Ukrainian commander asks for international help to evacuate from Mariupol 1:02
(CNN) — The second phase of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, an offensive in eastern Donbass, has already begun. The question is whether it will be more successful and competent than the first phase, and whether Ukraine will have enough troops and weapons to prevent or even block it.
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said on Tuesday that the operation in Donbass is “a very important moment of this whole special operation”.
Russia’s goal is clear and has been publicly stated: to secure all of eastern Ukraine in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, parts of which have been controlled by Russian-backed separatists since 2014. A second goal is to crush the remaining resistance in the port city of Mariupol in order to consolidate a land bridge between Russia’s Rostov region and Crimea, which Russia wrested from Ukraine eight years ago.
To this end, the Russian forces stationed north and east of Kyiv were redeployed and partially rebuilt after heavy casualties.
Armored vehicles from the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic drive down a street in Mariupol on April 18.
Now these vehicles and other newer units are entering Ukraine from the northeast. US officials estimate that Russia has mobilized about 78 tactical groups in eastern Ukraine, likely numbering 75,000 troops, and is gathering even more in Russia’s border regions.
So far, their tactics have been straight out of the Russian playbook: massive deployment of artillery, missile and missile systems, followed by advancing armor. Cities in Luhansk such as Severodonetsk, Popasna and Rubizhne were reduced to rubble, and electricity, gas and water supplies were destroyed.
But Russian advances on the ground have been modest. That may be because they didn’t take the time to regroup after losing in February and March.
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) notes that “Russian forces failed to take the operational pause that was probably necessary to properly rebuild damaged units withdrawn from northeastern Ukraine and engage in operations in eastern Ukraine to integrate the country.”
US officials estimate that Russia has lost up to 25% of its pre-invasion combat capability.
Donbass fencing
CNN’s analysis of satellite imagery, dozens of social media videos, and statements from both sides suggest the Russians are now trying to advance along three axes.
Think of the Donbas as a square: Russian troops are already on three sides, leaving only the west open for the Ukrainians to receive reinforcements and retreat if necessary.
From the south and east, Russian units advanced a few kilometers at best this month. In the south they had already advanced and had captured territories from the Zaporizhia region, neighboring Donetsk. This week they started shelling villages in Zaporizhia.
Little progress was made from the north after the city of Izium was taken earlier this month.
It is unclear at this point whether the Russians are able and willing to shift gears and whether a more coordinated offensive is at hand. The Kiev campaign’s record suggests otherwise, but US officials believe Russia is still “conducting shaping operations … to ensure it has logistics and support” for now.
Still, the ISW assesses that “the Russian military has likely not addressed the root causes that have made previous offensives difficult: poor coordination, inability to conduct cross-border operations, and low morale.”
An elderly man walks past an unexploded tail section of a 300mm rocket embedded in the ground in Lisychansk, Luhansk region April 11.
Ukrainian tactics
The Ukrainians have proven to be shrewd strategists in this conflict, ceding territory to conserve resources and using their terrain knowledge and mobility to inflict casualties on Russian units.
This week, Ukrainian soldiers emerged from the city of Kreminna in the Lugansk region, where they were defeated.
Now they must decide whether to build static defenses that could result in units being destroyed or surrounded by Russian artillery, missiles, and armored tanks. The alternative is mobile defence, ie fighting and retreating from less important terrain, hitting the Russians as they fall back, and then holding their lines on terrain of their choosing.
At the same time, the Ukrainians will try to cut Russian supply lines, creating confusion and challenging Russian logistics and morale. And the morale of some Russian units, which will be deployed in a few months for their second offensive, could be fragile.
Militiamen of the pro-Russian Donetsk People’s Republic walk past damaged vehicles during fierce fighting in a separatist-held area in Mariupol.
One of the Russian destinations is the city of Sloviansk, but the surrounding area includes forests, rivers and swamps that are difficult to navigate and require special bridge equipment. When the Russians are confined to the streets, as became evident north of Kyiv, they are more vulnerable to both Ukrainian drones and light anti-tank missiles.
Ukrainians don’t just limit themselves to defense either; Small units have made modest advances east and south of Kharkiv in recent days, potentially threatening Russian supply lines. If they can keep that up, the Russians would have to deploy units to guard those lines.
There are already signs that Ukrainian special forces are operating behind Russian lines: a road bridge on a major entry route from Russia was blown up last week. Unexplained damage also occurred to a railway bridge inside Russia outside of Belgorod. The Russian Army relies on rail for much of its logistics. In this aspect of the struggle, Western intelligence support can play a crucial role.
Another important aspect of the coming struggle is the cultural one. Ukrainian units enjoy a degree of autonomy and are encouraged to take advantage of opportunities on the battlefield. Even when there is no clear direction or orders, they have the motivation to fight. In contrast, the Russian chain of command is rigid and the culture does not encourage taking the initiative.
However, Ukrainians also face significant risks. They are basically fighting in a box that could be closed if the Russians were successful in one or more directions. They must maneuver intelligently, as they did in Kyiv, always alert to the risk of being surrounded.
Local civilians walk past a destroyed tank April 19 during heavy fighting in Mariupol.
If Mariupol falls, the Russians will be able to redirect the forces involved in that attack, but degraded and exhausted by nearly two months of city fighting.
Above all, in a race against time, Ukraine needs a constant replenishment of arms and ammunition, much of which must now come from outside the country via a long supply line that is vulnerable to interception. They need more anti-tank weapons and mobile air defenses.
Counterattacks to disrupt the Russian offensive would have to be secured from the air.
On Tuesday, a senior US official said Washington was working “around the clock” to get arms into Ukraine at an “unprecedented” speed. The United States has already authorized $2.3 billion in arms and equipment shipments to Ukraine since the invasion.
“What’s unprecedented here is the number of consecutive withdrawals we’re processing at this rate,” the official said.
The goal is Victory Day
There is talk that the Kremlin wants to make tangible progress by May 9, the day when Russia celebrates Victory Day marking Nazi Germany’s defeat in World War II. At the current rate of progress, this seems unlikely. The bigger question is whether this conflict will drag on into the summer in a bitter war of attrition.
The Russian military would have to rotate units and draw on its limited reserves to sustain a conflict that has already hit its ground forces. His calculus (and the Kremlin’s political strategy) will be influenced by the effectiveness of the Ukrainian resistance and the ability of Western governments to provide Ukraine with more and better equipment.
In War on the Rocks, Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute in London says: “Ukraine’s resistance has bought him time and opportunity not only to prevent further Russian advances in the Donbass, but also to prepare for the fight behind them. If Ukraine’s allies act today, they can deter or at least prepare an offensive for the summer.”
Replenishment is urgent. The Biden administration last week approved another $800 million security package that included artillery and anti-artillery radar. On Tuesday, the President indicated that more packages are expected.
Ukraine will need offensive equipment if it is to exploit vulnerabilities in Russian lines, and this includes heavy artillery (like combat-ready tanks) as well as a variety of other systems.
Watling says there is no time to waste. “Supplying Ukraine with tactical mobile air defense systems like the National would allow Ukraine to maneuver near the Russian border and retake cities while attacking Russian supply lines.”
The National or NASAMS is an advanced mobile surface-to-air missile system.
Western governments understand that this is a critical moment: raising the cost of Russia’s “military special operations” to the point where they are prohibitive. Ukrainians are clamoring for more and better weapons as they try to keep their air force aloft.
Still outnumbered and outgunned, they will need agility, determination and reinforcements to repel the second phase of Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine.