quotby death squadsquot To quotcannon fodderquotthe bloody year of the

"by death squads" To "cannon fodder"the bloody year of the mercenaries of the Wagner group

Through a note from their secret services, the Ukrainian government discovers the Russian plan to bring down Kiev. On February 27, 2022, four days after the start of the Russian invasion, Ukraine reported the presence of 400 Wagner Group mercenaries near the capital. Their target: President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, but also the members of his cabinet. There were 23 names on their blacklist, including that of Kiev Mayor Vitali Klitschko.

“The mercenaries were very dangerous back then. They were experienced, well equipped and trained with multiple deployments in Syria, Mali and elsewhere,” explains Karen Philippa Larsen, security expert at the Danish Institute for International Research (DIIS). in the study of the Wagner group.

The Wagner Group, founded in 2014, made a name for itself that same year during the first fighting in Ukraine’s Donbass and in connection with Moscow’s annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The organization is gradually expanding its activities to around thirty countries, notably Syria, Libya, the Central African Republic and Mali. Known for its brutality, the militia operates in secret, allowing Moscow to deny its official involvement in armed conflicts while serving as a tool for geopolitical influence.

Terror on Boucha

While the group maintained a presence in Ukraine after 2014, the Russian invasion led to a massive influx of their mercenaries. According to Ukrainian intelligence, between 2,000 and 3,000 soldiers recruited by Wagner entered the country in January 2022, weeks before the February 24 outbreak.

“As early as December 2021, we saw that Wagner had started a new recruitment campaign. At that point it was unknown for what purpose, until the invasion began,” recalls Karen Philippa Larsen

After reports of the presence of these mercenaries in Kiev at the beginning of the conflict, the government immediately decided to impose a 36-hour curfew and strict containment of the population. Anyone venturing outside their home could then be suspected of being a Russian agent and risk arrest and worse.

Held in check by the Ukrainian security forces, Wagner joins the Russian army in the fighting raging around the capital. His mercenaries are reported especially in the spring in Boutcha, a martyr town 25 km northwest of the capital and the scene of war crimes against civilians.

>> Read on France 24.com: The Boutcha massacre, a modus operandi reminiscent of Chechnya

After the Russian withdrawal, the first images of streets littered with the corpses of residents spread around the world. Some have their hands tied behind their backs. Others were mutilated or burned. According to local authorities, 419 people were killed during the Russian occupation, including nine children. Many witnesses also report torture and rape.

According to German intelligence services, if Russian troops played a major role in these attacks, members of the Wagner group also participated in this terrorist strategy.

Less well trained, less well equipped

The summer of 2022 marked a turning point in the Wagner Group’s engagement in Ukraine. Rather than secure the services of professional military men, Vladimir Putin’s shadow army began recruiting from Russian prisons.

In a video posted to Telegram, Wagner boss Yevgeny Prigoyine – nicknamed “Putin’s cook” – promises inmates amnesty in exchange for a six-month contract in Ukraine. “It was a big change that changed the nature of the group,” analyzes Karen Philippa Larsen, recalling that of the 50,000 mercenaries stationed in Ukraine, 40,000 are Russian prisoners.

“In contrast to the first Wagner members, these prisoners received only a few weeks of training. Hardly enough to become familiar with handling a weapon. They are also much poorer equipped,” adds the researcher.

>> Also read: In Russia, the worrying return of the front of prisoners recruited by Wagner

Despised by the more experienced mercenaries, these prisoners are sent to the most dangerous places on the front lines, specifies Karen Philippa Larsen, especially to the east in Bakhmout, which Evguéni Prigojine calls “the butcher shop”. “We send them into the field to find out where the Ukrainians are shooting from. For Wagner, they serve as ‘cannon fodder’.”

This year also marked the formalization of Wagner’s existence. Prigoyine, who has long denied his ties to the militia, admitted in late September that he heads the paramilitary organization before opening a headquarters in the city of St. Petersburg in November.

A total shift in strategy which, according to Karen Philippa Larsen, aims to establish Prigoyine’s legitimacy and position him on the Russian political stage through the image of a dynamic warlord.

While the Russian army is struggling in the Ukraine, Wagner, on the contrary, is claiming successes in the East. There is growing rivalry between the militia and the Defense Ministry: Prigojine is increasingly openly attacking the “incompetence” of the regular army.

Growing rivalry

However, Wagner paid dearly for his “successes” at the front. Karen Philippa Larsen estimates that 40,000 mercenaries, or 80% of the workforce, deserted, surrendered, or were killed or injured. “There are therefore only 10,000 fighters left in Ukraine,” adds the researcher, specifying that Moscow does not count her losses because these soldiers are not part of the regular army.

In recent months, multiple testimonies and videos have demonstrated the brutality of the group’s internal workings. In November, Yevgeny Prigoyine coolly commented on the video of the execution with a hammer of a “deserter”: “A dog deserves a dog’s death”.

During December and January, the Wagner Group would have lost most of its forces at the Battle of Soledar, multiplying waves of desperate attacks against the Ukrainian defenders. “It was a suicide squad,” explains Karen Philippa Larsen, for whom the capture of the city can be explained more by the appalling number of soldiers being sent to their deaths than by any military strategy.

Wagner claims the capture of Soledar on January 11th. But the announcement is not confirmed by Moscow. The next day, the Russian Ministry of Defense claims that the city has fallen, but without mentioning the contribution of Wagner’s mercenaries. Angry, Prigoyine accuses the Russian army of having “stolen victory” from his men.

Since then, the already vile relationship between Prigoyine and the General Staff has continued to deteriorate. In February, Wagner announced the halt to his prison recruitment campaign, despite a colossal death toll. According to Karen Philippa Larsen, this decision is likely the result of a direct order from the Russian Defense Ministry, which remains Wagner’s main supplier and therefore has the power to cut him off.

“Russian law was also changed to allow the army to recruit people with a criminal background,” explains the expert. A way for the Russian army to partially shed its reliance on infantry provided by Wagner.

This rivalry recently took a new step when, in mid-February, Prigozhin personally criticized Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu for a lack of material support for members of his militia – a form of “treason,” he said.

>> To go further: Valeri Guerassimov, an obstacle in Wagner’s path?

Wagner today seems far removed from the image of an army of experienced soldiers, observes Karen Philippa Larsen, who sees Prigojine increasingly sidelined by Moscow. “However, he should not be underestimated. Now he has two options: either he leaves Ukraine and focuses on building an army of professionals operating abroad, or he insists on Ukraine. But that scenario will largely depend on his ability to recruit new fighters, which he’s finding increasingly difficult.”

Article translated from English by Grégoire Sauvage. You can find the original here.