The coming weeks will be crucial because, according to Western experts, Ukraine has only one chance this year to launch a counterattack and recapture Russian-occupied territory. Since autumn, the war in Ukraine has become a war of attrition. Before and during the winter, both sides literally tightened their grip on their positions. The Russian army built several lines of retreat in the areas it occupied and heavily fortified them to prevent a rapid Ukrainian advance, as in late summer at Kherson.
Neither country has sovereignty over Ukrainian airspace. Russia failed to do this at the start of the invasion, both sides now have very good air defenses to change that. Therefore, the conflict is mainly conducted as a land war, that is: artillery is decisive. Ukraine, itself a major arms exporter before the war, has fully devoted all of its remaining production capabilities to its own army.
debate
What would the end of the war in Ukraine look like?
Ammunition as a factor of uncertainty
The decisive factor, however, is the supply of arms from the West. In addition to tanks, which will also be crucial for an offensive, ammunition is lacking. Western stocks – artillery warfare was no longer envisaged in NATO scenarios – are now severely depleted. Production is increasing, but it will take time. To illustrate the problem: the US wants to produce 90,000 grenades a month in the future, but according to the New York Times it will take two years to reach that capacity. And the US is the NATO country with by far the strongest weapons industry. For its part, London is trying to buy stocks of Russian or Soviet ammunition from around the world, which Kiev mainly needs.
Both sides, but above all Ukraine, are now saving on ammunition because it is so scarce. As the “NYT” reported, the Pentagon estimates that the Ukrainian army is currently firing about 6,000 shells a day – in Bakhmut and along the entire front of almost 1,000 kilometers. The Ukrainian side is also particularly reluctant to save soldiers, ammunition and other war materials for the planned counter-offensive.
Russia also suffered heavy losses at Bakhmut, but the ratio of losses changed when Russia conquered the flanks (which are on high ground), starting with the southern flank in January and the northern flank in mid/late February, including Yahidne in Day 25 . https://t.co/ejA7yG3Y6l
— Rob Lee (@RALee85) March 20, 2023
Tough decision on Bachmut
The question of whether Ukraine should continue to hold out in Bakhmut or give up on the small town must be seen above all in this context. According to American military expert Rob Lee, trapping Russian troops there and inflicting as many casualties as possible was the correct calculation. In the meantime, the ratio of dead soldiers – according to Lee, there were sometimes six dead Russian soldiers for one Ukrainian – is significantly less favorable for Ukraine.
This has to do with the fact that Russian units managed to occupy the hills near Bakhmut and the Ukrainian soldiers who remained in the city found only precarious protection in the buildings on the periphery without cellars. Lee sees a final decision from Kiev on where to stay or withdraw close – also because of the onset of the thaw, which makes withdrawal more difficult.
more on the subject
One million artillery shells for Ukraine
EU grenades too late for offensive?
Earlier in the week, EU states agreed to supply Ukraine with one million new artillery shells – but within twelve months. As important as the promise is, given the timetable, the counter-offensive planned for the first half of the year will probably have to take place wholly or largely without these supplies.
And Kiev will only have a chance for an offensive – simply by the number of available soldiers and weapons. Kiev wants to avoid a war of attrition on its own territory with all its consequences. Unlike Russia’s ruler, Vladimir Putin, who, more than a year after the attack on Ukraine, still does not meet significant resistance in his own country, despite the many dead soldiers and economic difficulties.
ISW sees Russian offensive weakening
The US think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW) wants to see evidence that Russia’s spring offensive in eastern Ukraine is about to peak and will soon fade. The balance so far from the Russian point of view is meager: some small gains in territory, but no strategically important objectives achieved, especially not the conquest of the entire Donbass.
The institute cites, among other things, Ukrainian information that heavy losses near the frontline town of Wuhledar severely weakened Russian attack capabilities in Donetsk Oblast. The ongoing offensives in the early months of 2023 would not yield more than a few tactical gains. With the partial mobilization in September, Russia mobilized 300,000 troops.
Ukraine ‘in good position’ for counter-offensives
Once the Russian offensive ceases, Ukraine has good prospects of regaining the military initiative, the ISW was confident in its assessment of the situation.
“If 300,000 Russian troops were not able to give Russia decisive offensive superiority in Ukraine, it is very unlikely that deploying additional forces in future waves of mobilizations this year will produce a significantly different result,” the institute wrote. “Ukraine is therefore in a good position to seize the initiative again and launch counter-offensives on critical sections of the front,” he added.
ORF Analysis: China and the Ukraine War
ORF correspondent Miriam Beller reports from Moscow. She explains how Chinese leader Xi Jinping can influence Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the war in Ukraine.
Unlikely Lightning Success
But Western military experts have also been stressing for months that recaptures as quick and comprehensive as in Kharkiv this year are unlikely to be possible. The Russian army has built multiple lines of retreat in many parts of the front line and also uses less ammunition on the defensive. Russia has also learned to deal with superior Western weapons systems, such as US HIMARS rocket launchers, and has relocated ammunition depots to out-of-reach areas.
In December, in an analysis for the US Foreign Policy Research Institute, Lee and his American counterpart Michael Kofman emphasized what will be decisive for the course of the war: arms deliveries – and whether Russia will be more capable than before from recruit new recruits, train, integrate into combat units and improve cooperation between different units.