Fighting between the Burmese army and ethnic armed groups has increased in Burma since late October following an unprecedented offensive in the north of the country that highlighted the junta’s difficulties on the ground.
“This is the biggest challenge the military junta has faced since the coup of February 1, 2021,” said Thomas Kean, Burma expert at the International Crisis Group, an NGO specializing in conflict monitoring. Since the end of October, the Burmese army, the Tatmadaw, has had to face a simultaneous offensive by armed rebel groups in several regions of the country.
On Saturday, November 18, fighting broke out in the north of the country, in Shan, Kachin and Chin states, as well as in Rakhine state in the west, where a ceasefire had been in effect for almost a year – until the beginning of the week. At the same time, armed groups also confronted the Tatmadaw in Kayah state in the country’s central east, the expert said.
“Operation 1027”
In fact, the offensive began on October 27 in northern Shan State on the border with China under the name “Operation 1027.” On his initiative, three armed groups – the Taang National Liberation Army, the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army – joined forces under the name Brotherhood Alliance.
“With the help of the resistance groups formed after the coup, hundreds of experienced and fairly well-armed fighters managed to simultaneously attack key junta locations. They captured several towns and villages in the region, took control of military outposts and cut off important trade routes to China,” says Thomas Kean, calling this attack “the junta’s biggest setback on the ground in a long time.”
Officially, this joint offensive was aimed at combating the criminal activities that are common in this border area, particularly in the Sinic region of Kokang. The latter has been dominated since 2009 by a pro-junta militia that enriches itself through drug production and all kinds of illegal trafficking, such as prostitution or online fraud.
“Since May, Beijing has been calling in vain on the Burmese army to strengthen control over its militias on the border,” explains Thomas Kean. “The Fraternity Alliance therefore took advantage of this inaction by the junta to launch its attacks under the guise of fighting crime.” A way for the alliance to avoid a negative reaction from China, according to the expert.
“Also an opportunity to deal a diplomatic blow to the junta, a traditional ally of Beijing,” added Kyaw Win, director of the UK-based NGO Burma Human Rights Network. Shortly after the attack, Beijing showed “its great dissatisfaction” by lamenting the Chinese casualties in Kokang. “And China is supposed to build a major railway connection in Kokang as part of the ‘New Silk Roads’. That’s why it wants stability at its border,” the expert continued. “However, given this offensive, the junta no longer seems able to guarantee this.”
In Burma, “Operation 1027,” an unprecedented offensive against the junta? © Graphic studio France Médias Monde
Serial attacks
Above all, these attacks appear to have triggered a local chain reaction on an unprecedented scale in the north. “These victories have in some ways galvanized the armed groups in the country,” continues Thomas Kean.
On November 6, armed groups announced they had taken control of the 25,000-person town of Kawlin in the Sagaing region. The next day, resistance forces said they had captured Khampat, a city in the west of the country. “And the fighting gradually expanded, with fronts in several regions,” summarizes Kyaw Win. “According to the various ethnic groups, today the army has lost about a hundred military posts and control over about fifty towns and villages. The ethnic groups have also managed to confiscate numerous weapons and vehicles.”
However, the junta chief, Min Aung Hlaing, promised on November 2 to launch a counterattack in the north of the country. “We will take the necessary measures to counter terrorist attacks,” he warned, announcing an emergency meeting with his military leaders.
But given the multitude of fronts, the Tatmadaw appears to be showing its weaknesses. “As has often been the case since the beginning of the civil war, it responds with air strikes, but its mobile forces on the ground appear to be limited and overwhelmed,” says Thomas Kean.
Since the coup, there has been a shortage of fighters in the Tatmadaw. In a note published in May, researcher Ye Myo Hein estimated that “the army currently has about 150,000 troops, including 70,000 combat troops.” According to him, at least 21,000 soldiers have been killed, deserted or defected since February 1, 2021.
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“The current situation shows that the pressure on the Burmese army is greater than ever,” emphasizes Kyaw Win. “Today it lacks people and resources. It is losing ground every day in the countryside and is gradually being confined to big cities like Yangon or Mandalay.”
“The Tatmadaw can collapse now,” he hopes, calling on the international community to act. “Now is the time to act and restore peace to Burma.”
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A turning point ?
“It is true that recent events show that the Burmese army is at a critical moment. “So far it has never lost so much ground or even entire cities,” admits Thomas Kean. “But it has already shown in the past that it is capable of reversing the trend. The whole question in the coming weeks will be whether it will be able to regain the lost territories or not.”
Before the regime “surrenders,” “it is more likely that the army will redouble its efforts to regain the upper hand, and that this will lead to an increase in violence and bombings,” the expert laments. “The country risks sinking into an increasingly brutal spiral in which civilians will pay a heavy price.” According to the United Nations, at least 75 civilians, including children, have been killed, 94 others injured and more since October 27 More than 200,000 people were displaced.
One actor could come along at any time and turn the tide: China. “Even if Beijing has largely let the fighting in Shan State run its course so far, this may not last. Beijing has far more influence on events on its border than any other international actor,” concludes Thomas Kean. “China can just as easily put pressure on ethnic groups as on the junta to end the fighting and fix the conflict in a status quo.”