During the Cold War, the United States and Japan focused on the threat posed by the Soviet Union, but as tensions rise around Taiwan, Tokyo has turned to its south, adopting principles that former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was pushing for before his death.
This week’s events are the latest in this trend, and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Washington marks a significant shift in the US-Japan alliance. For the first time in decades, Tokyo and Washington are preparing in earnest for the possibility of a major conflict in the near future. As Japan’s new National Security Strategy warns, “The possibility cannot be ruled out that a serious situation could arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, particularly in East Asia.” command relationships and new training arrangements. In short, the US-Japan alliance is moving to a war base.
It may seem obvious that Japan and the United States should prepare to wage war in the Indo-Pacific region. Finally, the allies face growing challenges from three nuclear-armed adversaries: China, Russia and North Korea. Over the past decade, the United States and Japan have responded by slowly but deliberately increasing their military capabilities to deter conflict. But President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and Secretary-General Xi Jinping’s mounting pressure on Taiwan have reminded leaders in Tokyo and Washington that even carefully crafted deterrence efforts can fail and the consequences can be devastating. In the face of new uncertainties, more robust responses have become necessary.
America’s best ally in Asia
Japan is in a unique position to prevent regional conflict. Tokyo has the world’s third-largest economy, has gradually increased defense spending in recent years, and made major strides to modernize its alliance with the United States under Abe’s leadership. Japan also hosts more US troops than any other country in the world. And Japanese leaders have increased their contributions on a variety of issues, from punishing Russia’s aggression in Ukraine to providing aid to Kyiv to collaborating on semiconductor supply chains and supporting the Biden’s Indo-Pacific economic framework -Government.
Experts have rightly noted that this is not a revolutionary rejection of pacifism, but rather a more modest set of evolutionary changes in Japanese security policy. Indeed, at the time of his assassination last year, key elements of Abe’s transformational agenda remained unfinished. But many of the restrictions imposed by Japan’s pacifist constitution and history are now being relaxed or adjusted. Japan’s increased defense spending and the adoption of counter-strike capabilities are just two examples of the change taking place under Kishida’s leadership.
Indeed, Japan’s preparedness for conflict has so far lagged behind that of America’s other top allies. South Korea and the United States have combined command and experience to jointly respond to frequent provocations from North Korea. Australia has fought alongside America in every major conflict of the last century. And the NATO allies face a war on their doorstep; fought together in Afghanistan; and were active in the Balkan conflicts after the end of the Cold War. In comparison, the US-Japan alliance has some catching up to do to be prepared for a major emergency.
This week, therefore, marks the beginning of a major – and remarkably rapid – shift in Japan’s approach. Some details have already been announced by the Security Consultative Committee, the bilateral meeting of defense and foreign ministers/secretaries, colloquially known as the 2+2 meeting. These announcements show that three major changes are underway simultaneously: 1) an increase in defense spending in Tokyo, 2) redesigned command relationships, and 3) major attitude and capability changes. Each is important in its own right, but taken together they represent a major shift in the US-Japan alliance’s approach to deterrence and warfare.
An ambitious agenda
First, Japan is increasing its defense spending and building up the military supplies needed for modern warfare. For decades, Japanese defense spending has been at or below 1 percent of gross domestic product. Now Kishida aims to nearly double defense spending to 2 percent over five years. If fully implemented, it would move Japan from the ninth largest defense spender to the third largest, only after the United States and China.
Of course, there are real challenges to increasing defense spending. The Japanese public must be persuaded to pay more taxes, and the details are still being debated in the state legislature. Also, new skills cannot be acquired overnight. As the United States is learning in Ukraine, stockpile replenishment is slow given limited industrial capacity for many key weapon systems. It will be years before new missiles such as Tomahawks or an improved version of Japan’s native Type 12 surface-to-ship missile are delivered. This therefore requires close cooperation not only between governments but also with allied defense industries.
Second, the United States and Japan are both updating their command and control arrangements. Tokyo has announced it will set up a permanent joint headquarters in Japan to command the Japanese Self-Defense Forces during a crisis. When fully implemented, this would give Japan its own version of a combatant command and simplify its coordination with US forces in a major emergency. Meanwhile, the US Congress has called for the establishment of a new joint forces headquarters in the Indo-Pacific to do the same for American forces.
Of course, these changes take time. But once in place, they will provide the US-Japan alliance with the beginnings of an architecture needed for wartime command and control. Unlike NATO or the US-South Korea military alliance, Washington and Tokyo have never really had a combined command structure. This became evident during Operation Tomodachi in 2011, when the Allies initially struggled to respond to the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami. The establishment of a joint headquarters should be a first step towards a joint and combined command that will be able to provide Allied command and control during the war, even in the most stressful scenarios.
Third, the allies are adjusting their military stance by shifting more capabilities to Japan’s Southwest Islands, a key geographic region that stretches south from mainland Japan to just 100 miles off the coast of Taiwan. Throughout the Cold War, Japan was more focused on the Soviet Union in the north before turning primarily to North Korea in the east in the post-Cold War era. As a result, China was not a top priority in the South until the last decade. Today, prospects of a serious conflict over Taiwan are growing, forcing allies to fundamentally change their modus operandi. With this in mind, the allies are announcing a major step: the creation of a US Marine Littoral Regiment in Okinawa, to be operational by 2025.
This unit will be capable of conducting sea refusal operations as it includes both an infantry battalion and an anti-ship missile battery armed with the Marine Corps medium-range NMESIS launcher. Such a unit will likely operate out of Okinawa, but will also have a presence near Ishigaki, Yonaguni and Miyako, offering new opportunities near the Taiwan Strait. The US Army will also play a role by moving watercraft to facilitate a variety of operations in and around Japan. There is also the possibility of increased Allied Forces training and exercises in Japan’s southwest islands. All of these steps will send a clear signal to China that Washington and Tokyo routinely upgrade their alliance for any contingency, including one in the waters off Taiwan.
Conclusion
These moves appear to be the beginning, not the end, of a series of initiatives aimed at strengthening deterrence by improving US and Japanese posture and capabilities. The expected announcements about the effort with the Philippines, Australia and others promise what Deputy Defense Secretary Ely Ratner called “the biggest year for posture in a generation.” There is still much work to be done to implement these reforms, but this is remarkable progress and deserves recognition.
This broader regional framework reinforces the point that changes in the US-Japan alliance are not occurring in a vacuum. South Korea, Australia, the Philippines and others are tightening ties with the United States in response to China’s more assertive behavior. These efforts need to be closely coordinated to reinforce each other. Nonetheless, there are real opportunities to engage third parties in this new approach, as is the case with Japan and the United States running training in Northern Australia.
If Japan can increase its defense spending, modernize its command and control systems, and improve its defense posture, it would put Tokyo on an important new path. Washington should applaud Kishida’s bold vision and robust contribution to regional security. Japan’s transition from pacifism to regional protector is not yet complete, but there is no denying that it is well underway.
Zack Cooper is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a partner at Armitage International. He hosts the Net Assessment podcast for War on the Rocks and previously served in various capacities at the Pentagon and White House.
Eric Sayers is a Nonresident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and a Managing Director at Beacon Global Strategies. He was previously a Special Assistant to the Commander, Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM).
Image: US Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Javier Reyes