In about 20 months, two very serious crises with unusual characteristics have shaken the world. First, in February 2022, the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces, a frontal challenge to the current world order. Now Hamas is launching an unprecedented offensive against Israel with a brutal response. The two conflicts are not connected; they have specific dynamics and reactions. Geopolitically speaking, attempts are being made to disrupt the process of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the West; another from the normalization of relations between Israel and the Arab countries. But despite the differences, both earthquakes produce ruptures that spread well beyond their region in the atlas, forming blocks of lands that are aligned for one side, the other, or not, and when you overlay the positions you can see that it largely both impact the same gaps that are tearing the world apart.
A survey of global reactions to the Hamas attack conducted by Le Grand Continent, a geopolitics magazine published in several European languages - including Spanish – provides an overall perspective compared to the UN General Assembly vote on the invasion resolution in Ukraine in March 2022. The current radiogram cannot, of course, be as clear as a vote at the United Nations. Furthermore, the unfolding of events – with an Israeli response causing much outrage – can lead to twists and nuances. But the diplomatic language of the initial reactions allows for a fairly clear and politically significant division between three blocs: that of resolute condemnation of Hamas while at the same time resolute support for Israel; those who emphasize the demand for de-escalation (with different criticisms of the two actors); and that of supporting Hamas against Israel.
west
The first observation in the votes on both conflicts is that in the group that has offered the most explicit support to Israel – about 60 countries, according to Le Grand Continent’s cataloging – the essential core is the galaxy of about 40 states that are more active Supporting Ukraine by imposing sanctions on Russia. These are a number of advanced democracies linked by shared values, alliances (NATO) or power-sharing structures (EU).
Of course, neither in the case of Ukraine nor in the case of Israel is the Western position monolithic: there are nuances and discrepancies. Israel’s military response, which shows clear signs of going beyond international law, has drawn more criticism from some than others. If this continues, cohesion could break down. Some were already in favor of suspending humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, while others opposed it (the majority in the EU). There were and still are differences of opinion and different views in the Ukraine crisis.
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Nevertheless, a significant degree of convergence of the bloc can be seen in the face of two attacks hitting two democracies – albeit clearly imperfect, each in its own way – and two processes that interest the West (and particularly the United States) in Ukraine’s rapprochement and normalization between Israel and Arab countries. At least this degree of convergence is more structured and explicit than that of other real or potential poles, such as the BRICS countries or the Global South.
Both the crises in Ukraine and Israel also highlight two fractures in this part of the world. First, geopolitics: the distance of this group from Turkey (which, as a member of NATO, is linked to the West, but neither sanctions Russia nor supports Israel like the others). Another, purely political aspect: the internal tensions in the various souls of the left (with the moderates more clearly expressing their support for Israel and Ukraine and the extremists emphasizing abuses against the Palestinians and a pacifism that gives Kiev the advantage of the military would refuse). Help for self-defense).
For the West, the two crises are also linked by the specter of double standards that many around the world accuse. His response to the invasion of Ukraine is seen in light of that of Iraq, and his criticism of Putin’s excesses is compared to his attitude toward those of Israel.
The Democracies of the Pacific
Another pattern repeated in the two crises is the clear bias of advanced Pacific democracies – such as Japan, South Korea, Australia and Taiwan – towards the West. Both crises are occurring very far from their immediate areas of interest. But beyond the values-based impulse, it is in the interest of these countries to have an explicit and active focus on these issues with the perspective of reciprocity, given the potential risks associated with the rise of China (in particular) and the outgrowths of North Korea.
Although not geographically located, these countries are increasingly fitting into the West’s geopolitical concept, for example with the Aukus project (between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States) and through greater coordination with NATO, which has begun to invite some of them to its summits. At the same time, they strengthen the relationships between them, be it bilateral or multilateral.
Major Eurasian regimes
A look at the group of countries that choose to de-escalate or directly support Hamas, and the countries that did not condemn the invasion of Ukraine, shows in broad strokes the great rupture of the world today: the framework of confrontation or the stark discrepancy between advanced democracies and Eurasian regimes, with China, Russia and Iran at the forefront.
