Today in Israel you often hear the expression: “If we win.” It serves to postpone an intervention or to imagine a better life if the country fulfills its publicly stated mission: to end Hamas in Gaza, which is considered to be at its bloodiest day in 75 years of history is responsible. Although the wording is vague and experts disagree about its realism, it is a clear objective, for which it bombs incessantly (the death toll exceeds 9,000, mostly civilians) and surrounds the capital of Gaza with tanks. But what after that? Who will govern the Gaza Strip once the Islamist party militia that has done so since 2007 is overthrown? Who will prevent hatred from giving rise to a new, post-Saddam Hussein Iraq in its ruins? These are questions that Washington – with its symbolic withdrawal from Afghanistan still fresh – and Arab and European foreign ministries, concerned about the possible impact, such as a refugee crisis, are asking Israel privately these days.
Last week, national security adviser Tsaji Hanegbi responded defensively in a press conference (“The day after?”), emphasizing that Israel’s current concern is to free the more than 200 hostages and put an end to Hamas. “When we are close to the goal, we can start thinking about the day after,” emphasizes Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Lior Haiat.
However, the United States is urging its ally, which it helps economically and militarily, to think in the medium to long term. Secretary of State Antony Blinken addressed the issue this Friday at a press conference in Tel Aviv, on his third visit to Israel since the war began on October 7: “Everyone agrees that there is no return to the status quo.” “The Hamas continues to have governance and security responsibilities.” “But,” he added, “we also know that Israel’s permanent resettlement of Gaza, from which it withdrew its settlers and soldiers in 2005 but which it technically continues to occupy, “cannot resume” and has “no intention” either. With these goals, he added, the United States is conducting discussions with its regional and international partners, which have resulted in “several possibilities and permutations” that it is “premature” to elaborate.
However, the debate is already dominating academic and security circles. “It is not too early for the Biden administration to talk about the issue,” said Gerald M. Feierstein, former diplomat and Middle East expert at the US Analysis Center for the Middle East Institute, in a video conference this Thursday. Feierstein criticized the fact that the entire debate “always revolves around Gaza,” such as “who will govern it or what reconstruction will look like.” “We must recognize that this is an Israeli-Palestinian issue, not Israel and Gaza, and that the solution is political, not military, and neither party will achieve victory through force,” he noted.
A plan is already being outlined in the discussions. Once the Israeli military destroys Hamas’s executive and military capabilities, it would establish a three-kilometer-long security buffer zone. “Gaza must be smaller at the end of the war” [..] “Whoever starts a war with Israel must lose territory,” said Gideon Saar, minister without portfolio in the new emergency government, before the land invasion. It then remained on the ground for several months with far fewer troops, opting for frequent incursions to suppress the rebellion’s predictable sources. West Bank style, but with no settlers to protect.
In parallel, a multinational force would emerge, presumably with an important role from that part of the Arab-Muslim world that recognizes Israel, such as Egypt, Jordan, Turkey or Morocco. The day-to-day administration of the Gaza Strip would fall back into the hands of the Palestinian Authority, just as it did in the 1990s, after the Oslo Accords and the Hamas coup in 2007; and in West Bank cities under Israeli military occupation.
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All of this would be accompanied by seals of legitimacy from the United Nations and the Arab League, a shower of millions for reconstruction and a new push to finally resolve the conflict with the creation of a Palestinian state.
In addition to the many desiderata, one of the settlement’s main problems is that it responds to many of Israel’s concerns – which, with its sophisticated solution, neither wants to manage the lives of 2.3 million Palestinians again nor see hundreds of its citizens die helplessly again. However, the border security wall turned into cheese is not used for that of other actors whose participation brings them dubious benefits, but is almost taken for granted. Israel will also demand many guarantees before leaving its security in the hands of others.
Two-state solution
The Prime Minister of the ANP, Mohamed Shtaye, has already indicated that they will not come to the stage “on board an F-16 or an Israeli tank” without “a political solution for the West Bank” and “a “Global Horizon of the Peace”, which makes it possible to bind Gaza into the framework of a two-state solution. It is also considering bringing Mohamed Dahlan, the ANP’s controversial former security chief, whom Israel views favorably, from Dubai. He has excluded himself and, despite being an Al-Fatah member, insists that “Hamas will not disappear” and that it should be able to take part in elections to prepare a technocratic interim government in the Gaza Strip.
Arab states, for their part, “never wanted to take responsibility for Gaza,” recently recalled Nathan J. Brown, a professor of political science and international relations at George Washington University and author of several essays on politics in the Arab world. “And it’s likely that this is even less the case now, and they don’t want to come together to solve a problem that they believe was caused by the recklessness of others.”
