For Marine Le Pen “Sanctions [contre la Russie] serve absolutely no purpose other than to make the European peoples suffer and, by the way, the French people”. In early August, the leader of the RN Group in the National Assembly went so far as to demand that they “disappear to prevent Europe from a power cut, especially as far as gas imports are concerned”.
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Union imposed significant sanctions on Moscow with the aim of “imposing severe consequences on Russia’s actions and effectively counteracting Russia’s ability to continue aggression,” the European Council said. “I think of our people who will need the strength of the soul to face the times to come, to resist uncertainties, sometimes relief and adversity, and united to pay the price of our freedom and our values,” declared he the President of the Republic Emmanuel Macron, Saturday 20 August.
“Before asking whether the sanctions are working, we must first ask for what purpose?” says Olivier Schmitt, a professor of international relations at the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. “Those who criticize the sanctions say ‘it doesn’t change Russia’s behavior’ and the debate is often reduced to that. However, we already know – as shown by studies in international relations – that changing the behavior of a state with sanctions does not work or works very little.”
According to him, “the purpose of sanctions is not to change Russia’s behavior, but to reduce its capabilities in the medium and long term.” In other words, to impose on Russia, without having to use force, in addition to the attrition inflicted by the Ukrainian army on the military front. “Sanctions are a cross between doing nothing and going to war. They also make it possible to set a standard within the international system by specifying what is and is not acceptable.
An endurance race
Six months into the invasion, the sanctions appear to have had no visible impact on the front lines, although the Russian army is faltering in the face of fierce Ukrainian resistance. Russia has defaulted on payments for the first time since 1918. But according to the International Monetary Fund, Russia’s economy is expected to contract by 6% in 2022, while the institution forecast an 8% contraction last April and the World Bank is partially expected to contract by 11%. The gas price explosion, largely orchestrated by Moscow, even made it possible to temporarily increase the federal budget at the beginning of the year.
Exports of advanced technologies to Russia have fallen by 90% since the war began, while its defense industry is extremely dependent on them.
“It’s not magic: the opponent adapts,” comments Olivier Schmitt. In fact, Russia has found solutions, notably by shifting its activities to other countries that do not apply sanctions, such as Turkey, India or China. An impedance for Oleg Korenok, economics professor at the University of the Commonwealth of Virginia, Swapnil Singh, economics researcher at the Central Bank of Lithuania, and Stan Veuger, researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. In an article published by Foreign Policy in July, the three experts stress that it is futile to “hope for the sanctions to take effect in the same timeframe as military action,” but that “the Russian economy is already undeniably and seriously affected by the sanctions harmed in a way that will only become clearer.”
For example, according to the New York Times, the sanctions are already affecting Russia’s ability to import electronic chips that power many of its weapon systems. Exports of advanced technologies to Russia have fallen by 90% since the war began, while the country’s defense industry is extremely dependent on imported materials.
“It is the bet that is being made: to weaken the Russian economy and its supplies of critical technology, to structurally degrade its production because its supplies are not unlimited,” adds Olivier Schmitt. “The whole challenge for the Ukrainians is to continue to be supported by the West in order to keep this attrition against Russia as long as possible.” Sanctions against Moscow are just as much a part as arms deliveries to Kyiv.
mistake
Another crucial parameter for measuring the effectiveness of sanctions is also measuring the effectiveness of their implementation. At the end of June, the head of the UK agency responsible for enforcing the sanctions admitted it had only 70 staff while the number of posts affected by the sanctions fell from 220 to 1,400 after the invasion of Ukraine, and that the same agency in the United States has more than 300 people.
Many oligarchs accused of involvement in one way or another in the war in Ukraine or in enriching the Russian regime are still slipping through the cracks. Opponent Alexei Navalny appointed several a few days ago, including none other than Alexei Miller, head of Russian gas giant Gazprom. In June, Navalny’s team revealed how Miller worked for years to save Vladimir Putin’s coffers. To date, he has not yet been the target of European sanctions.
After the 2014 invasion of Crimea, the European Union had already imposed sanctions, including an arms embargo. In fact, however, there was an “exemption” that authorized the countries of the Union to continue to honor their pre-2014 arms treaties with Russia. That derogation was only lifted last April, and European soldiers are now on the front lines in Ukraine.
As winter approaches, fearing gas shortages, Russian propaganda emphasizes the cost of sanctions to Europeans.
Above all, Europe is paying dearly for decades of economic ties with Russia, Olivier Schmitt notes. “During the Cold War, the sources of security and prosperity for Europe were the same: North America. With the end of the Cold War, Europe separated these two sources, entrusting its security to the United States, its energy supply to Russia, and its economic growth to China.
“Some thought that interdependence would pacify political relations. In fact, the opposite happened. Europe has become dependent on Russian gas, which gives Russia leverage for counter-force.”
language elements
Despite showing relentless resilience, Russia continues to call for the sanctions to be lifted, knowing that the longer the war lasts, the more of a threat they will pose to its economy and war effort. “If it didn’t bother them, they wouldn’t be spending their time asking her to stand up,” notes Olivier Schmitt.
With winter approaching and fears of gas shortages, Russian propaganda has been emphasizing the cost to Europeans of the sanctions for several months. “The gravitational center of Western countries is their democratic cohesion. The Russians are therefore very interested in weakening cohesion on this issue as much as possible,” observes Olivier Schmitt. The Kremlin can rely on its traditional squadrons, above all Marine Le Pen.
Last March, American magazine Newlines revealed how leaders of Europe’s far-right are coordinating with Moscow by releasing internal documents to Russian media group Tsargrad, owned by ultraconservative Russian oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, who is close to Vladimir Putin. Malofeev notably played the intermediary in obtaining the Russian loan from the National Rally.
“We believe that today there is still a possibility to resume contacts for systematic work with the Eurosceptics against the sanctions policy in Brussels,” explains an internal document in Malofeev’s organization, which among its allies quotes Italian Matteo Salvini and Marine LePen. Tsargrad then proposes to provide them with the language element that the sanctions against Russia would do “irreparable damage” to Europe’s economies.