By Ben Hodges
Social media channels are full of grainy footage of tanks and explosions in southern and eastern Ukraine. Reports are circulating everywhere that Kiev’s longawaited counteroffensive is underway, causing excitement and concern. Offense is incredibly important for Ukraine’s future.
But to gauge what’s really going on, it helps to understand a few key facts. There is a big difference between launching an offensive and the main attack or effort of the operation. The offensive has definitely started, but I don’t think it’s the main attack.
When we see large formations of tanks joining the attack, I think we will know that the main attack really has begun. I don’t think we’ve seen such a concentration of several hundred tanks and armored personnel carriers in the attack before.
A Ukrainian tank battalion typically has 31 tanks. A Panzergrenadier battalion would have about the same number. Add armored vehicles that transport engineers, air defense, logistics, etc. An armored brigade would probably have three tank battalions and one or two mechanized infantry battalions. In total, an armored brigade has more than 250 armored vehicles of different types.
I estimate that the Ukrainians had between seven and twelve armored brigades. Some may only have captured Ukrainian or Russian equipment, others may have a mix of westernsupplied equipment.
If we see two or three of these brigades (about 500750 armored vehicles) concentrating on a narrow front, we can say that the main attack has probably begun. and where does it happen. But be careful anyway. The Ukrainian General Staff will want to keep the Russians in the dark about the location of the main attack for as long as possible, and it won’t bother them too much (and probably welcome it if Twitter gets it wrong).
As Russia fortified parts of Ukraine in advance of a possible counteroffensive, defenses sprang up along, behind, and sometimes very far from, the front lines.
If the West provides everything the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) need, especially longrange precision weapons, I still expect Ukraine to have Crimea, the crucial terrain of this war, by the end of this summer, which is by the end of August , can free . I think that’s one of the goals of the offensive. By this time, the UAF’s longrange precision weapons could hit Sevastopol, Saky, Dzankoy and other key targets in Crimea, rendering the peninsula untenable for Russian forces. This is why the supply of Storm Shadow airlaunched cruise missiles with a range of over 155 miles by the UK was such an important contribution.
I hope that the Biden administration finally gives in and supplies shortrange (up to 300 km or 186 miles) ATACMS surfacetosurface missiles to Ukraine. This would be a crucial contribution to the performance of the Ukrainian forces on the ground and would provide a tremendous boost to the offensive.
Some have dated the start of this campaign to June 4, two days before the June 6 Russian sabotage of the Kakhovka Dam on the Dnipro River. This was probably the moment when, I think, General Valerii Zaluzhny, the supreme commander of the UAF, decided that his three conditions are met and he can therefore give the green light. He would have asked:
- There is sufficient combat capability (armoured brigades with tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, engineers, artillery, air defenses and logistics) to penetrate the Russian line defenses and carry out the tasks assigned to them, which probably include cutting the “land bridge” to Russia. Russia for Crimea and also for the protection of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant?;
- Russian defenses and logistics were sufficiently degraded; the Russian hinterland and transport network were duly disrupted; And is the Russian leadership confused enough about the purpose and timing of the UAF offensive?; It is
- Is the ground dry enough to support the movement of hundreds of heavy, armored, and tracked vehicles?
In defensive positions ahead of UAF assault units, the Russians are lined up behind hundreds of kilometers of trenches lined with bunkers, minefields, antitank pits and “dragon’s teeth” obstacle belts. But these defenses are only as good as the soldiers who man them and cover these obstacles. I am unimpressed by the Russians’ combat prowess in most places, and the fierce power struggles we see between the various Russian leaders (e.g., warlords like Prigozhin and Kadyrov) highlight the lack of cohesion on the Russian side. I imagine the UAF will investigate this.
So far, it looks like the Ukrainians are still researching vulnerabilities, pushing them and looking for vulnerabilities to exploit.and strengthen local tactical success where they find or create it. This is one of the benefits of introducing a Westernstyle tactical command and control function, where lowerlevel managers can make decisions themselves. And part of what we’re seeing may be designed to confuse the Russians as to where the main attack will land.
The depiction of a leopard on the battlefield at such an early stage should probably draw too much attention to this area, perhaps as a decoy, in my opinion.. I have no way of knowing, but it would be something I would have done if all the media attention had been focused on these excellent tanks.
As always, those who engage in combat face not only the deception of the enemy, but the sheer confusion of combat. The fog of war takes a toll on field commanders. It was always very difficult for me to visualize and understand what was happening during a battle as a brigade commander and COO in Iraq and later as a commander of operations in Kandahar, Afghanistan even though we had the most powerful command and control systems. Modern. A commander still relies on reports from forward commanders who are actually deployed at the front edge of the combat area. Drones help keep track, but it’s still a challenge. Therefore, it is important to trust that junior commanders understand the overall plan and continue to make good decisions in the heat of the moment.
Still, there will be losses. The destruction of a lone leopard caused quite a stir on Twitter, but it was actually salvaged from the battlefield so it could be repaired and returned to combat. This is impressive. That’s what we practice in the US Army, and it’s worth noting that the UAF managed the same.
There is a great deal of uncertainty, but one thing we can be sure of is that the Ukrainian general staff did an excellent job of protecting information, preventing the Russians from knowing what was going on and giving them a chance to prepare for the attack .
Uncertainty in Russian minds may have been one of the reasons behind the sabotage of the Kakhovka Dam. In addition to the dire humanitarian and ecological consequences, the flooding of the lowlands and the widening of the Dnipro might have delayed UAF offensive operations in this area for a while. But there are experts who say the flooding will subside in the next five to seven days and the soil will begin to dry out quickly in the summer heat. The effect probably intended by the Russian side, namely making it more difficult to cross the Dnipro, is therefore likely to be shortlived.
In the meantime, I don’t trust any reports from the Russian side about the dam being demolished or anything happening on the line of contact. Of course, Ukrainians are very disciplined about protecting information, and they’re also very good at controlling the narrative. We’ll know more soon.
So what does Ukraine need as it joins this great national effort? It needs defenders and it badly needs ATACMS.
SOURCE: CEPA.org