillingness to take a fair share of the burden of collective defense within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the height of the Cold War, even recognized Atlanteans such as President Dwight D. Eisenhower were angry that Europeans were almost “making idiots out of Uncle Sam.”
After the fall of the Soviet Union, all NATO countries, including America, took a peace dividend and reduced their troops. But many European countries have gone far beyond that, choosing military castration. Germany was the biggest culprit.
The Bundeswehr, a significant and respected army on the front lines during the Cold War, became a hollow force. By 2017, most of the German fighters had been shut down due to lack of maintenance and all six of its submarines were inaccessible. During an exercise with the NATO Rapid Reaction Force, a German battalion had to use black brooms as a spare for its machine guns.
NATO troops participate in the Noble Jump 2015 exercise in Poland in 2015. Anna Krasko / Agencja Gazeta via Reuters
European nations have ignored the growing gap between their military and US forces for nearly 30 years, even after European inadequacies were uncovered during the bombings in Kosovo and Libya. The war in Afghanistan, in which most NATO members sent part of their troops, further revealed the limits of European military capability and risk tolerance.
Many European leaders thought the war was outdated – at least for their continent. Economic power and “soft power” were what mattered in the 21st century. Boutique armies were really only needed for multilateral humanitarian interventions abroad. Territorial defense was no longer a real concern.
Growing Russian revanchism over the past 15 years has failed to shatter these illusions, although the annexation of Crimea in 2014 has helped foster new security concerns in some European non-NATO forces.
In 2018, Sweden resumed its military service, a major part of its Cold War defense, while neighboring Finland set up rapid response units to prevent the threat of Russian “little green men.” In December, Finland announced that it was replacing its obsolete F-18 with 64 new F-35 fighters – the equivalent per capita of the 3840 F-35 for the United States.
But much of Europe continued to sleep under the American security blanket, with only rhetorical leanings toward a changing security climate. NATO members spend an average of 1.7% of GDP on their military, less than half of what the United States spends on defense. Most of these costs were for pensions and manpower, not for modern weapons, ammunition and communication systems.
Ships from NATO naval forces during the Dynamic Mongoose exercise in July 2020 British Royal Navy / LPhot Dan Rosenbaum
The ability to project significant combat power, even within Europe, has disappeared. A 2017 Rand Corporation report found that Britain and France, the continent’s best-funded and most capable military, would take a month or more to deliver an armored brigade to vulnerable Baltic states.
Ukraine changed all that, almost literally overnight. Europe has come together to impose unexpectedly tough economic sanctions on Russia and to direct military aid to Ukraine. Finland and Sweden, neutral and unattached throughout the Cold War, are in a serious debate over joining NATO.
Sweden, which last fought in 1814, has just sent 5,000 anti-tank weapons to Ukraine. Even Turkey, a rebellious ally for many years, has sold drones to Ukraine and plans to block some Russian warships from accessing the Black Sea.
But it is in Germany, the latent power of NATO and the biggest lag, that change is seismic. On Sunday, new Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that Germany would increase its defense budget to 2% of GDP (as it had long promised) and would commit a whopping $ 113 billion to rearmament this year.
As the leader of the Social Democratic Party, long inclined to accept Russia, Scholz promises to bring the rest of Germany with him into this newfound commitment to national defense and collective security. Outside, half a million demonstrators gathered in Berlin to support Ukraine.
Russian Marines take part in the joint Russian-Belarusian military exercise Union Courage-2022 in Belarus in February. Press service of the Russian Ministry of Defense via AP, file
Thanks to Putin’s recklessness, the United States can finally have what it has wanted for decades: a Europe that takes its defense seriously. As leader of NATO’s most important force, President Joe Biden can steer this naval shift toward America’s broader strategic advantage – if he is ready to withstand the urge to reflexively strengthen Europe once this immediate crisis is over.
In the absence of much geopolitical surprise, Russia is likely to be a staunch opponent of Europe and the United States for a generation. But the biggest threat to America is still in five time zones: the People’s Republic of China.
Europe, with a triple population and nearly 10 times its GDP, has enough resources to control Russia. Now he can finally find the will.
Regardless of the outcome in Ukraine, the German frigates are in the Baltic, not the South China Sea. European commandos must prepare to counter Russia’s irregular war, not seek counter-terrorism missions, as the Americans do.
If European NATO members are finally ready to step up and test Russia, America can realize its delayed turn to Asia and focus entirely on competition with China. The greatest impact of the war in Ukraine can be felt on one continent.
Gil Barndolar is a senior fellow at Defense Priorities.