Ghassan Jatib, a former Palestinian minister and professor of contemporary Arabic and international studies at Birzeit University in the West Bank, is also not clear that both parties accept the hot potato. “Israel has not withdrawn from Gaza and has not returned, and I believe that after what Israel is doing, the Arab countries have no interest in playing a role in the administration of Gaza.” I don’t believe that either the Palestinian Authority is ready for this,” he says.
A group of protesters at a march against Netanyahu’s policies near his residence in Jerusalem on November 4. Alvaro Garcia
One of the West’s favorites, Salam Fayad, prime minister of the Palestinian Authority between 2007 and 2013 after going through the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, issued two warnings in Foreign Affairs magazine last week: “You can’t ‘impose it’.” “to present a concrete agreement to the Palestinians” and not to pretend that the weak and discredited ANP will take over the administration of the Gaza Strip again with its current structure. Fayad proposes redesigning it together with the Palestine Liberation Organization – the legal representative of the Palestinian people, which does not include Hamas or Islamic Jihad – so that they “reflect the full spectrum of Palestinian views on what it would be an acceptable agreement. “”
Jack Joury, commentator on Arab affairs at Haaretz newspaper, warned this Tuesday: “Without the restoration of the PNA and the institutions of the Palestinian people, Mogadishu and Beirut will be transformed during their respective civil wars compared to what will develop between Jabalia and Khan , seem like a paradise.” . Yunis”, in the north and south of Gaza. But neither Western countries nor Israel will accept Hamas’s presence in a government in advance, as it would give it a kind of effective veto like Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Division between Gaza and the West Bank
Today, Israel treats the ANP like an old friend it has ignored for years who suddenly calls to ask a favor. The government of Benjamin Netanyahu – whose coalition agreement emphasizes “the exclusive right of the Jewish people” to Israel and Palestine – has for years promoted division between Gaza and the West Bank to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state; and to weaken the ANP without offering a horizon of dialogue that legitimizes it vis-à-vis Hamas. For the far right, it is also the enemy, as current Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich described it: “The ANP is a burden and Hamas is an asset,” because “no one will recognize it, nor will they give it status.” [el Tribunal Penal Internacional] He will also not be allowed to present a resolution in the United Nations Security Council.” A few days before the attack on the 7th, the ultranationalists cried out because the ANP security forces – whose deployment in Gaza is currently being tested – 18 were funded by the USA vehicles had received.
Daniel Wajner is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations and European Forum at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and specializes in international legitimacy and conflict resolution. He rules out three options: that Israel resume civilian administration of the Gaza Strip, that the ANP do so (“even if it wanted to, it is very delegitimized among its population,” he argues), and an international mandate. He suggests a fourth: the inclusion of “central countries of the Arab-Islamic world,” at least Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which had negotiated recognition of Israel. “I don’t know if it’s the best plan or the safest, but it’s the most legitimate,” he clarifies.
Wajner insists that “international coverage,” particularly support for the Arab League, is more important than the number and size of countries. What if they don’t want it? “It’s the big doubt. “The key will be that they understand that they can benefit from this,” he replies, before recalling that both Cairo – where coffers are full and inflation is skyrocketing – and Amman, which is in a better economic situation to receive money from the International Monetary Fund.
Vague concept
Another problem lies in the vagueness of the concept of “eliminating Hamas,” a movement that administers Gaza and employs tens of thousands of officials. At what level of the hierarchy will they be arrested or eliminated? Eyal Hulata, Israel’s former national security adviser, last week argued for retaining some civilian officials during the transition. A French proposal, reported in the Haaretz newspaper, is to replace all Hamas-appointed officials with ANP employees, to whom Ramallah pays their salaries without working since Hamas drove out loyal forces in street fighting in elections .
Israel also doesn’t have an easy time agreeing on its wishes. The fiasco of the 7th has put Netanyahu’s political future in jeopardy, and the emergency government formed for war harbors sensitivities ranging from those who favor strengthening the ANP, who were part of the opposition a month ago, to those who see an opportunity to remain in Gaza and rebuild the Gush Katif settlement, which was evacuated in 2005. This is the case of Simja Rotman, the head of the parliamentary justice commission and striker of the controversial judicial reform, who defined the victory as: “That a Jewish child can walk through the main street of Gaza.” A leaked working document from the Ministry of Intelligence, for example, suggests that To forcibly and permanently expel the population of Gaza to the Egyptian Sinai.
“The question: ‘How will Gaza be governed when the war is over?’ There may be no good answers in the end and it may not even be a good starting point,” summarized the expert Brown in an article published this Friday at the Carnegie Center on the Middle East. “It would be better to ask: What does it mean to throw a party like Hamas from power when it dominates all levels of government in Gaza?” What does it mean for Israel to end the military capabilities of Hamas, a social movement with a military one Arm that also oversees public safety, administration and other government functions, especially when operating above and below ground? [por la red de túneles subterráneos] What does victory mean? And what will Israel actually achieve beyond the goals? And how will anyone know the war is over?”
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