The director of the Israel Studies Center at the University of California, Los Angeles, Dov Waxman, in an image from UCLA.UCLA
Dov Waxman (London, 49 years old) sees some dark clouds in Israel's immediate future. First, because it has set “unrealistic and unattainable” goals for its bloody campaign in Gaza, just as it did in 2006 with Hezbollah, which is more powerful today than it was then. He predicts that Israel will end up militarily occupying Gaza because there is no viable plan for the next day, and that there will be a guerrilla-style insurgency emerging from the rubble. “Israel has created the conditions to win all the battles but lose the war,” he summarizes. Today's bombings, he warns, may give him “short-term calm,” but they will lead to “another round of conflict within a few years.”
Waxman, professor and director of the Y&S Nazarian Center for Israel Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), has written four essays over the past two decades on his areas of expertise: the Middle East conflict, Israel's politics and foreign relations, the alliance with the United States and contemporary anti-Semitism. From this perspective, he believes that the country is heading towards a “very serious political crisis” once the current illusion of unity dissipates, based on the social consensus on the need to confront Hamas after its massive attack on October 7th to put an end to it.
Questions. To what extent has Israel achieved its goals in Gaza after two and a half months of war?
Answer. In terms of eliminating Hamas's military capabilities, it has killed many of its men, its commanders and some commanders, but not its leaders, nor has it defeated them on the ground. It's still a fighting force. The second goal is to overthrow the Hamas government in Gaza. It succeeded in this in the north, where it had its headquarters, in the capital. It is difficult to imagine today that Hamas will regain control of the government. And then there is the release of the hostages. There are about 129 left.
So he hasn't achieved any of them completely, which shows how difficult it is to achieve them at the same time. Ensuring the release of the hostages contradicts the other goals. I'm not sure I can reach them all.
Historically, the Israeli army is very good at winning battles and tactical victories. But it is much less successful when it comes to achieving strategic victories. He wins the battles, but in some ways he loses the wars. An example is the war with Hezbollah in 2006. It dealt it a strong military blow, but did not achieve the defeat that it had promised as a victory. In a sense, Hezbollah won the war by essentially surviving. And there is a risk that this will happen again, because [el primer ministro, Benjamín] Netanyahu has defined the goal as total victory and anything less than this will be perceived as defeat by the Israeli public. Hamas could well emerge from the bunkers and tunnels at some point and declare victory. I don't rule out Israel winning, but it would take months and I'm skeptical that it will have it. The pressure is getting bigger and bigger.
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Q The Israeli government insists that the release of the hostages is linked to military power as it pressures Hamas to negotiate.
R. From the beginning, Hamas offered to release hostages in exchange for prisoners. The pressure may have led them to accept more favorable terms for Israel, but it is clear that the continuation of the war puts their lives in danger, whether through staying in the tunnels, through bombings or through death at the hands of Israeli soldiers, like z as we saw last week.
I also don't think Hamas is reducing its demands because of military pressure. He still loves all the security prisoners. It's a politically convenient argument for Netanyahu.
Q The government will have set the bar very high, but the population will not accept anything less than what was promised
R. I suspect that Netanyahu is seeking at least some kind of victory that he is trying to sell to the Israeli public, for example by killing [el líder de Hamás en Gaza] Yahia Sinwar and say that they have not achieved the other goals of the international community. I agree that the Israeli public will accept nothing less than total victory, but I am skeptical that they will achieve it. And I think that the Prime Minister is already laying the groundwork to try to survive politically an outcome that will not be a total victory.
Q So the goals are not realistic…
R. I do not believe that. The fall of the Hamas government is imminent, but it raises the question of what comes next. And without a realistic plan for the next day, Israel will most likely effectively occupy and rule Gaza again.
Regime change is realistic in that it eliminates the current government. But if there is nothing feasible to replace it, it could end in anarchy or a prolonged military occupation, which I think is the most likely outcome.
What I don't think is realistic is the rhetoric about the elimination, the defeat, the destruction of Hamas. His fighters could simply regroup as a secret force. Let's not forget that Hamas is not just in Gaza. There are also militants in the West Bank and Lebanon. And his leadership lies elsewhere. Even if Israel completely expels them from Gaza, which I don't believe will happen, they will continue to exist as an organization with their finances and external support. And currently it enjoys greater support among the Palestinians and throughout the Arab world.
Hamas is not like ISIS, that's the analogy Netanyahu draws, and that's part of the problem. It is rooted in Palestinian society, has existed for decades, and its program is popular among a significant number of Palestinians. If you eliminate it, a different organization will emerge.
In the first days of the war, as in 2006, the government set unrealistic and unattainable goals. And it created the conditions for winning all battles and ultimately losing the war.
Q And how do you close the loop between the goals being unattainable and the population expecting them to be achieved?
R. At some point there will be a very serious political crisis in Israel, because support for the war is dependent on achieving its goals. I understand why the Israelis want to catch up, but once again it is their leaders who are telling them that there are military solutions. And for all its military prowess, Israel needs diplomatic solutions that this government is woefully unprepared for.
First, there will be a massive demand for new elections. There is a real possibility of a new coalition between the center-left and center-right, without Likud or the far right. And at the front there is someone like Benny Gantz, who is on the right but is not an opponent of the Palestinian Authority. And based on his military experience, he could win the support of centrist Israelis by explaining that right-wing politics have long created the conditions that led to October 7, so there must be a change.
There will be a political crisis. It already existed before October due to the judicial reform, and now it will be even more profound, as citizens' faith in the government, even in the state itself, is truly in question.
Q Another internal problem is the tens of thousands of people displaced from the borders with Gaza and Lebanon. When will it be assumed that the conditions for a return to their homeland, especially this one, are met?
R. The United States will not support Israel's war against Hezbollah next year. Ultimately, there are no easy options for Israel. Just a selection of bad options, each with a price. It is extremely difficult to tell Israelis to return to their homes in the south or north, but the reality is that their security cannot be achieved without agreements. Living next to failed states creates insecurity for residents. Building walls high enough to keep problems out may work for a while, but in the end they will get to you. You can only achieve security if your neighbor has it.
Q He spoke about how the deaths of thousands of minors and women in Gaza are detrimental to Israel's security.
R. Israel's military strategy, dating back to the 1950s, has always been one of massive, overwhelming and disproportionate retaliation. “If you hit us, we’ll hit you three times as hard.” As a deterrent. It provides short-term peace of mind, but encourages another round of conflict in a few years. Think about the children of Gaza today, about their trauma. Some Hamas fighters are children of previous rounds of fighting in which they lost their homes and families. We see it in polls among Palestinians: support for armed resistance is increasing.
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