Vladimir Putin vowed to punish Yevgeny Prigozhin for “treason” related to the warlord’s armed insurgency. Instead, the former Kremlin caterer and his Wagner group appeared to have escaped harsh consequences after Russia’s first attempted coup in three decades.
Prigozhin’s failed coup ended abruptly, but it still exposed deep flaws at the heart of Putin’s regime, cast serious doubts about the Russian president’s invasion of Ukraine, and raised the specter of a state collapse should unrest boil over again, people, those close to the Kremlin told the Financial Times.
“Of course, this is a great humiliation for Putin. It’s obvious,” said a Russian oligarch who has known the president since the 1990s. “Thousands of people are moving from Rostov almost to Moscow without any resistance, and nobody can do anything about it. Then [Putin] announced that they would be punished, but they did not. That is definitely a sign of weakness.”
The cause of the rebellion lay in frustration within the Russian armed forces over how Putin had handled the full-scale invasion of Ukraine – to the point that a dispute between paramilitaries and regular armed forces nearly brought down the state. Russia’s army and security services failed to prevent Prigozhin’s uprising.
The ease with which Wagner launched his uprising, the lack of resistance from other security forces, and the enthusiastic reception his fighters found in the southern city of Rostov when they rejected “damages.” [Putin’s] “It has a good reputation domestically,” said Alexei Venediktov, the well-connected former editor of radio station Ekho Moskvy.
“Turns out you can start a revolt against the President and be forgiven. That means the President isn’t that strong.”
The extraordinary events have prompted even ardent supporters of the invasion to publicly question Russia’s rationale for the invasion and fear that further convulsions could follow.
“The whole world has seen that Russia is on the brink of a serious political crisis,” wrote Sergei Markov, a former Kremlin spin doctor and MP, on Telegram. “Yes, the putsch was unsuccessful, but putsches have fundamental reasons. And if these reasons persist, the coup could happen again. And it could be successful.”
The Kremlin says it has quashed Prigozhin’s threat for now after the warlord agreed to leave Russia for Belarus in exchange for a promise not to prosecute him or Wagner’s fighters.
On Sunday, Russian state media tried to let life continue as normal. City workers poured out to repair highways damaged by Wagner’s advance, while Russian forces retook the command center in Rostov, which Wagner had briefly taken over the day before.
But Russia’s attempt to downplay the incident as an inconvenient incident belies the major problems that the invasion of Ukraine has created for Putin’s rule.
“You can only see it as a sign of weakness and dysfunction,” said Ekaterina Schulman, a Russian political scientist. “This is not an unexpected, one-off event or an external shock. It’s an integral part of the war,” she said.
The Kremlin on Saturday insisted that Prigozhin’s uprising would have no impact on its conduct of the war. But Wagner’s prominent role at the front was itself a consequence of Russia’s mishandling of the invasion.
Originally created to fight covertly in conflicts around the world, Putin moved Wagner’s men to Ukraine when the invasion plan failed. He then allowed Prigozhin to increase his ranks by personally signing pardons for convicted criminals who had banded together to fight.
“They started a war they shouldn’t have had, they couldn’t fight it properly, and they decided to go to the extreme by letting it round up an army of prisoners,” Schulman said. “He became a political actor and they had to deal with that. One thing leads to another.”
Putin’s reluctance to end Prigozhin’s months-long public feud with the Defense Ministry appears to have convinced the former caterer that he has the power to succeed in his attempt at mutiny, people close to the Kremlin report.
But the episode also proved damaging for Prigozhin, after he failed to secure the resignation of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu or Valery Gerasimov, commander of the Russian invasion forces.
Some of Wagner’s troops would sign contracts with the Defense Ministry, the Kremlin said. That comes as a humiliation after Prigozhin declared his group would never submit to Shoigu – a move that would deprive him of the money and influence that came from being answerable only to Putin personally.
When the uprising began, Prigozhin apparently had no idea how to successfully endure it, according to a person who has known the warlord since the early 1990s.
“I don’t think he had anything in particular in mind. He just decided to convince Putin to let him keep all the money they took from him,” the person said. “Then the situation got completely out of hand.”
“At some point he realized he didn’t know what to do next. You come to Moscow and then what? You open the doors of a dozen prisons, some unimaginable freaks come out, the country goes bust, and then you get to the Kremlin. . . and you don’t know what to do.”
The humiliating episode will likely prompt Putin to dismantle Wagner and ensure he can no longer threaten the state, said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center.
“They promised not to touch anyone, but I think it’s entirely possible that someone could go to jail or die under mysterious circumstances to scare the rest,” Gabuev said. “Putin must have realized by now how vulnerable the system is and will try to fix it.”
Much remains unclear about exactly how Russia persuaded Prigozhin to resign, and many members of the Russian elite suspect that Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, who allegedly brokered the deal, was a proxy for powerful figures in Russia.
“Everyone wanted to call [Prigozhin] and make a deal. And in the end they found a more sensible middleman in Luka, who offered both sides a way to resign,” said the person close to Prigozhin.
However, on Monday state media reported that charges were still being brought against Prigozhin, adding to the uncertainty after a feverish weekend.
Having failed to stop the insurgency, the Russian elite are unlikely to escape unscathed as Putin is now aware of the threat to his own power.
“It was a colossal failure of counterintelligence. The CIA knew this was coming, and your own intelligence agencies didn’t know or didn’t report it. So he will tighten the screws and keep the elite on their toes,” Gabuev said.
But even sweeping changes may not be enough to restore order, the oligarch said. After Russia’s war effort stalled last year, many members of Russia’s elite began discussing the likelihood of a “period of troubles,” a repeat of the long, violent political crisis of the early 17th century when different factions vied for the throne.
But even then, according to the oligarch, “I expected that the army would step in immediately if it did start.” And they didn’t. That’s a surprise.”