Everyone has their own job, as the saying goes, and the cows are well looked after. The Caisse de dépôt etplacement du Québec is a remarkable steward of our collective “nest egg.” But its subsidiary CDPQ Infra proves that it is not particularly good at managing a public transport network.
Posted at 7:00 p.m.
Since the REM went into operation, the problems have multiplied. And CDPQ Infra does not have the reflexes that we have a right to expect from a manager of a network like REM.
It is not normal that we learn in La Presse – a week later – that it took paramedics more than 25 minutes to save a passenger who had health problems. Especially when the ambulance sent to the scene of the accident had no way of getting to the train even after contacting an REM officer.
It is not normal for users to have to use their mobile phones to obtain information during outages. It is also not normal for the causes of breakdowns that start in the middle of the afternoon to only be clarified in the evening.
In the face of such events – because there have been others – CDPQ Infra’s reflex is to downplay the severity by calling them “communication problems”. In reality, these are security issues.
In fact, if a train stops in the middle of the Samuel De Champlain Bridge for several minutes without warning, it could cause serious problems if passengers are not informed as quickly as possible. We cannot rule out the possibility that passengers may panic and, for example, try to get off the train and go straight onto the track, where they would certainly be in danger.
PHOTO HUGO-SÉBASTIEN AUBERT, LA PRESSE ARCHIVE
A REM train crosses the Samuel De Champlain Bridge at full speed
Normally, the operator of a public transport network attaches great importance to the safety of its passengers, which results in fast and transparent communication with users and the public.
CDPQ Infra too often has the opposite reflex: we say as little as possible and as late as possible. Because the house’s habits are more about protecting the reputation of the fund than the safety of the public.
The fund has to live with its decisions. The use of driverless trains may be justified for financial reasons, but certainly not in terms of the safety of passengers who cannot count on a manager on board. One more reason to get quick answers.
We cannot seriously use the excuse of a running-in period. It is inevitable that disruptions will occur in the first few weeks of activity on a project such as the REM. What is not normal is that we do not have planned or cannot apply intervention protocols for situations where the safety of passengers is at stake.
For this reason, the REM has so far failed to gain a reputation as a safe and reliable means of transport among potential users. Especially since the first winter has not yet begun and we have not yet seen how the railway carriages manufactured in India by the cheapest supplier will react in reality, even if they have been tested in the laboratory.
PHOTO HUGO-SÉBASTIEN AUBERT, LA PRESSE ARCHIVE
Jean-Marc Arbaud, President and CEO of CDPQ Infra
Many of these issues are due in large part to the corporate culture at CDPQ Infra. The project was designed in isolation, entirely internally and without even attempting to integrate it with other public transport options.
It must be remembered that the very first version of the REM did not include a connection to the subway. A modest integration into existing public transport networks is only considered later and only hesitantly.
Finally there will be a connection at McGill and Édouard-Montpetit stations (still under construction), which explains that users arriving at the central station will still have to walk a good fifteen minutes through a labyrinth before reaching the Bonaventure metro station to reach.
But from the beginning, the Caisse de dépôt’s main goal in proposing the REM was never to serve the public, but rather to generate a return on the fees paid to it by the Quebec government.
The fund also relied on its reputation for delivering the REM “on time and on budget” to sell its model internationally. With what we know today, it will be much more difficult.
This means that we now have to think about the possibility that the Caisse decides to activate a clause in the contract concluded with the Quebec government at the start of the project in 2018, which provides for it to sell the REM the end can only be five years old. Actually for everyone, even for a foreign investment fund.
This is an option that we can no longer rule out if ridership is non-existent and other cost overruns that the Caisse must assume continue to cloud the financial balance sheet.