The massacre of the conscripts is “the fault of indiscipline” and unleashes “the hatred of the warmongers and pacifists against Putin”. While Russia “has run out of capacity”. “We don’t produce enough ammunition.” And “after the big battle in February” there will be a ceasefire. The interview with the most authoritative military expert in Moscow.
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“An entire regiment decimated” due to “lack of discipline and leadership” in the armed forces. That Russia, particularly due to Russia’s insufficient capacity to produce arms and ammunition, “will soon be unable to endure a conflict that has turned out to be much more intense than expected.”
That is the analysis of one of the leading defense experts in Vladimir Putin’s country. According to the analyst, by attacking Makiivka, Ukraine has achieved both political and purely military goals.
In fact, it has reignited criticism from the most warmongering militarists against the Kremlin, accused of disastrous leadership of the conflict. And it also triggered anger and sadness in the Volga region, where the fallen came from.
Russian missile explodes live behind French TV journalist broadcasting from Donbass
Both circumstances could “contribute to a future overthrow of the Moscow regime,” says our interlocutor. “2023 will see another major battle, probably in February, but it could be the last year of this war.” Fanpage.it spoke to the Dean of Russian Military Analysts.
We respect your request to remain anonymous: your family has problems with the authorities and has been hit by terrorist attacks in the past. He answers the phone for us from his house in Moscow. We call him Ivan – the name of the toy soldier of all Russian wars. The latter, “our” Ivan, knows them very well.
A regiment housed in a three-story civilian building that is undefended and exposed to enemy fire. But what do Russian officers have in mind?
Our armed forces lack discipline and leadership. And that cost the decimation of a whole regiment. That doesn’t mean everyone was killed. But surely this military unit is no longer combat-capable.
The Russian Ministry of Defense speaks of 63 dead. Still, it’s among the gravest admissions of losses Moscow has ever admitted. But they are not the 400 that Kyiv is talking about.
The number allowed by Russia certainly does not include those who were not immediately identified, nor those who later died in hospital, nor the so-called “missing”. The Department of Defense data is always extremely conservative. The dead are certainly well over 60.
But what happened Ivan? Could it have been avoided?
As far as I know from my sources, the Mobiks, the conscripts, celebrated the New Year. This is by far the most important holiday for Russians. They drank and shot in the air and called home the whole time. Actions that made him an easy target for the enemy. Officials should have prevented all of this. And I understand that the external conditions of cold and damp made them choose a comfortable civilian building to rest their troops. But they should have come up with a less stupid solution.
What did they hit the Ukrainians with? There is talk of up to 25 Himars rockets being fired at Donbass on New Year’s Eve.
It is more likely that the Makiivka building was hit by GPS-guided howitzer guns. We are close to the front lines, the range is certainly sufficient and the howitzers are more effective than the Himars in destroying a building. I have information that the target was reached in five or six shots. It’s unlikely they were rockets. Six Himars are not wasted against such a limited target. There was then a second explosion when an ammunition depot was incautiously close to where the soldiers were. In my opinion, they were howitzers with the latest generation of GPS guidance systems.
How are the two sides, rockets? Many observers say the Russians have few left.
Certainly, thanks to Western supplies, Ukraine has an advantage. Russian reserves are running low when it comes to the most advanced weapons. But a wide range of Soviet-era missiles remains. They won’t be accurate by today’s standards, but they can still be used successfully. Take the S-300, for example: it is an anti-aircraft system, but ground-to-ground use has also been envisaged since its conception. They were mass-produced in the USSR. And then there are the more modern X-32s, which are part of the armament of the Tupolev Tu-22 bombers. Again, the purpose was different: these are missiles designed to hit aircraft carriers or carry tactical nuclear devices. But they can very well be fired against terrestrial targets. Indeed, in this way they do not run the risk of being confused by radars, as is the case at sea. X-32s could miss a ground target by a hundred yards or more. But the effects are devastating. And the range is over 600 kilometers, so they can be conveniently operated outside of Ukrainian airspace. And then there are the Iskanders, the Kalibrs, and some nuclear carriers that can be hurled at the enemy as a shock mass once they are stripped of their nuclear warheads.
In short, antique Soviet missiles.
The Russian military improvises. And they laid their hands on the warehouses of the Soviet Union to make ends meet. Ammo is a problem that may soon become insurmountable. Russia lacks the industrial capacity to keep up with a high-intensity war. It doesn’t produce enough artillery shells. It’s a problem that has existed since the 1990s. I have been present at meetings of defense and military industry executives where the issue was raised. Never solved since. Only the production of ammunition for small arms is currently fair. The fact is that no one in Moscow even remotely imagined a war of this intensity. It was not considered that ammunition could become a problem.
There are always Iranian drones.
Useful. Ironically, we also try to buy old Soviet shells from North Korea. But all this will not cover Russia’s production capacity problems. Let me give you an example: the only real gunpowder factory left is that of Perm, founded in the Tsarist era. An old and inefficient facility. The fact is that since the last years of the USSR, the Russian war industry has suffered a tremendous decline from which it has never really recovered. I’m not saying it’s gone, but it’s specialized in high technology. The series production necessary for a war like the current one is completely inadequate.
Meanwhile, the most warmongering militarists are unleashed against the military in charge of running the conflict. After the attack on Makiivka, they literally insulted the generals and the government. Is that also a success for Kyiv?
Ukraine has achieved a military success with Makiivka and at the same time a double political success. The hawks now hate the Kremlin for its warfare, and this could be the start of serious trouble for Putin. And the families of the fallen soldiers, almost all from the Volga region, add their grief to their anger, adding to the ever-growing segment of society fed up with this absurd military adventure. The President could end up being hated by both those who wanted war and those who never did. A situation that could end up being like that of Serbian President Milosevic after the wars in the former Yugoslavia, and which is costing him much more than the seat.
However, it seems to me that in Russia we are far from a revolutionary situation.
It will depend on how the war goes and how political and social pressures start to develop. But in 2017, the sovereign saw himself hated by both warmongers and pacifists, the military and the civilian population.
But I don’t see a Lenin on the horizon. Without belittling the Russian opponents in prison for their ideas.
Also in 2017, at the beginning of the revolutionary events, there was no Lenin. Lenin was still in Switzerland and few knew him. But when things take a certain turn, the Lenins pop up overnight.
What year will 2023 be for the war in Ukraine?
I expect a big battle in February when the ground is frozen and will allow the necessary movement. Kyiv will take the initiative with an offensive. Our army is preparing for this, it now has the necessary number of soldiers. It will probably include offense and counterattack.
Where will the fight take place?
In southern Ukraine. Exactly where is difficult to predict. A lot of misinformation will circulate before the confrontation: each side wants to gain the advantage of a tactical surprise. There will be diversionary maneuvers before the decisive blow.
Ivan, who will win?
War is not very predictable.
But could this war end in 2023 one way or another? We talked about Russia’s production capacity problems and possible political and social pressures on the Kremlin. Could they get the invader to negotiate a reasonable peace?
I don’t think the war will last long. Probably ends this year. Technically, Russia is running out of options (capacity, resources and military strength combined with the will and real possibility to use them, ed.). And the West is also trying to avoid further military escalation. After the big battle in February, a truce might be possible. Under which conditions depends on the result on site.