While the United States and other NATO allies are sending arms to Ukraine to fight Russian invaders, some left-wing critics have denounced the effort as a warmongering escalation.
For example, linguist professor and activist Noam Chomsky described American politics as “praising ourselves for heroism” while “fighting Russia to the last Ukrainian.” I don’t blame anyone for lamenting the destruction and hoping for peace, but that assessment misunderstands this war and America’s role in it.
It is up to the Ukrainians to decide when the fight for Ukraine will stop. Helping them while offsetting other risks is the best path to peace.
However, Chomsky argued that America should press Ukraine to accept Russian demands: “You can sympathize [Ukrainian President Zelensky’s] positions. But you can also pay attention to the reality of the world.” That reality, he says, is a “neutralization of Ukraine, a kind of accommodation for the Donbass region” and removing Crimea’s status from the negotiating table. He compares Russia to a hurricane and argues that concessions are the “alternative to the destruction of Ukraine and nuclear war.”
The linguistics professor and longtime anti-war activist drew criticism for denying both Ukrainian and Russian agency and sounding like a Putin apologist, but he also has his defenders. Here’s how Ben Burgis explained it in a Daily Beast column last week:
“Chomsky’s analysis is that the options are either serious pressure for Russia, Ukraine, the US and other powers to sit down and negotiate a negotiated settlement to end the fighting, or further escalation that will at best lose countless more Ukrainian lives will. At worst, the regional war could escalate into a larger conflict that could lead to World War III.”
This is a wrong choice. The options aren’t serious diplomacy to end the fighting, or military escalation. Ukraine is the key player here, and it has a choice to acquiesce to Russian dominance – with the surrender of the cities, the resignation of the Zelenskyi government and the installation of a pro-Russian leader (as Russia’s original push into Kyiv attempted). – or to resist. Ukraine’s elected leaders and a large percentage of its population chose to fight back.
At this point, it’s not diplomacy or war. It is and.
War, explains political scientist James Fearon, is a negotiation process. Two sides have conflicting demands, so they can’t make a deal, but they don’t really know what to force the other to do. The fighting thus reveals information that shows what the military can (or cannot) achieve, and this continues until at least one side amends its demands enough that an agreement becomes possible.
Ukrainian and Russian delegations met days after the invasion began, but failed to reach an agreement. As late as April 19, Russia rejected ceasefire proposals from both Ukraine and the United Nations to allow civilian evacuations. The main reason the war isn’t over isn’t because the United States is trying to “fight to the last Ukrainian,” but because Russia is demanding much more than Ukraine is willing to give.
More broadly, America arguably bears some responsibility by admitting post-Cold War former Soviet republics – such as Poland and Estonia – to NATO and leaving open the possibility of Ukrainian membership. It is reasonable to argue that through NATO enlargement, Russia has perceived a geopolitical challenge that it must meet. However, it is also plausible that post-Soviet Russia would still have wanted to assert itself in neighboring countries. As Daniel Nexon, Professor of International Relations, argues, there are many factors involved and many possible alternate histories. We do not know, we cannot know, and while some hypotheses may seem more plausible than others, we cannot change the past.
Regardless, the massacre of Ukrainian civilians is not a sensible response to geopolitical concerns about NATO expansion.
“The war in Ukraine, like most wars, will end in a negotiated settlement, but the details will be shaped by military outcomes that remain uncertain.”
Attributing the current violence to American ambition and willingness to sacrifice Ukrainians requires accepting many unknown outcomes. It is safe to assume that when Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders in January, all the US would have said was, “Ukraine will never be in NATO and everyone should consider it within Russia’s sphere of influence,” that would have satisfied the Kremlin.
Considering Russia’s maximalist demands and how little Putin and his spokesmen mention NATO in public justifications – instead focus on claims that Ukraine is not a real country, and frequently shifting lies about a genocide of Russian-speaking Ukrainians, hidden programs of mass destruction and a government with a Jewish president secretly run by Nazis – that’s not particularly plausible.
The US is an important player in this situation, but not the protagonist. Russia chose to call for the Ukrainian government’s abdication and national demilitarization at gunpoint. Ukraine, which has been fighting Russian-backed separatists in the Donbass region for eight years, has opted for independence over abdication. Russia then decided on a full-scale invasion. Acknowledging the Russian and Ukrainian agencies means accepting that the US is not the root cause of this war and probably could not have stopped it.
The war in Ukraine, like most wars, will end in a negotiated settlement, but the details will be shaped by military outcomes that remain uncertain. Ukraine has already achieved greater success than many expected, thwarting Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv and other major cities. Far from futile resistance to the last, Ukraine’s war effort, backed by Western arms, has secured its independence.
What Chomsky calls the “reality of the world” is not a fait accompli. Russia is not a mindless force of nature like a hurricane, but a state with finite resources, led by people with finite wills. They have already been forced to abandon regime change and pursue the less ambitious goal of controlling Donbass and southern Ukraine.
Ukraine strikes back, and if it wins the Donbass battle (as it won the Kyiv battle), it can improve its negotiating position and perhaps even hold out long enough to exhaust the Russian offensives. Perhaps they can achieve something like the pre-invasion status quo, or better.
Or maybe not. But since Ukrainians want to try, it’s not surprising that they would be offended by the willingness of outsiders, Ukraine’s territory and ability to choose their own international relations, not least because they fear that an abdication will now happen could mean Russia could reap the profits and rebuild its armed forces, and is returning in a few years to finish the job. I have seen Russian forces rape, torture, steal and kill all over their countryFew Ukrainians, from Zelenskyy onwards, seem interested in giving Russia things they don’t need to have, though they certainly recognize that continued fighting means more deaths.
That means America doesn’t have to choose between diplomacy and war, but rather between complying with Ukraine’s plea for help and telling her they’re on their own.
With NATO openly supporting Ukraine’s war effort, there is a serious risk of escalation that could spiral out of control and lead to a nuclear exchange. But the Biden administration’s policies show a healthy appreciation of that risk. The president has not and will not send in American troops, has rejected calls for a no-fly zone, has blocked a transfer of fighter jets from Poland to Ukraine, and has avoided responding to Russian missile tests and other nuclear provocations. The US is taking a cautious line, helping Ukraine as much as possible while minimizing the risk of a major war.
Whether and on what terms an agreement with Russia is concluded is up to Ukraine to decide. If a deal pleases them, the US should support it, even if it means removing the economic pressures that critics of Putin have advocated for years.
But as long as Ukrainians choose to fight, the road to peace is Ukrainian military success. This improves Ukraine’s negotiating position and prevents future international aggression – not only from Russia but also from China – by showing that the costs outweigh the benefits.
An agreement is possible if Russia accepts Ukraine’s independence, not before.