One can assume that Russia not only wanted to pursue specific goals by invading Ukraine, but also wanted to lead a movement that rejected the West in the hope of encouraging others to follow the path in a different way. He has certainly succeeded in doing this with Iran, which supplies him with weapons and is now a central player in the conflict between Hamas and Israel.
It remains to be seen whether and to what extent Tehran cooperated in the specific planning of the attack, but its significant role as a supporter of Hamas as well as a major supporter of Hezbollah in Lebanon is obvious, which could soon be a new one Actors in competition. Tensions between Iran and the West go back decades. Both the crises in Ukraine and Israel are exacerbating them.
Given the closeness between Russia and Iran, it is interesting to note that Moscow, which has promoted deepening ties with Israel throughout much of Putin’s mandate, has been more cautious in its response under current circumstances. Without a doubt, harmony with Tehran and complete hostility with the West, which supports Israel, have shaped their position. On Friday, the Kremlin introduced a possible resolution at the United Nations, acting in some ways as a possible mediator between the parties. We will see. It is obvious that this crisis reveals a change linked to the previous one.
China, for its part, has also placed itself in an alternative position to the West, in the bloc of those who do not clearly take sides and urge the parties to de-escalate the conflict. It is a position that is in keeping with his diplomatic traditions. But the current crisis represents a special test for Beijing, testing the continuity of its ambitions as a global player and its influence in the region.
China has recently sought to take a leading role in this area by overseeing the resumption of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, while the United States has encouraged the thaw between Israel and Arab countries. Now, not only is the former suffering a major blow, but the prospect of an escalation in the war could thrust China into the international spotlight in much the same way as it did in Ukraine.
If the current conflict between Hamas and Israel reaches a new dimension with the full participation of Hezbollah, an even greater wave of pressure against Iran would be triggered than the current one. As a result, China would be subject to demands from the West that would push it to exert its influence on Tehran, which is largely dependent on the Asian giant for economic purposes. The same thing happened with Russia. Beijing has not backed down, although it has not provided strategic assistance either.
India and the Global South
India is the big difference between the geopolitical scenario of Ukraine and Israel. First, New Delhi has maintained a position of non-alignment towards gestures favorable to Russia, such as purchasing its oil. In the second case, the power of South Asia was clearly defined in favor of Israel and thus tilted towards the West.
It is the culmination of a shift in the relationship with Israel initiated years ago by Narendra Modi. Undoubtedly, the political vision of Hindu nationalism, which tends to marginalize the large Muslim community in its country, influences an internal fact with political projection. It is possible that on this basis the Indian leader also saw an opportunity to make a benevolent gesture towards the West after the relative dissatisfaction with his position towards Russia. Amid shared concerns about the rise of China, the West is seeking India’s complicity. New Delhi responds to this argument, but does not want to join a bloc, but rather be an independent power that plays different sides depending on its interests.
This positioning by New Delhi is another episode that shows the lack of geopolitical consistency of groups like the BRICS, whose only real common denominator is the demand for greater shares of power in the world order. Like Russia, Brazil is also submitting a draft resolution to the United Nations. Each has their interests, in many ways competing to be leaders and standard-bearers of a global South that, like them, has some things in common in its demands on the North – and particularly the western North – but not much else.
Muslim world
Of course, the crisis triggered by the Hamas attack has many peculiarities that bear no resemblance to the crisis of the Russian invasion. The most obvious case is the rupture it causes in the Muslim world, which initially reacts to its own regional logic. Countries with already established relations with Israel or with established relations with the United States have opted for intermediate positions (including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan or Morocco) in which, while of course explicitly criticizing Israel’s excessive response, they refrain from doing so to do offer clear support to Hamas.
On the other hand, there is another group in the Muslim world that is clearly hostile to the United States and the West more broadly and has positioned itself positively for Hamas (which, in addition to Iran, also includes Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania ). In addition to them, hostile Western countries such as Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua have also spoken out outside the Muslim world.
The fractures progress on the map. Those who want to expand them and turn them into abysses seem to prevail against those who want to build bridges.
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